

May 1972

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According to an official estimate recently presented to Congress, the foreign intelligence-gathering activities of the CIA, the military services, and sundry mysterious agencies of the Federal Government cost the taxpayers about \$3 billion a year. A less official but probably more realistic estimate current on Capitol Hill places the cost of these operations at about twice that amount. Except for a few favored members of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees, no one in Congress knows precisely where in the Federal budget these appropriations are hidden, or how much they amount to, or what they produce.

Senator John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky Republican, is sponsoring legislation that would require the CIA to provide the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees with the same reports it now furnishes to the White House—"fully and currently," as his bill states. The Senator makes a persuasive case, maintaining that "the Congress, which must make decisions on foreign policy and national security, which is called upon to commit the material and human resources of the nation, has a right to access to all available information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our Government and its people."

Far less persuasive is Senator Cooper's contention that members of these committees can—and should—be counted on to keep such information secret from their constituents. In the last analysis, aren't *all* Americans responsible for "decisions on foreign policy and national security"? Aren't *all* Americans called upon to "commit the material and human resources of the nation"—*their* material and human resources? Therefore, shouldn't *all* Americans have access to "available information and intelligence"?

If the American people had known all the facts about Indochina eight or ten years ago, they might not have acted any more wisely than the national security managers who were privy to the data. But they could hardly have acted more foolishly.

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11 April 1972

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STATINTL

Congress Seeks Facts On CIA

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.

A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, April 11

CONGRESS CAN be gimlet-eyed when looking at welfare projects, but thus far has played the doting, indulgent parent if cloak-and-dagger work is afoot. It is bad form for a legislator to inquire as to how many billions the intelligence agencies are geeting, or ask for a peek at what they find out.

That is changing. Senator John Sherman Cooper (Rep.), Kentucky, appears to be making good progress with his proposal that the Central Intelligence Agency make available to Congress what it knows about matters relating to foreign countries and the national security.

Proponents of the Cooper bill say it will prevail because the existing situation does not make sense. Congress needs light to make its decisions. Why should Congress be ignorant of facts and analyses assembled by the United States at great cost?

Congress now operates in the dark. As Cooper noted when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened hearings March 28, the foreign intelligence information developed by the CIA and other agencies is available only to President Richard M. Nixon and the Executive Branch, as a matter of law.

"I contend that the Congress, which must make decisions upon foreign policy and national security—which is called upon to commit the material and human resources of the nation—should have access to all available information and intelligence to discharge properly and morally its responsibility to our government and its people," Cooper said.

SENATOR COOPER'S proposal would amend the National Security Act of 1947, under which the CIA was established. There is a precedent for what he wants to do, in that Congress required in 1946 that its joint Committee on Atomic Energy be kept fully informed of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, a federal agency.

It was remarked at the hearings by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, a member of the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees, that he had been unable to obtain nuclear information as a member of those committees. He became a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy last spring.

"I learned more about the true strength of the United States in six days in Europe about this time last year than I did in my previous 18 years as a member of the Armed Services Committee," Symington said.

Testimony ~~Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400210001-6~~ Senators an opportunity to complain

rect the CIA to make available "facts and analyses" to Senate and House committees dealing with foreign relations and the armed services. The CIA reports would include material produced by all agencies.

WHAT COOPER and his associates want, as a practical matter, is the same basic intelligence that is disseminated to the White House, the Pentagon and other branches of Government. They do not want to be fed tidbits carefully selected by persons who may have an axe to grind.

Vast sums have been voted by Congress to buy weapons systems that insiders maintained were essential to counter perils that turned out to be illusory. Critics of such spending want to be able to question the CIA, which has the reputation of putting out sound and honest reports.

Among witnesses who have testified favorably on the Cooper bill are Adam Yarmolinsky of Harvard Law School, a former assistant secretary of defense, and Herbert Scoville Jr., former director of science and technology for the CIA.

"**IT SEEMS TO ME**," Yarmolinsky said March 30, "it is rather inappropriate for the Congress of the United States to be in the position of the schoolboy who is lectured by his instructors rather than in the position of the graduate student who is able to go into the library and look up the sources."

Scoville noted that the CIA frequently briefed congressional committees but said this was not so satisfactory, in his opinion, as the situation would be if the CIA had a legal duty to keep Congress informed. He pointed out that measures must be taken to safeguard the information.

"I believe the regularized provision of national intelligence to the Congress by the CIA would improve security," he said, "not compromise it."

In the House, a companion bill to Cooper's has been introduced by Representative Paul Findley (Rep.), Illinois.

STATINTL

*Senate Group
Backs Walters
For CIA Post*

Associated Press

The Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday approved as day-to-day working head of the Central Intelligence Agency an Army general who came up from the ranks, Maj. Gen. Vernon Anthony Walters, 55.

President Nixon in reorganizing the American intelligence community made CIA head Richard Helms responsible for supervising and coordinating the effort spread through several services and agencies. This leaves routine to the CIA deputy director, the post Walters will take if the full Senate approves.

The nomination carries with it promotion for Walters to the rank of lieutenant general.

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5 APR 1972

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Congress and C.I.A.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings last week on a bill requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to provide the appropriate Congressional committees with the same intelligence analyses it regularly furnishes the White House. This legislation, introduced last year by Senator Cooper, ought to be expedited in the interests of strengthening the machinery of foreign policy.

As Congress reasserts its rightful role in the foreign policy process, it is essential that its members be as fully informed as possible. The respective Congressional committees are entitled to share the fruits of intelligence-gathering operations for which the American taxpayer is billed up to \$6 billion annually. These fruits include assessments which sometimes sharply challenge Executive policies, as the Pentagon Papers revealed.

There is ample precedent for Senator Cooper's proposal. A former C.I.A. official testified last week that the agency has been furnishing highly classified intelligence on world atomic developments to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee for fifteen years, with no security breaches. Even now, senior agency officials provide oral briefings to other committees on request but only with White House approval. Congress could better discharge its own constitutional responsibilities in the foreign policy field if it had full and direct access to this information.

Beyond the Cooper bill, it is high time Congress revived its languishing effort to establish closer scrutiny of intelligence operations. In a move designed to sidetrack legislation with this aim, the Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 was invited to send three members to the C.I.A. joint briefings held by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, which are currently responsible for overseeing intelligence activities. But no meetings of this group were called during all of last year—an "oversight" of frightening dimensions.

It is not enough for Congress to know what the C.I.A. is saying. It is also essential that at least key members of the legislative branch, which provides the funds for worldwide intelligence-gathering and other undercover operations, keep informed about what, in general, this secret arm of the United States Government is doing.

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
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POWER

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PENTAGON



the creation,
control and acceptance
of defense policy by the

U.S. CONGRESS

NEWPORT NEWS, VA.
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APR. 1 1972

CIA Data-Sharing

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) complains that the Senate can hardly carry out its foreign policy role adequately unless it receives up-to-date information on relations with other countries and he is not satisfied with the data which seeps down from the executive branch, so he is pushing an amendment to the 1947 National Security Act that would require the Central Intelligence Agency to keep the Senate and house Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees "fully and currently" posted.

The White House looks upon this proposal as an attempted encroachment on the responsibilities of the secretary of state and raises the question of whether it would violate the constitutional requirement as to separation of powers. Behind this argument is the fear that once Congress started getting hold of secret intelligence data there would be no end to it. While Senator Cooper said the legislation "would not affect in any way or inquire into the intelligence gathering activities of the CIA, its methods, sources, funds or personnel," that's a portal which an element in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wouldn't mind entering.

However, this and other relevant congressional committees do need access to the best current data on matters which they hear testimony on and debate and it is a disadvantage to have to rely on the executive branch.

A constructive way out of the impasse was offered this week by a former senior CIA employe in committee testimony. He said it would be advisable for the agency to give information and analysis on a continuing basis and proposed that a staff of "carefully" chosen officers be designated to provide liaison, adding that the mind boggles at the thought of truckloads of classified documents being delivered to the Senate and House.

There is no reason why such a system should have to pose any of the dangers that have been raised directly or implicitly in response to the Cooper bill. Of course Congress would want to satisfy itself that the officials chosen were just as aware of its needs as the desires of the executive side of government, within the realm of recognition that the CIA can serve security needs best only by remaining as essentially a secret operation.

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28 MARCH 1972

McCone backs bill to give Congress CIA reports

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — John A. McCone, a former Central Intelligence Agency director, has endorsed a bill that would require the CIA to turn over its secret intelligence reports to Congress.

His endorsement indicates that the CIA has abandoned its long-standing opposition to the circulation of its secrets outside the executive branch.

Aides to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported Monday that McCone had committed himself to testifying in favor of the bill during hearings starting Tuesday. The aides said the Nixon administration had registered its opposition to the bill, thereby preventing the current CIA director, Richard M. Helms, a presidential appointee, from taking a position on it.

Indirect support

But McCone's testimony is sure to be interpreted as indirect CIA support of the bill. Former directors of the agency, a loyal and tightly knit group, rarely, if ever, take a public position that the incumbent director opposes.

The bill was introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) last July, shortly after the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Sun-Times and other newspapers published the Pentagon papers. The papers revealed that the CIA consistently expressed a skeptical view of Vietnam from the Truman to the Nixon administrations. Cooper and other senators argued that Congress might have blocked the deep U.S. involvement if it had received the intelligence estimates.

Regular reports

Cooper's bill would require the CIA to make regular re-

ports to the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. It also would require the CIA to provide special information on request.

Tuesday's witnesses will be Chester Cooper, former intelligence analyst for the CIA and the White House, and Herbert Scoville, former head of the CIA's research division.

Sec. of State William P. Rogers, who has asserted the right to testify for the CIA, has been asked to appear after the Easter recess to present the administration's position. He may send a subordinate but presumably not Ray Cline, head of the department's bureau of intelligence and research.

An ITT director

Cline, a former deputy CIA director for intelligence, recently told the committee that he favored the distribution of CIA reports to Congress, provided the "sources and methods of intelligence gathering" were not jeopardized. Cooper insists that his bill provides adequate protection.

McCone is scheduled to testify next month. It may be the first in a series of appearances before the committee. As a director of the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., he is a potential witness in the committee's planned investigation of the involvement of major corporations in U.S. foreign policy.

According to memos released by columnist Jack Anderson, McCone was given reports on ITT negotiations with the CIA to devise a plan for blocking the installation of Salvador Allende, a Marxist, as President of Chile in 1970.

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26 MAR 1972

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Discord Surrounds Roles Of Hill Units on Defense

STATINTL

By Jack McWethy
Congressional Quarterly

Advocates of Pentagon policy or overseers of the military? There is sharp disagreement over which role the House and Senate Armed Services committees play.

These facts emerge from a Congressional Quarterly study:

- On both committees, about two-thirds of the members come from states or districts whose No. 1 source of federal money is the Pentagon.

- In the 11 years that the committees have been authorizing money for weapons, 65 per cent of the big money bills were passed on the floor without amendment to the dollar total.

- Not once in the same 11 years was an amendment to alter dollar totals of House committee bills adopted over objections by the committee chairman. It's happened only three times in the Senate.

- Both committees consistently cut the Pentagon's budget request, but one member of Congress who used to be a budget planner in the Pentagon said the requests are routinely padded in anticipation of the cuts.

Making America's defenses strong against the Soviet threat is like a horse race to F. Edward Hebert, the crusty Louisiana Democrat who heads the House Armed Services Committee.

"In war they don't pay off for second place. There's one bet and you've got to have the winner," Hebert says.

"I intend to build the strongest military we can get," he adds. "Money's no question."

Hebert's attitude exasperates a five-man minority on the 39-member committee, but they are helpless against the chairman's overwhelming support in committee and on the floor.

The House Armed Services Committee doesn't control the



REP. F. EDWARD HEBERT
...money's no object

Pentagon," says Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), one of the dissenting five. "The Pentagon controls the House Armed Services Committee."

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), a committee member who was an economic adviser to former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, says: "We used to think of the House Armed Services Committee as the one we could count on to carry water for us."

Hebert dismisses these charges as ridiculous. "Yes, I'm a friend of the military, he says, "but I'll take them to the woodshed and spank them any time."

Though the dissidents give Hebert high marks for fairness, his power is an irritant to those who feel the committee is not tough enough on the Pentagon's budget request.

"If the Armed Services Committee isn't looking out for the taxpayer, then who the hell is?" Aspin asks. "Nobody on the floor of the House is going to be able to push through an amendment to an Armed Services Committee bill, and God knows, we've tried."

Last year, for example, 21 amendments were offered to

the \$21.3 billion weapons authorization bill and only two were accepted by the House. Hebert offered one of the adopted amendments and supported the other.

"That's right," smiles Hebert. "The power is awesome."

In the Senate, John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) and his predecessors as committee chairman once enjoyed the same kind of unwavering majority support. But the scene has changed in the last four years.

Former Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, next to Stennis the ranking Democrat on the Senate committee, says: "More than ever before in the years that I've been around here, people — liberals and conservatives—are apprehensive about the future viability of the economy and the soundness of the currency." This kind of apprehension, the Missourian says, is having a direct effect on the way the committee and the Senate in general look at the defense budget.

22 MAR 1972

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Soviet Missile Peril Now Found Unlikely By U.S. Till 1980's

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 21—The Defense Department, which in the past has justified requests for a missile defense system by Russia's projected ability to destroy a large part of America's Minuteman missile force by the mid-nineteen-seventies, now estimates that this threat may not materialize until the nineteen-eighties.

The new analysis was revealed in testimony today by Dr. John S. Foster Jr. before the Senate Armed Services Committee. It stems from the conclusion of the American intelligence community that Soviet tests of a three-part warhead for its giants SS-9 Intercontinental ballistic missile have failed to demonstrate enough accuracy to seek out and destroy three separate Minutemen in their steel and concrete silos.

Dr. Foster, who is the Pentagon's director of defense research and engineering, said that Russia "may have canceled or curtailed the SS-9 tripler program."

Since there have been no tests of the multiple warhead since late in 1970, he said, some analysts have concluded that the Russians may intend to seek such a missile-kill capability in improved new missiles for which nearly 100 silos have been under construction since then.

Despite what appeared to be evidence of a less immediate threat, Dr. Foster said that the Nixon Administration still wanted to continue with the Safeguard missile defense system.

The Administration requested in the new defense budget about \$1.5-billion to continue construction of defenses around two Minuteman complexes, to start construction at two more and to do preliminary work on a missile defense around Washington.

Dr. Foster's rationale for expanding the Safeguard program was based on two primary elements—a desire to continue pressure on the Soviet Union to conclude a strategic arms limitation agreement as a hedge against achievement by

the Russians of the ability to warhead can be controlled to destroy a substantial part of limited extent, most of them the Minuteman force in the mid-to-late-nineteen-seventies, when the missile defense would be operational.

While noting the Administration's hope that an initial agreement limiting defensive and some offensive missiles can be achieved soon, Dr. Foster said: "We cannot be certain of this, nor can we be sure of the exact provisions of such an agreement. Meanwhile, the Safeguard program now proposed enhances the probability of success" in arms control talks. The arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union are to resume Tuesday in Helsinki, Finland.

Other officials privately estimate that an initial agreement will probably be announced at the time of President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union in May. Since the final shape of an agreement has not been worked out, they say, the Administration wants Congressional approval for an expanded defensive system to apply pressure on Soviet negotiators to accede to some American demands. They declined to go into specifics.

In his testimony today, Dr. Foster said: "Analysis of the latest projections concerning Soviet missile growth rates and accuracy improvements indicate considerable variation in the time period in which our Minuteman forces would be seriously threatened."

One analysis, he said, assuming a slow Soviet multiple-warhead development effort, suggested that the Minutemen would not be seriously jeopardized "until the early nineteen-eighties or beyond."

A second set of assumptions moves the point of jeopardy to about 1980, or slightly before, he said.

A third approach, assuming a high priority effort, would threaten survival of the Minutemen in a first strike "as early as the mid-seventies," he declared, adding: "Prudence requires that we take the more pessimistic projections seriously."

In the past, when the Russians were rapidly building up their force of SS-9's and testing three-part warheads of about five megatons each, Administration officials warned that, if the Russians perfected accurate multiple warheads, a force of 420 SS-9's could destroy about 90 per cent of America's 1,000 Minuteman missiles.

But the Soviet Union halted the SS-9 building program at about 300. And although some defense analysts insist that

each part of the SS-9

Minutemen effectively. Within the Administration, the current argument is whether the Russians intend to try to develop a better multiple warhead for its existing missiles, or wait to deploy an improved system in the nearly 100 large silos constructed at several sites in the Soviet Union.

Tests of the missile for the new silos is expected soon, defense analysts say.

Well-placed Administration sources suggest that the United States and the Soviet Union may agree to limit antiballistic missiles to 200 in each country. They would also hope to halt temporarily new construction of land-based missiles and conceivably sea-based missiles, pending negotiation of a comprehensive agreement at Helsinki.

The missile defense agreement would lapse after a specified time, they add, unless a more comprehensive agreement was achieved. Continued development of missile defenses, which the Russians do not want to see expanded in the United States, might keep pressure on the Soviet Union to conclude the more comprehensive agreement, these officials argue.

STATINTL

Prying at U.S. secrecy lid

By Lucia Mouat
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington

Sen. Stuart Symington (D) of Missouri saw no particular reason why the 46-page statement of the Defense Department witness should be classified as "secret." Never a man to mince words, he bluntly suggested as much to the witness.

Only a few hours after the Senate Armed Services Committee executive session, the Senator had his answer in the form of declassification of the entire statement with the exception of two sentences — and even on those, he was told, the need for secrecy was questionable.

The debate in Washington over the executive branch's need for secrecy continues as vigorously as it did in the days when the Pentagon papers were published and behind-the-scenes minutes of the administration's India-Pakistan policy were disclosed.

Only this month, for instance, the President moved to cut the scope of government classification by halving (to 12) the number of federal agencies allowed to stamp "Top Secret" on government papers and by speeding up the automatic declassification procedure.

Much of the prodding for such change, limited as the results appear to some, has come from Congress. Conceding the need for secrecy in certain delicate diplomatic and defense matters, the legislative branch nonetheless continues to try to narrow the radius.

One of the foremost champions of the public's right to know and of a more assertive role for Congress in foreign policy is the tall and courtly Senator Symington. This onetime businessman, secretary of the Air Force, and presidential candidate (1960) who now is serving on three of the Senate's key defense and foreign-policy committees, sees the issues from a unique vantage point.

Despite the military element in his background and his consequent service on the National Security Council, the Senator says he thinks far too much

information is being withheld from Congress by the executive branch.

Stiffer policy urged

"I don't get enough information on which to make my decisions, and I resent that," he commented in the course of a recent luncheon interview. "If we could just get this passion for secrecy out of the way . . . having run quite a few businesses, I have a difficult time voting other people's money in the blind. There's just no true accountability."

Following up his words with action, the Senator from Missouri is trying to obtain declassification of a report recently completed for the Senate sub-committee on U.S. security agreements and commitments abroad which he chairs. He admits that "the going is a little heavy."

Based on firsthand visits to Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia in January by two subcommittee staff members, the report concludes that while the war in Vietnam is indeed winding down, war in Laos and Cambodia is increasing in intensity. As the Senator describes it in a letter accompanying the report to Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D) of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "We are offered nothing . . . but the prospect of more of the same, at higher cost." Senator Symington further argues that intelligence activities, such as those in Laos and Cambodia, have strong foreign-policy ramifications and are subject to no "true" congressional over-

To remedy this lack of an outside check, the Senator proposes creation of a select Senate committee on the coordination of U.S. Government activities abroad; to oversee the operations of such influential groups as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The proposal, in the form of a resolution, is in committee.

In the meantime, Senator Symington, who has traveled widely in the course of his work on the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, considers control of the purse by Congress an effective weapon for pulling more information from the executive branch.

"If we keep voting the money, we're voluntarily abdicating our constitutional prerogative," he says. "We should refuse the money until we get the facts."

Information and power are closely linked in his view. He is fond of quoting a comment made 15 years ago by the late Dean Acheson, former secretary of state, that the shift of power from Congress to the White House was the greatest change in government in this century.

"If that was true before Kennedy and Johnson, how much more true is it today?" he asks with an amused twinkle in his eye to a question concerning the power of the executive branch.

A supporter of the so-called war-powers bill, now before Congress, which seeks to balance that shift somewhat, Senator

Symington argues that national security no longer, if it ever was, a physical, military matter but also a question of having viable economy and of — "remember, I'm Democrat" — credibility and public faith policies of the national government.

He has withdrawn his support of the war in Vietnam for many reasons, not the least of which are economic. Also, he sees a U.S. weakness for pushing people aside and saying, "Let us show you how to fight." In terms of national security, he sees Western Europe and the Middle East as much more important to the United States.

Time will tell whether the Senator and his colleagues succeed in getting the information from the White House that they seek. It is noteworthy that Senator Symington secured declassification status last December for a voluminous, two-year subcommittee report on U.S. commitments abroad. Among its points — bound not to please the executive branch — was the assertion that multimillion-dollar U.S. support of the 30,000-man army in Laos could in no way be considered an intelligence operation.

As for the Senator's role in all this, Rep. James Symington (D) of Missouri, the Senator's son, notes in his book "The Stately Game" that in any argument or challenge his father "displays a solidarity of determination that is awe-inspiring."

A formidable challenge to any administration

19 MAR 1972

Influence Fades, Hostility Grows

Think Tanks Fight for Life

By Stanley Karnow

Washington Post Staff Writer

A decade or more ago, few organizations in America were as influential as the Federal Contract Research Centers, popularly known as "think tanks." Sponsored by the Pentagon, these idea generators played a decisive role in shaping high policy and, although remote from the electorate, they were sometimes as powerful as any other branch of government.

Now, however, the autonomous non-profit brain trusts have not only lost much of their authority, they are struggling for sheer survival as they face an assortment of difficulties that threaten to put them out of commission.

The think tanks in their heyday laid the groundwork for the U.S. space program, and they conceived the strategies that steered the nation through the dangerous years of its nuclear rivalry with the Soviet Union. Their employees, frequently armed with only chalk and blackboard, developed revolutionary analytical techniques and new weapons systems, and their researchers produced thousands of studies, some with titles like

"Communist Vulnerability to the Use of Music" and "Performance of Miniature Pigs After Partial Body Irradiation."

A dozen independent research organizations still operate on a total annual budget of more than \$264 million, most of which goes for weapons development research. But the activities of these outfits are being increasingly exposed to criticism.

Their principal patrons in the Defense Department, which once relied on them heavily for new concepts, have long had doubts about their free-wheeling operational style. These doubts have been compounded by interneccine Pentagon feuds that date back to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

The military establishment's disenchantment with the think tanks was further exacerbated last year when Daniel Ellsberg, formerly with the most prestigious of the research groups, the Rand Corp., admitted to having filched the super-sensitive Pentagon Papers from its headquarters in Santa Monica, Calif.

Security Clamp

That incident spurred the Pentagon to impose a security clampdown on Rand and to tighten its controls in other research organizations. It also provoked attacks against think tank intellectuals as being too liberal, thereby balancing the image of them as cold warriors.

Legislative dissatisfaction with the think tanks, which had been growing for years, also reached a peak last fall, when Congress slashed the budgets of four key research outfits by \$8.2 million—about 13 per cent.

The cuts hit what are called the "paper factories"—organizations that essentially turn out ideas. They are Rand, which works largely for the Air Force; Research Analysis Corp., an Army affiliate; the Center for Naval Analyses, which is backed by the Navy; and the Institute for Defense Analysis which serves the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The budgets of eight other Federal Contract Research Centers were left intact. But these outfits, in contrast to the "paper factories," concentrate primarily on the development of sophisticated military hardware. The largest recipients among them are the Aerospace Corp. and the Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University of Baltimore.

Ominous Outlook

As ominous as the budget cuts was the view of the future of the research units expressed by Congress. In a report on Rand, the Appropriations Committee chairman George H. Mahon

(D-Tex.) asserted that "the time has come for the military services to begin phasing out the think tank operations." Mahon added that the functions of the think tanks should be taken over directly by the government.

Congressional hostility toward the think tank stems from various motives. Some legislators, like Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) see them as evil tools of the Pentagon. Others perceive them to be composed of dangerous "eggheads," while still others contend that their employees enjoy privileges not accorded to civil servants.

The belief that the research groups enjoy special deals lingers from past probes into their activities. A 1965 investigation of Aerospace, for example, revealed among other things that it was dabbling in Florida real estate with public funds and that it had spent \$3,133.03 to ship an executive's yacht from Massachusetts to California.

Legislative View

Legislators who have no strong opinions against the think tanks explain, meanwhile, that the idea factories elude them. Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre (D-N.H.), whose Senate Armed Services subcommittee on research and development is supposed to keep watch on the think tanks, says that it is "almost impossible for a small-town lawyer" like himself to ask the "hard questions" about the research units.

McIntyre told an interviewer not long ago that his biggest concern about the think tanks is a "lack of knowledge about what they're up to." Even with expert help, he added, the Senate could not adequately study the budget requests of the research organizations.

The men who direct the research outfits hope to regain their former financing—and maintain their freedom when they confront the congressional committees again this May. Yet their optimism may be un-

warranted, for the think tanks also have been tarnished in the public mind as cabals of Dr. Strangecloves concocting sinister schemes to blow up the world.

This image, however fanciful, has been strong enough within the U.S. student population to prompt many universities to break their relationships with certain of the research organizations.

Links Severed

The Institute for Defense Analyses, for example, formerly numbered 12 universities as members of its corporation. But after students at Princeton, Columbia and elsewhere demonstrated against this link, all the universities have severed their formal ties with the Institute—although academic figures still participate in the organization as individuals rather than as representatives of their schools.

Some of the think tanks also lost prestige because of their dubious involvement in Southeast Asia. Rand, for instance, undertook an elaborate study that fundamentally served to justify the use of tactical U.S. air power in South Vietnam. The study endorsed the bombings on the grounds that peasants blamed the Vietcong for turning their villages into targets for air strikes.

Later Rand studies on Vietnam were far less accommodating to the White House and the Defense Department. In August 1970, for example, Rand specialist Brian M. Jenkins published a report entitled, "Why the North Vietnamese Keep Fighting," that effectively punctured official U.S. contentions that the enemy was on the brink of collapse.

Frank Analysis

A year before, when he was serving in Vietnam, Ellsberg wrote a brutally frank descriptive analysis of the failure of the South Vietnamese pacification program in Long An province. A Washington reaction to his study, he candidly disclosed

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Congress Cuts Secret Panel Meetings by 5%

1971 Record Shows 36% of Sessions Are Closed-Door in Year Reform Act Is Passed

Exclusive to The Times from the Congressional Quarterly

WASHINGTON — Congressional committees met in secret slightly over one-third of the time last year.

Congressional Quarterly's annual tabulation of committee sessions showed 36% were held behind closed doors in 1971, the year a new law—aimed at opening meetings to the public—went into effect.

This marked a decrease from the 41% closed committee sessions recorded in 1970, but matched the secrecy score for 1969.

Since 1953, when Congressional Quarterly began its annual tally of open and closed committee meetings, 23,720—or 37%—of the 64,231 meetings reported have been held in executive (closed) session.

The highest secrecy score was 43% in 1968. The record low was 30% in 1959.

The House, as usual, topped the Senate in the number of executive sessions. The public was barred from 41%—1,131 of 2,785—of its committee sessions. This was a decrease from the 48% of 1970 but comparable to the 42% recorded in 1969.

Senate at 30%

Senate committees had a secrecy score of 30%—down from the 33% of 1970 but up from the 28% in 1969. It closed 580 of 1,905 meetings.

Few executive sessions were held by joint congressional committees. Of 126 joint committee meetings reported, only 20, or 16%, were closed.

Most noteworthy in 1971 was the opening of selected House Appropriations Committee hearings.

Although only 8% of its sessions—36 out of 455—was contrast to the 0% record-ed in the past.

The 1970 reform act stipulated that House Appropriations budget hearings are to be held in open session, except when testimony may affect national security.

Ways and Means was the only other House committee to meet more than 100 times and close its doors more often than not. It closed 69 of 111 sessions for a secrecy score of 62%.

On the Senate side, only one committee which met more than 100 times held the majority of meetings in executive session. The Armed Services Committee closed 118 of 150 meetings.

50% Record

The Senate Public Works Committee barred outsiders from 50% of its sessions.

The House Education and Labor Committee remained at the top of the list of committees which met more than 100 times and mainly in open session. The committee closed only six of 199 meetings for a secrecy score of 3%.

Other House committees which met more than 100 times with comparatively few closed sessions were Interior and Insular Affairs, 20% closed sessions; Government Operations, 22%; Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 24%; Foreign Affairs, 28%; Public Works and Merchant Marine and Fisheries, both with 31%.

Judiciary was the leader among Senate committees which met more than 100 times and had a low percentage of executive sessions. It closed only 15% of 167 meetings. Both the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and the Labor and Public Welfare Committee closed 20% of their meetings; Com-

merce, 21%; Appropriations, 30%.

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970—the first reform act in 24 years—was designed, in part, to open up committee proceedings to public scrutiny.

It included provisions for the public announcement of committee roll call votes and coverage of hearings by radio and television.

The act stipulated that Senate committee business meetings are to be open, except for mark-up (when a committee revises and decides on the final language of a bill) and voting sessions or when the committee closes them by majority vote.

Of those Senate committee meetings specifically designated in the Congressional Record as business sessions—organizing, marking-up, voting, briefing sessions—97% were closed to the public in 1971.

According to the reorganization act, House committee business meetings are to be open, except when the committee closes them by majority vote.

Excluding the House Appropriations Committee, 79% of the sessions listed as business were held behind closed doors. (House Appropriations subcommittee mark-up sessions are not reported to the Record.)

Public mark-up sessions are rare. Most committees prefer to write legislation in private for a variety of reasons. Some members believe that open meetings tend to encourage greater posturing and longer speeches for public con-

sumption. Others think committee action is hindered by the necessity of observing formal procedures.

Inhibition Charged

Another objection is that open meetings inhibit the free exchange of ideas. One committee, which has held open mark-up sessions in the past, found that such meetings usually attracted more lobbyists than public.

The House Education and Labor Committee led in open business meetings. It closed its doors only six times out of 60.

Congressional Quarterly's statistics on open and closed committee meetings are derived from the daily digest section of the Congressional Record. Although required by the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, not all committee meetings are actually listed in the Record.

Committees use different criteria for defining a meeting. Some do not report their meetings regularly to the Record.

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Exceptions to Rule

The Executive order further states: "In no case shall information be classified in order to conceal inefficiency or administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to a person or a department, to restrain competition or independent initiative, or to prevent for any other reason the release of information which does not require protection in the interest of national security."

The President ordered that the "top secret" label be used "with utmost restraint" and that the "secret" label be employed "sparingly."

As to declassification, the President ordered that "top secret" documents be made available after 10 years, "secret" papers after eight years and "confidential" items after six years.

But there will be exceptions, including the following:

Information furnished in confidence by a foreign government or international organization on the understanding that it be kept in confidence.

Information covered by law, such as atomic energy information, or documents pertaining to codes and intelligence operations.

Information on a matter "the continuing protection of which is essential to the national security." That broad statement would appear to give advocates of secrecy considerable leeway.

Information that, if disclosed, "would place a person in immediate jeopardy." That pertains to intelligence agents.

May Ask for Document

But anyone may, after a document is 10 years old, ask for a review of the reasons why it is still kept secret. He must specify the document he wishes to see, which means that he must know that it exists. Moreover, the agency holding the paper must be able to find it "with a reasonable amount of effort."

That part of the order also applies to documents written before the order becomes effective. The President said that the National Archives had "160 million pages of classified documents from World War II and over 300 million pages of classified documents for the years 1946 through 1954."

Only a small number of those postwar documents have been made available. The vast majority are not now subject to any sort of automatic declassification as provided under the new order. They are subject to declassification only after 12 years, as opposed to the top limit of 10 years under the new

PRESIDENT ORDERS LIMIT ON LABELING OF DATA AS SECRET

Calls for Faster Release of Material Not Injurious to the Nation's Security

By RICHARD HALLORAN.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 8—President Nixon signed today an Executive order to limit the secrecy surrounding Federal documents, a major source of information about the Government.

The President said in a statement that his action was "designed to lift the veil of secrecy which now enshrouds altogether too many papers written by employees of the Federal establishment—and to do so without jeopardizing any of our legitimate defense or foreign policy interests."

The Executive order, which will become effective June 1, calls for reducing the number of documents classified "top secret," "secret" or "confidential" when they are written and for limiting the authority of officials to stamp such classifications on those papers.

Rely on Discretion

At the other end of the process, the order calls for speeding up the process of declassifying these documents, making them available to the public, with certain exceptions that the Administration pledged would be narrowly applied.

The President and Administration spokesmen who explained the new order readily conceded, however, that the success of the program would depend largely on the discretion of officials. Mr. Nixon said, "Rules can never be airtight and we must rely upon the good judgment of individuals throughout the Government."

The action is a result of a 14-month study ordered by the President and spurred by the publication last summer of the secret Pentagon study of the Vietnam war. Had the new order

been in effect, then, large portions of the documents in the Pentagon papers would already have been declassified.

10-Year Limit Set

Under the new order, "top secret" papers can become public after 10 years. Thus, documents in the Pentagon papers that were written before 1961 would have been automatically declassified or would have been subject to a challenge in which the Government would have had to prove that injury to the national security would have resulted from their publication.

Similarly, many "secret" papers dated before 1963 and "confidential" documents dated earlier than 1965 would have been available. The Pentagon papers included documents from 1945 to 1968.

The new order means that large numbers of papers from the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations should become available, plus those of the early Kennedy years. Documents concerning the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, for instance, will be eligible for public inspection unless the Government can prove that such disclosure will harm the national interest.

Later this year, under the order, documents pertaining to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 will become eligible for inspection unless the Government can prove that the national interest will be harmed.

The order drew some immediate fire on Capitol Hill. Representative William S. Moorhead, Democrat of Pennsylvania, who is chairman of a House subcommittee on Government information, said,

"Congress may want to write its own statutory law on this important and sensitive matter."

Along the same line, a House Armed Services subcommittee began hearings this morning on a bill proposed by Representatives F. Edward Hebert, Democrat of Louisiana, and Leslie C. Arends, Republican of Illinois, the committee chairman and senior minority member respectively.

While the Nixon Administration plans to keep control of the classification of documents in the hands of the Executive branch, the Hebert-Arends bill would establish a joint executive-Congressional-Judicial commission to undertake continuing reviews of secrecy in

The general counsel to the Department of Defense, J. Fred Buzhardt, testified this morning before the House Armed Services subcommittee, which is headed by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, in opposition to the Hebert-Arends bill.

Mr. Buzhardt said that, in an effort to stop unauthorized disclosures of secret information, Pentagon researchers had begun looking for a type of paper that could not be Xeroxed or otherwise duplicated. The Pentagon papers given to The New York Times and other newspapers were reportedly Xeroxed copies of the original documents—in some cases, Xeroxes of Xeroxes.

In issuing his order today, Mr. Nixon said, "We have reversed the burden of proof: For the first time, we are placing that burden—and even the threat of administrative sanction—upon those who wish to preserve the secrecy of documents rather than upon those who wish to declassify them after a reasonable time."

Under the new order, papers can be classified only if their disclosure "could reasonably be expected" to cause damage to the national interest. Previously a paper could be stamped "secret" even if the threat of damage to the national security was remote.

The new order further reduces the number of Federal agencies, outside the White House, that can classify documents. At present, 38 agencies can classify papers "top secret" or place them under the lesser classifications.

Must Identify Officials

After June 1, however, only 12 agencies, such as the State Department, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, can use the "top secret" stamp and 13 more will be able to use the "secret" stamp.

In the agencies that will be able to use the "top secret" label, only 1,860 officials will be authorized to assign such a classification, against 5,100 at present.

Moreover, the President said, each agency will be required to identify those officials doing the classifying. "Each official is to be held personally responsible for the propriety of the classification attributed to him," the President said.


"Repeated abuse of the process through excessive classification," the President continued, "shall be grounds for administrative action." That would be an administrative reprimand, which can be damaging to a career.

The President also ordered that, wherever possible, classified information be separated

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


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Text by Morton Kondracke

Photography by Dennis Brack & Fred Ward

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The New York Times/Nancy Moran

LAOTIANS ON THE MOVE: Soldiers board plane at Ban Xon, Laos, for flight to Long Tieng, a base operated by the Central Intelligence Agency that was recently under siege. The Airline, Air America, is also supported by C.I.A.

First Congressional Restraints Are Imposed on C.I.A.

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 12.—The foreign aid authorization bill, signed by President Nixon on Monday, includes for the first time in a quarter-century new controls on the operations, cost and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The controls, which thus far have attracted little public attention, are the first to be added since Congress created the agency through the National Security Act of 1947, a measure that was amended in 1949.

This act exempts the CIA from most fiscal and personnel controls imposed on other federal agencies. Funds, personnel and material voted by Congress to other agencies, such as the Defense Department, can, for example, be switched legally to the C.I.A.

The controls were inserted at various points in the aid bill largely through the efforts of

forts of Senators Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey; Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri. They are members of the Foreign Relations Committee, which in a quarter-century new controls on the operations, cost and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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The controls were inserted at various points in the aid bill largely through the efforts of

convention of Congressional intent in the funding of activities such as the Thai troops in Laos through C.I.A. rather than through more open Government agencies."

"It would also," he said, "eliminate the possibility that the Cooper-Church prohibitions against the use of American troops or advisers in Cambodia could be skirted by using C.I.A. personnel."

Stennis Their Irritant

The ire of the committee members is reported to be less against the C.I.A. itself than against Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee and of the so-called "Oversight" Committee for the agency. The Oversight Committee comprises senior members of the Armed Services

and Appropriations committees plus four members of the Foreign Relations Committee. It is supposed to watch over all the agency's activities.

Under Senator Stennis's direction, however, it did not meet at all in 1971—to the annoyance of Senators from the Foreign Relations Committee, who contend that C.I.A. activities around the world intimately and sometimes decisively affect the conduct of United States foreign policy.

They have now moved to bypass Senator Stennis and to gain some control over the agency's funds, personnel and activities by writing controls into the aid bill. Some Congressional sources say, however, that there are still loopholes.

Specifically, according to legislative specialists, the new controls will require the following actions:

Approved For Release 8200N/0304 : CIA-RDP80-0160

The World at Weekend

STATINTL

By CONRAD KOMOROWSKI

Anderson Papers

The bloodhounds are baying on the tracks of Jack Anderson, who conducts a weekly news column, The Washington Merry-Go-Round, published in 700 newspapers at home and abroad.

Investigators for the FBI, State Department, Department of Justice and probably other agencies are hot on his trail. Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), anti-union, racist chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, announced Thursday a subcommittee will get into the act immediately when Congress opens on Jan. 18.

Anderson has published in his column excerpts from the minutes of the Washington Special Action Group (a subcommittee of the National Security Council, abbreviated as WSAG) and other documents and memoranda meant only for the inner circles of the Administration. They expose the double-dealing and lying of the Nixon Administration, particularly in relation to the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Anderson has also made some of this material available to the press generally.

Among the information Anderson disclosed is the revelation that Nixon's adviser on national security affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, on the one hand publicly told the press that the Administration was friendly to India and on the other hand told the Washington Special Action Group behind the screen of official secrecy that Nixon "wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan" and that Nixon believed "we are not being tough enough on India."

It is quite possible, after the exposure of the governmental lying during five Administrations, Democratic and Republican, in the Pentagon papers, that some governmental figures may have begun to think twice about the questionable "wisdom" — from a pro-capitalist point of view — of Nixon's policies in the Bangla Desh situation and in Asia generally.

The differences in the ruling class and its collaborators on this score are useful to the people.

Besides the facts revealed by Anderson, there is an important issue involved in his disclosures. That is the right of the people to know. Anderson has not made this a major feature of his exposé, but it is there anyway. It is also involved in the defense of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, who are being prosecuted and persecuted for their part in tearing away the veil of secrecy in which the searing facts of the conspiracy which plunged the United States into barbaric aggression in Indochina had been buried.

No 'Secrets' for Fulbright

By JAMES WIEGHART

Washington, Jan. 6 (NEWS Bureau) — The State Department only last week rejected a request by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) for the same "secret" information on the India-Pakistan conflict that has been widely publicized in the Anderson papers.

Although Fulbright was out of the country and could not be reached for comment, committee sources told THE NEWS today that he would demand a full-scale probe of the Nixon administration's handling of the India - Pakistan conflict.

A series of secret documents and diplomatic cables released by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson over the past few days revealed a conflict between the administration's public and private



J. William Fulbright

statements on its position in the 15-day war.

This is what Fulbright suspected when he requested — last March and on Dec. 11 — that the State Department turn over to his committee diplomatic cables from Dacca and New Delhi which reportedly questioned United States policy statements on the India-Pakistan dispute being issued in Washington.

A committee source told THE NEWS that the department refused Fulbright's written requests for the secret cables—the last time only last Thursday—in order to "protect" the individuals filing the dissenting cables.

Accuracy Challenged

The cables sought by Fulbright came from Archer Blood, former U.S. Consul General in Dacca, and American Ambassador to India Kenneth Keating. Both reportedly criticized U.S. policy in the India-Pakistan dispute, and Keating challenged the accuracy of accounts of U.S. policy being issued in Washington.

According to Anderson, Keating warned the administration that Pakistan could not stay united and that India was the potential and actual great power of the area. Blood cabled reports of the slaughter of civilians by the Pakistani army in Bangladesh, but the administration evidently believed his reports were exaggerated.

Last Thursday, the department turned down a Fulbright request for a copy of a secret Dec. 8 cablegram from Keating to Secretary of State William E. Rogers. In the cable, Keating, a former

U.S. senator from New York, said statements of administration policy simply did not coincide with events in India as he knew them over the last eight months.

In the cable, which was released by Anderson and widely published in newspapers today, Keating complained that the administration's justification of its pro-Pakistan policy was inconsistent with the facts and detracted from the administration's credibility.

Meanwhile, the House Armed Services Committee is undertaking an investigation of its own aimed at curbing overuse of the secrecy classification and closing what the chairman calls an "open season" on printing government secrets.

The CIA's New Cover

The Rope Dancer
by Victor Marchetti.
Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., \$6.95

Richard J. Barnet

I

In late November the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a series of "senior seminars" so that some of its important bureaucrats could consider its public image. I was invited to attend one session and to give my views on the proper role of the Agency. I suggested that its legitimate activities were limited to studying newspapers and published statistics, listening to the radio, thinking about the world, interpreting data of reconnaissance satellites, and occasionally

publishing the names of foreign spies. I had been led by conversations with a number of CIA officials to believe that they were thinking along the same lines. One CIA man after another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me that the days of the flamboyant covert operations were over. The upper-class amateurs of the OSS who stayed to mastermind operations in Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and elsewhere—Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald—had died or departed.

In their place, I was assured, was a small army of professionals devoted to preparing intelligence "estimates" for the President and collecting information the clean, modern way, mostly with sensors, computers, and sophisticated reconnaissance devices. Even Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now be as much a museum piece as Mata Hari. (There are about 18,000 employees in the CIA and 200,000 in the entire "intelligence community" itself. The cost of maintaining them is somewhere between \$5 billion and \$6 billion annually. The employment figures do not include foreign agents or mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-man hired army in Laos.)

A week after my visit to the "senior seminar" *Newsweek* ran a long story on "the new espionage" with a picture of CIA Director Richard Helms on the cover. The reporters clearly had spoken to some of the same people I had. As *Newsweek* said, "The gaudy era of the

adventurer has passed in the American the spy business; the bureaucratic age of ingt Richard C. Helms and his gray spe- kno cialists has settled in." I began to have fina an uneasy feeling that *Newsweek's* ingt article was a cover story in more than vote An ccili

It has always been difficult to fail analyze organizations that engage in A false advertising about themselves. Part of i of the responsibility of the CIA is to larly

spread confusion about its own work. The world of Richard Helms and his beca "specialists" does indeed differ from ized that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence orga- Hel organizations, in spite of their predilection over for what English judges used to call ligel "frolics of their own," are servants of Age policy. When policy changes, they Bur must eventually change too, although the because of the atmosphere of secrecy cen and deception in which they operate, over such changes are exceptionally hard to vice control. To understand the "new Age espionage" one must see it as part of imp the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence, Th is a global strategy for maintaining US power and influence without overtly reo involving the nation in another ground He new war.

But we cannot comprehend recent developments in the "intelligence com- ne munity" without understanding what fur Mr. Helms and his employees actually Pre do. In a speech before the National mc Press Club, the director discouraged w journalists from making the attempt. de "You've just got to trust us. We are no honorable men." The same speech is P made each year to the small but growing number of senators who want h a closer check on the CIA. In asking, tl on November 10, for a "Select Com- co mittee on the Coordination of United n States Activities Abroad to oversee p activities of the Central Intelligence t Agency," Senator Stuart Symington p noted that "the subcommittee having A oversight of the Central Intelligence i Agency has not met once this year."

Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and veteran member of the Armed Services Committee, has also said that "there is no federal agency in our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA." Moreover, soon after Symington spoke, Senator Allen J.

STATINTL



International News



Patriotic victory in Laos

VIENTIANE—Royal Lao Defense Minister Gen. Thongphan Knoeksy said in Vientiane on Monday that forces of the Laotian Patriotic Front (LPF) had captured two more bases south of the Plain of Jars and now directly threaten the big Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Cheng. Knoeksy said the situation in Laos was growing "confused," and that 30,000 Meo tribesmen had already been evacuated from Long Cheng. He said that on Saturday the pro-U.S. regime had to retreat from Ban Na and Khan Kho airstrips, 14 miles northwest of Long Cheng. On Monday, LPF attacks were reported eight miles northwest of Long Cheng, headquarters for the CIA-run "Secret Army" of Meo mercenaries.

The LPF's Kaosan Pathet Lao news agency reported on Monday that the LPF had scored a tremendous victory in the Dec. 18-21 fighting, capturing the entire Plain of Jars—Muong Sui region—killing, wounding or capturing 3,300 Meo "secret Army" mercenaries, shooting down 17 planes, and capturing large stores of equipment, including tanks and heavy artillery.

On Sunday in Saigon, Rep. G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery (D-Miss.), a ranking member of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, said the "Communists" could take over Laos anytime they wanted and also accused the CIA of making a mess of things in the small, Southeast Asian country. "What I know about Laos is that the CIA has done a pretty lousy job and has been ineffective," the Mississippi Democrat said. He said he favored reducing U.S. spending in Laos and replacing the CIA with regular U.S. military advisers. Montgomery was evidently unaware military advisers of any kind are prohibited by the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos which the U.S. signed.

MONESSEN, PA.
VALLEY INDEPENDENT
DEC 28 1971
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Review of intelligence

YEARS AGO, then Sen. Eugene McCarthy used to come down hard once in awhile on what he viewed as excessive secrecy about the Central Intelligence Agency's budget and operations. Though there was considerable sentiment favoring closer surveillance of the CIA, and a greater degree of accountability to Congress, nothing much came of McCarthy's efforts.

Despite his attempt to shed some light on how much money the CIA spends, and to force disclosure of such information as could be revealed without hurting the national security, the agency remained essentially hidden from the public. The size of its budget continued to be concealed in appropriations for other governmental functions. Watchdog committees set up by both House and Senate presumably were privy to quite a bit of information, but most of Congress as well as the general public was kept in the dark.

That period is recalled by the current effort of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Democrat of Michigan, to extract more public information about the CIA and other intelligence groups. The situation is basically unchanged today: no one who is telling seems to have any clear notion of what the CIA budget amounts to, though estimates range from four to six billion dollars annually.

The approximate size and extent of CIA operations remain hidden from the public, which also gets only fragmentary (and often disquieting) hints as to the CIA's role in foreign policy decisions and implementation.

For the past several months Nedzi has been chairman of a group set up by the House Armed Services Committee to oversee intelligence operations. Inquiries thus far, he said the other day, have led him to conclude that from the standpoint of national security "more can be made public than is being made public."

This is the heart of the matter. No responsible person suggests that the operations of the CIA or other intelligence agencies ought to be made an open book to the public — and, by extension, to other governments. Intelligence work is by its nature secret, and would quickly be undermined by excessive disclosures.

The public which is served by intelligence agencies and which foots the bill for them, however, has the right to general information about how big they are and how much they spend — and above all, about how well they stay within carefully defined limits of their proper function.

Congressional review of the situation with this in mind would be a sound step in the public interest.

LIMA, OHIO

NEWS

DEC 15 1971

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CIA Secrets Target Of Senate Inquiries

By GEORGE KENTERA

WASHINGTON (N A N A) — Both Senate and House are showing a growing restiveness over being kept in the dark about this country's vast intelligence apparatus.

This restiveness is particularly strong in the Senate at present, but it also exists in the House — and it has been present almost since 1949, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was first granted power by Congress to operate without congressional review.

The mounting frustration on Capitol Hill is hardly likely to produce any legislation requiring disclosure by the Nixon administration of intelligence funding or activities.

But it is almost certain to result next year in discreet efforts, primarily by Congressional committees and subcommittees involved, to lift at least partially the curtain that now hides an intelligence effort said to cost up to \$6 billion a year.

Sen. John C. Stennis, D-Miss., powerful chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, has already felt compelled to promise a thorough committee study and, "if necessary," an investigation into intelligence operations.

In making that promise to the Senate, Stennis specifically referred to President Nixon's reorganization early this month of the U.S. intelligence system — a reorganization that some senators fear removes the system even farther from any accountability to Congress.

Two other signs point to some congressional action next year:

— Sen. Stuart Symington, the Missouri Democrat who has long protested the lack of information Congress gets about intelligence matters, reportedly is already to press a demand that the Senate begin a thorough accounting in private session.

— And Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Detroit Democrat and chairman of a special House subcommittee on intelligence, is quietly laying the groundwork for what is likely to be public hearings about the many-sided intelligence apparatus.

Members of Congress like Symington and Nedzi are not seeking to know all, or even a good deal, about the nation's intelligence setup. But they believe Congress as a rule ought to know something, perhaps about the intelligence budget, and they are dissatisfied with the present system, under which only a handful of senators and representatives knows any of the facts.

On the night of Nov. 23, the Senate held an extraordinary debate on an amendment by Symington to the \$70.8 billion defense appropriations bill. The amendment would have set a limit of \$4 billion for intelligence spending — by the CIA, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and for intelligence work performed by or for the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Fifty-six senators voted against and defeated the amendment — but 31 senators voted for it. And one of those 31 votes was from Montana's Democratic Sen. Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, who praised Symington and said, perhaps significantly:

"He has raised an issue which is just now in its infancy, but which in time I am confident will grow to enormous proportions. It is time, in my judgment, that we take a long, hard look at our intelligence community, its function and objectives."

Nedzi thinks so, too. In his preparatory work, he and his subcommittee aides have already to press a demand that the Senate begin a thorough accounting in private session.

STATINTL

ment and the State Department, and also "eight hours of continuous discussions" at the national security agency.

Still to come are the FBI, the Atomic Energy Commission and, finally, the intelligence agencies of the armed services that reportedly spend the lion's share of the intelligence budget.

"I haven't come to any conclusion... Yet on the whole question of how far one should go in making public activities of this kind," Nedzi says. "What I think I'd like to do is get people from the agencies to present unclassified versions of their positions and provide a forum for critics and students of the problems."

An opponent of the war in Vietnam, Nedzi thinks his appointment in July as chairman of the intelligence subcommittee by Rep. F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, may have "tempered the strong passions" some frustrated house members have about intelligence procedures.

Still, more than a dozen bills have been introduced in Congress this year aimed at making intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, accountable to Congress. That is a rate slightly higher than average since 1949; in the two decades since then, almost 200 such bills have been introduced — and none has passed.

Whatever review power Congress has over intelligence matters resides in four congressional subcommittees.

On the House side, one is Nedzi's subcommittee, created in July. The other is the intelligence operations subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. Its members are an official secret, but there is good reason to believe they are the ranking three Democrats and two Republicans on the full committee's defense subcom-

On the Senate side there are also two subcommittees. One is the central intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee which includes Stennis, Symington, Democrat Henry M. Jackson of Washington and Republicans Peter H. Dominick of Colorado and Barry Goldwater of Arizona. This subcommittee reviews CIA programs, but not financing.

The other is the intelligence operations subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. Its members are Chairman Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, Stennis, Democrat John L. McClellan of Arkansas and Republicans Milton R. Young of North Dakota and Mrs. Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.

It seems worth noting that Symington is a part of these elite groups and yet is a leading protester against the setup they represent.

One reason may be Ellender's explanation on Nov. 23 about the way five senators (from the Appropriations Committee) decide what funds the intelligence agencies need.

"This method of appropriating funds for these intelligence activities has been in effect for at least 20 years that I know of..." He said. "We five who sit on this committee hear the testimony of those applying for funds. The funds are justified to us.

"We ask many questions. None of this information is in writing, nor is it recorded, but it is simply given to us, and we weigh it and then recommend appropriations as is seen fitting... I would hesitate to suggest that more senators and more members of the House be involved in this sensitive work."

At another point, Symington and his supporters referred to newspaper disclosures two years ago that the CIA was financing much of the war in Laos.

DANBURY, CONN.

NEWS-TIMES

DEC 3 1971

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A blank check with no maximum limit

Even in these days of \$230 billion federal budgets and \$27 billion federal deficits, \$579 million is a lot of money.

It represents about \$11,000 for every man, woman and child in Danbury.

One would expect that when Congress votes an appropriation of \$579 million, it would know what the money is going for.

But in the case of the current Defense Department budget, it does not.

That \$579 million fund is the last item on the table of aircraft procurement requested by the Pentagon for fiscal 1972 and is identified merely as "classified projects."

Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, the only senator who is a member of both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee, suspects this is one of the hidden items to cover intelligence funding, for the CIA and for other intelligence operations.

But the Pentagon won't admit it is, nor will it say it isn't.

Senator Symington, a former Air Force secretary, has been on the Armed Services Committee for the past 20 years ranking immediately behind the chairman in seniority. Not once has he or the full committee, let alone the entire Senate, been informed what hidden funds are included in the defense budget for intelligence operations. During this period, U.S. intelligence operatives have been credited with or blamed for U.S. involvement in affairs of foreign countries, including the secret war in Laos.

Senator Symington last week tried to put a limit on the blank check Congress provides for intelligence operations. He offered an amendment to the defense appropriations bill to put a \$4 billion lid on the blank check.

He didn't ask that the budget provide a breakdown of the \$4 billion, nor that secret material be revealed to the Senate. He just wanted intelligence funding limited to intelligence, so we don't get into another situation where U.S. personnel are organizing and running a war on foreign soil, and an airline to go with it, without Congress or the American taxpayers knowing about it.

Unfortunately, only 30 other senators joined Senator Symington in voting for the amendment, so the intelligence operatives not only continue to have a blank check but one without limit as far as Congress is concerned.

The usual Pentagon supporters in the Senate won this round. But the questions Senator Symington and others raised about U.S. military and intelligence officials involving this country in distant wars cannot be hidden away like the \$579 million appropriation.

Sooner or later, the administration, the Pentagon, the CIA and others involved will have to face up to these questions. As far as taxpayers are concerned, the sooner the better.

SAN ANTONIO, TEX.
NEWS

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Symington hits CIA inactivity

WASHINGTON — If the Central Intelligence Agency and allied units in the government have been inefficient or unresponsive, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) wants to know how and why.

Symington, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also wants an explanation of why proper congressional committees were not consulted in advance of administrative changes in the intelligence operations announced by President Nixon.

A White House spokesman says there were consultations with key congressional leaders before the changes were made.

But Symington says that the CIA subcommittee of the Armed Services panel has not met this year. Symington's challenge centered on the Administration's alleged failure to consult Congress. While he admitted the changes might be "constructive," he posed several questions based upon the White House press release that described the reorganization as an effort to improve the "efficiency and effectiveness" of all U.S.

Fidel Castro Calls on Salvador Allende . . .

... and the two Marxist leaders find that Socialism is not as productive as they promised their people

By ROBERT S. ALLEN

Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende and Cuba's Communist dictator Fidel Castro are finding much in common to talk about during their 10 days of hobnobbing.

The economies of both their countries are in dire straits and steadily sinking further in the mire.

Inflation is rampant despite stringent price and monetary controls; food, material and other shortages are widespread and rationing common; mismanagement, incompetence and waste are gross and ruinous; and the chaotic and destructive excesses characteristic of extremist governments are taking a staggering human, social and industrial toll.

That disastrous cost has been heaviest and grimdest in Cuba, where Castro has been in power some 12 years.

After one year of Allende's bungling and incoherent rule, Chile is well headed on the same calamitous road. Given time, and the doubtful submissiveness of the Chilean people, that country too will wind up as insolvent and shattered as Castroite Cuba.

The totalitarian-ruled masses of that tragic island are literally kept going only through a massive infusion of Russian aid—now amounting to around \$1.5 million a day. But for that, famine and the most primitive living conditions would be widespread—as they already are in remote rural areas.

It's very questionable whether Chileans, with a long history and tradition of democracy and independence, would permit such debasement and degradation.

But only time will tell.

Meanwhile, after one year of Allende and his extremist cohorts, Chile has a head start for the same catastrophewrecked depths to which Castro has brought Cuba.

During their 10 days of hobnobbing with Allende, they have emitted much glowing rhetoric about grandiose aims,

pains and other bombastic propaganda. Much has been said about ideological "pie in the sky," but nothing about the bleak realities of economic and social systems in deep trouble.

There is good reason for this silence. The undeniable record in both countries is not the kind to talk about.

Castro admitted that in an amazingly frank speech to top lieutenants and party leaders earlier this year. He not only told them 1970 was a debacle, but this year would be no better.

"We are steadily losing ground in our struggle to create a true Marxist state," he said. "The innumerable problems and immense demands facing us are overwhelming. There is virtually no likelihood of improving our economy and social structure in the foreseeable future. We will be doing well if we merely hold our own."

Having made this confession, Castro then announced the launching of a "crusade to eradicate vagrancy, parasitism and other vices in order to root out ideological weaknesses and to redouble our efforts to create the new, socially conscious, Socialist man."

Allende took a different turn in a two and one-half hour speech early this month at a giant Santiago rally commemorating his first year in office. The Marxist grandiloquently proclaimed:

"Today the peasant feels himself a citizen, and the workers are conscious that they are the government."

But significantly, despite talking long and sonorously, Allende carefully avoided specifics and details. He berated opponents, particularly in the Chilean congress where they are in a majority, and effusively lauded supporters. But about his record—virtually nothing.

That's understandable, because it's nothing to talk about—as evidenced by the following:

consumer goods and steadily spreading. Beef is now available only one week a month, and then in small quantities; poultry, eggs and dairy goods are scarce and in some parts of Chile already are rationed. As a consequence, black markets have sprung up in most supplies. Even small dressmakers are having to pay under-the-table prices to get cloth.

The money supply has risen 75 per cent since January, and the government is admittedly turning out currency at a record rate. Price controls are supposed to offset this, but are having little effect.

Production is falling steadily, particularly in the copper mines recently expropriated from U.S. owners. Copper exports constitute 80 per cent of Chile's foreign trade and is vital to the country's solvency and stability. But under Allende, the nation has suffered a \$250-million balance-of-payments deficit as against a \$135-million favorable balance before he came into power.

Illustrative of Chile's spreading industrial woes is what has happened in the great copper mines. As a result of 40 per cent wage increases, wild-cat strikes, costly damages to expensive machinery and equipment, and widespread absenteeism, copper production at Chuquicamata and El Teniente, the two biggest mines, is now costing an average of 47 cents a pound while the world market price is 49 cents a pound. Manifestly, Chile's key economy is not thriving on a profit margin of 2 cents a pound.

The big question mark overhanging Chile's future is, what about the military?

Unlike Cuba, where Castro's seizure of power included the disorganized military forces, Allende's tissue-thin electoral plurality by which he maneuvered into office did not affect the Chilean army, navy and air force.

So far, they have stayed out of politics and the military has had their way—up to a point. That point is when the military feel their interests are directly at stake.

Congress and the CIA

President Nixon has issued an executive order which invests Richard Helms, director of the CIA, with authority to oversee all the intelligence agencies (the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, etc.) and to cut "bureaucratic fat" and professional overlapping wherever possible. There may be merit in this new order, but there is incontestable merit in Sen. Stuart Symington's reaction to it. The Senator notes that the CIA was brought into existence in 1947 by an act of Congress. Its powers and duties are defined by legislation adopted by the Congress. The director and deputy director are subject to confirmation by the Senate. Last year the Congress appropriated between \$5 billion and \$6 billion for the intelligence establishment; no one knows the exact amount, since part of the CIA's budget is artfully concealed. Yet the Senate was not consulted about the proposed reorganization. Senator Symington serves on the CIA subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. To his knowledge, the subcommittee was not consulted about, nor did it approve, the reorganization ordered by the President. As a matter of fact the subcommittee has not met once during the current year. This is an amazing state of affairs. Surely the Congress has a right to be consulted about the reorganization of an agency which owes its existence to an Act of Congress and is sustained by annual appropriations voted by the Congress.

The fact is that the CIA enjoys an autonomy almost as complete as that enjoyed by the FBI. Whatever the original intention of the Congress, the CIA functions today as an adjunct of the White House. The intelligence it gathers is available to the President; it is not available to the Congress. Under the proposed reorganization, it will be even more directly responsible to the President, and by its oversight control over the other agencies will be supplying him with a unified appraisal. An agency that gathers information for the President may be tempted to provide him with the estimates it thinks he wants (as the Pentagon Papers have shown, intelligence reports that do not coincide with White House opinion are apt to be ignored), and as Joseph Kraft pointed out in a recent column, there is much to be said for diverging, even conflicting, reports in the highly subjective area of intelligence evaluation.

The CIA is closed off from scrutiny by the press, public and the Congress; like the FBI, it functions in splendid bureaucratic isolation. Mr. Helms is such a gray eminence that a private elevator takes him to and from his office in the CIA structure in Langley, Va. Like Mr. Hoover, he is usually not "available," except at budget time. Recently, however, he has been trying to give the agency a new, or at least a brighter image, since he is well aware of a growing restiveness in the Congress and of the need to slash budgets. A *Nation* editorial of May 3 called attention to the way in which Mr. Helms was "breaking cover" to talk about the brilliant achievements of the

agency and to assure us that it is stalled by dedicated friends of the democratic ideal. Now he is up to the same antics again. This week he is the "cover boy" on *Newsweek*, with the predictable feature telling of gallant CIA capers of a kind that could have been made known only by the agency that is so super-secret it feels compelled to conceal its activities from the Congress.

Congress should not take any more of this guff from the agency or its director. It has authority to insist that its authority be respected and it has a clear responsibility to act in that spirit. In an editorial last August 2, we remarked on a measure, introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, which would require the CIA to make its intelligence reports available to the chairman of the germane committees of the Congress (Armed Services and Foreign Relations) and also require the agency to prepare reports at the request of the Congress. There is precedent for such legislation in the instructions given the AEC. After all, the CIA often gives to foreign governments information and reports which it will not make available to the Senate or the House. This is selective secrecy carried to a grotesque extreme.

Hearings will be held on Senator Cooper's bill (S. 2224) during the first week of February. It is a wise and sensible proposal. We hope it is adopted. We hope too that the CIA subcommittee will come alive and begin to exercise a real degree of oversight over the agency. Better still, the Senate should adopt the resolution offered by Senator Symington (S. 192, November 13) to create a select committee which would oversee the CIA. But there is really only one way to deal with the problem of the CIA and that is to make it directly responsible to the Congress. If it is engaged in activities of such a character that they cannot be reported to the Congress, then it should be told to abandon those activities. There is no place for a secret agency of the CIA type within the framework of a constitutional democracy, which is how Justice Stanley Reed once characterized our form of government. As long as the CIA can plead secrecy, Congress will be unable to exercise effective oversight. The time has come to make both the FBI and the CIA subject to close and continuing Congressional supervision and control.

STATINTL

Senators Fear Helms Has Lost CIA Control

Reshuffling, With More Positions Going to Military Men, Worries Key Lawmakers

WASHINGTON (UPI) — Key senators are concerned that CIA Director Richard Helms might have been "kicked upstairs" in the reshuffle of America's intelligence community, with more influence in spy activities going to military men.

Helms has assured inquiring senators that he had no reason to believe he had been shuffled aside in the nation's intelligence hierarchy.

But there is concern on Capitol Hill that Helms has lost out in the shakeup of the intelligence network ordered by President Nixon last month.

Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) are concerned that the shakeup has increased Pentagon predominance in the intelligence field, and Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.) is conducting an investigation to find out what happened.

What has disturbed Helms' friends in the Senate is that the day-to-day control of the CIA apparently has been relinquished to a military man, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., in order to free Helms for his new duties as overall director of the CIA and all other intelligence units. Cushman, a marine, is deputy director of the CIA.

Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the deputy secretary of defense have been given a new voice in the intelligence command through membership on a committee, which, under the direction of presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger, will oversee intelligence.

Helms, in a closed-door meeting with the Senate Armed Services Committee this week, said he did not think he was being shoved out of the way.

Stennis, the committee chairman, said Helms "assured me that his dominance over it (the CIA), his effectiveness, his powers over it will not be diminished one bit."

But Stennis indicated he still was not satisfied and "we are going into it and we are going to analyze it and study it and have an investigation — if one wants to use that word—if necessary. We do not take these things lightly. The stakes are too high."

No one in the Senate really knows what has happened at the CIA. Not even senators like Stennis, who are let in on the nation's intelligence secrets, were told in advance.

ST. LOUIS, MO.
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Spy Budget Secrecy May End

By TAYLOR PENSONEAU

A Staff Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 26.

THE BELEAGUERED CONGRESSIONAL minority that has fought to pry loose the Government's secret figures on intelligence expenditures mounted a challenge this week, that though unsuccessful, may make the objective more attainable.

Although an attempt by Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, to limit intelligence outlays was rebuffed by the Senate as expected, an increasing number of members—including some of Symington's opponents—predicted that the day would come when Congress was no longer in the dark on the country's undercover activities.

Possibly most significant, the debate on Symington's proposal brought out that the seemingly broad war being organized and financed in Laos by the Central Intelligence Agency may finally persuade some previously hesitant members of Congress to assert themselves more in this ticklish field.

THE MOST SUCCINCT appraisal of Symington's effort came from one of the opponents, Senator Charles Mathias Jr. (Rep.), Maryland, who remarked moments before the vote that the Missourian had focused "our attention on water that is not only muddy, but actually murky."

"Many members may be reluctant to stir this water for fear of what they may find," Mathias said. "I think we cannot delay much longer in turning our attention in this direction for fear that what is there may evade our examination and our concern."

This feeling may be realized sooner than expected because a number of Senators, in the wake of the Symington matter, said they would push for an executive session by the Senate to consider the intelligence question. It could mean a major breakthrough for those of Symington's persuasion—especially if a censored transcript was made public later.

SYMINGTON sought to amend the Department of Defense appropriations bill for fiscal 1972 to place a 4-billion-dollar ceiling on intelligence outlays. Most estimates put this yearly expenditure currently at more than 5 billion dollars.

The proposed limit, which the Senate rejected Tuesday 56 to 31, would have applied to the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency

and undercover endeavors by the armed forces.

Many observers regard Symington's move as the most determined attempt yet to force Congress to account at least somewhat for the activities of these agencies.

Although waste and duplication in many of the intelligence operations were given as the most obvious reasons for the amendment, the greater intent was to provide Congress, and the American public, with more insight into both the domestic and foreign activities of these agencies.

USING HIMSELF as an example, Symington contended that he had been unable to determine the appropriations this year for intelligence, even though he is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee as

well as an ex-officio member of the Appropriations Committee.

Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, asserted in the debate Tuesday that the Missourian should not feel insulted because nobody had discovered where the intelligence funds were in the defense appropriations measure.

"When they read a line item and find that there is so much for aircraft, or for a carrier, those may or may not be the real amounts," Fulbright said.

REPLYING Senator Allen J. Ellender (Dem.), Louisiana, chairman of the Appropriations Committee and a main opponent of Symington's amendment said that there was no specific appropriations for intelligence activities. "They are funded from many different appropriations included in the bill," he said.

Much of the argument this week centered on the CIA, which came under congressional scrutiny earlier this year for its clandestine role in the stations of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. In his support

"One of the things that worries me most of all is that I do not see any reason why we should pass appropriations for the CIA to organize an army, pay the troops and conduct a full-scale war in Laos," Fulbright said.

Yet people of this country think we have a democracy in which a war, if one is to be fought, has to be declared by Congress. Yet Congress did not know about the war in Laos until it was well under way."

When prodded by fellow Senators, Ellender conceded that he did not know in advance about CIA financing of any army in Laos. He said further that he had "never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA has asked for."

"It never dawned on me to ask about it," Ellender said. "I did see it publicized in the newspapers some time ago."

Fulbright and his allies pointed to Ellender's statement as a prime example of the necessity for greater congressional awareness of undercover activities.

Ellender became a prime target of the Symington side, because of an occurrence last week that the Missourian related to the Senate Tuesday. Symington, when asking staff members of the Appropriations Committee about intelligence figures, was told that they could discuss the matter only with Ellender and four other senior members of the panel.

"THIS MEANS that these billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money are being authorized and appropriated by the Senate with the knowledge and approval of just five of its members," Symington contended. The other four are Senators John L. McClelland (Dem.), Arkansas; John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi; Milton R. Young (Rep.), North Dakota, and Margaret Chase Smith (Rep.), Maine.

The House has approved a bill providing for a commission to conduct a two-year study of the stations. Continued funding of the stations would be channelled through the commission. A promise between the two bills is his support of the will have to be worked out in day. As the argument ensued, a conference between the two

houses of Congress.

Ellender was not hushed in his rebuttal as he told the Senate that "this method of appropriating funds for these intelligence activities has been in effect for at least 20 years that I know of, since I have been on the committee."

Only a few persons consider these funding requests because of the sensitivity of the subject, Ellender said. In addition, he expressed an opinion of many of Symington's opponents in saying that the intelligence field was too much of a hot potato to "discuss in the open."

THIS APPROACH was adopted by Young also, who asserted that proper defense of the CIA in the debate would require documentation of activities that could not be done.

"Spying is a dirty business, but it is a business every nation in the world engages in," Young said. "Russia does a bigger job of it than we do. You can not disclose secret information."

In an action earlier this year against the use of intelligence funds, the Senate passed a bill in fiscal 1972 for financing the operations of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty through the Secretary of State.

The measure, sponsored by Senator Clifford P. Case (Rep.),

New Jersey, is intended to divorce the CIA from the funding of the stations. Radio Free Europe, beamed to eastern Europe, and Radio Liberty, beamed to the Soviet Union, operate in West Germany, ostensibly on private contributions.

However, Case said in January that funds had been expended from secret CIA budgets to pay almost totally for the costs of the stations.

The House has approved a bill providing for a commission to conduct a two-year study of the stations. Continued funding

Symington's mention of this matter constituted an attack on the system and therefore, possibly his support of the will have to be worked out in day. As the argument ensued, a conference between the two

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26 NOV 1971

Military Role in Spying Too Great, Some Fear

United Press International

Some key senators fear that the military has gained excessive influence in the U.S. intelligence network even though a civilian has been named its top director.

They are concerned about the possibility that Richard Helms, popular director of the Central Intelligence Agency, might have given up considerable influence to his military assistants when he was named over-all czar of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies.

With his added duties, they fear, Helms will have to turn over many of his CIA responsibilities to Lt Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., a Marine.

Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the deputy secretary of Defense have been given a new voice in the intelligence community through membership on a committee under the direction of Henry A. Kissenger, President Nixon's adviser on national security, to oversee U.S. intelligence activity.

Sens. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., and J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., fear this reorganization means that the Pentagon is taking an increasingly larger role in intelligence activity.

Helms this week told a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee that this was not so, but chairman John C. Stennis is conducting an investigation to find out just what the situation is.

Stennis said Helms "assured me that his dominance over it [the CIA], his effectiveness, his power over it will not be diminished one bit."

No one in the Senate actually knows if there has been any lessening of Helms' influence within [the CIA], his effectiveness, his access to CIA secrets.

Only five members of the Senate and five from the House even are given information on the intelligence budget and detailed briefings on the operations of the various other intelligence services.

STATINTL

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SYMINGTON'S SHOT IN THE DARK

Spy spending still top secret

(UPI)—The Senate refused yesterday to limit U.S. intelligence agencies spending after a rare open discussion on how Congress supervises the secret spy network.

The proposed \$4 million ceiling, an amendment by Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., to a defense money bill, was rejected 56 to 31.

Sen. Symington, a former secretary of the Air Force, said that tho he served on the armed services and foreign relations committees he had no idea how much is spent on intelligence gathering. He said the \$4 billion limit was just a shot in the dark.

LESS SCRUTINY

"The point," he told senators during the dinner-hour debate, "is that we do not have the facts required to allocate the resources of the country."

"There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA," Sen. Symington said, and the same is true of other intelligence agencies of the government."

As a case in point, Sen. Symington cited the central intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee headed by Sen. John Stennis.

He is one of five senators entrusted with the details of the intelligence budget, it came out during the debate.

Another of the five, Sen. Allen Ellender, D-La., chairman of the appropriations commit-

tee, acknowledged that intelligence outlays were hidden by padding out line item appropriations in various bills.

He said he could not reveal how much is spent on intelligence because "that's a top secret."

Sen. Ellender conceded he did not know in advance about the CIA's financing of any army in Laos.

Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the foreign relations committee, argued that such lack of congressional knowledge demonstrated the need for more accountability.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is the CIA going off and conducting a war of its own," Sen. Fulbright said. He disputed Stennis' contention that revealing the total budgets of intelligence agencies would disclose any military secrets.

"I don't believe it is tragic" for the Senate to demand the information thru such a device as the Symington amendment, Sen. Fulbright said. "The Senate is due an explanation."

Sen. Symington at one point shouted "I can be trusted" in expressing his frustration over being kept in the dark.

Sen. Stennis argued that Congress itself had set up the agencies.

He told senators: "You're just going to have to make up your mind that you can't have an accounting -- shut your eyes and take what comes."

STATINTL

24 NOV 1971

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Intelligence Outlay Ceiling - Is Rejected by Senate, 56-31

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

After a sharp debate punctuated by such shouts as "the Senate is due an explanation" and "I can be trusted," the Senate last night voted 56 to 31 against an amendment to put a ceiling on spending by government intelligence agencies.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), in offering the amendment to the defense money bill, said his purpose was to let Congress in on what American intelligence operatives are already doing and plan to do in this country and abroad. "The point," he told the senators during the dinner-hour debate, "is to state that we do not have the facts required to allocate the resources of the country."

Symington and his allies thus made the stiffest challenge yet to the way Congress tries to keep track of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and the separate intelligence arms of the Army, Navy and Air Force, operations which altogether reportedly cost some \$6 billion a year.

"There is no federal agency of our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA," Symington said, "and the same is true of other intelligence agencies of the government."

As a case in point, Symington cited the Central Intelligence subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee which is chaired by Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.).

When Stennis during the debate said "it is so tragic" to try to limit intelligence operations through hasty action on the Senate floor, Symington shouted in reply: "I wish his interest

was such he had just one meeting, just one meeting."

The Missourian said he did not know how much the various intelligence agencies of the government spent in any one year, adding that he understood published estimates of \$6 billion were too high. But his amendment, in an attempt to force an accounting, would have limited total spending by all the various agencies to \$4 billion in the fiscal year starting next July 1.

Chairman Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) of the Senate Appropriations Committee and its Intelligence Operations subcommittee said during the debate he could not tell fellow senators how much is spent on intelligence because "that's a top secret."

Ellender conceded under questioning by fellow senators that he did not know in advance about the CIA's financing of any army in Laos. Symington's allies, especially Chairman J. W. Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee, argued that such lack of congressional knowledge about worldwide activities demonstrated the need for more accountability.

"One of the things that worries me most of all is the CIA going off and conducting a war of its own," Fulbright said. He disputed Stennis' contention that revealing the total budgets of intelligence agencies would disclose any military secrets.

"I don't believe it is tragic" for the Senate to demand the information through such a device as the Symington amendment, Fulbright said. "The Senate is due an explanation."

Symington at one point shouted "I can be trusted" in expressing his frustration in being kept in the dark about

covert intelligence operations. He said such lack of information undercut his effort to vote sensibly on the allocation of the nation's resources.

Several senators expressed uneasiness over the White House's recently announced reorganization of intelligence functions. "No doubt about it," Symington said of the reorganization, "we're putting intelligence in the hands of the military."

Stennis, in declaring that Congress in its own laws creating the agencies stressed the need for secrecy on intelligence operations, said to his fellow senators: "You're just going to have to make up your mind that you can't have an accounting — shut your eyes and take what comes."

He promised that the Senate Armed Services Committee would conduct an in-depth analysis of the nation's intelligence activities, including the restructuring recently ordered by the White House.

In the meantime, Stennis said, "The only thing to do is vote this amendment down" and work for reforms in a more orderly fashion.

STATINTL

STATINTL

Symington Wants Cut In Intelligence Spending

By a Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 23.

Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, in a major attack on secrecy in government, proposed today that Congress cut intelligence expenditures from more than 5 billion dollars to a mandatory ceiling of 4 billions.

He charged, in a speech prepared for delivery, that present intelligence operations were wasteful, overlapping and inadequately supervised by Congress.

In a reference to the Indochina war, he said that he believed "at least one war" could have been avoided if it had not been for "pressures, combined with unwarranted secrecy," on the part of the intelligence agencies.

Symington's proposed ceiling would apply to the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and all other intelligence units, including those within the branches of the armed services.

He said that he had not been able to determine how much was being appropriated this year for intelligence operations, although he is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee and an ex-officio member of the Appropriations Committee.

When the final draft of the military appropriations bill was before the defense appropriations subcommittee last week, he said, no mention was made of the multibillion-dollar appropriation requests that it contained for much of the 15 intelligence operating or advisory operations.

After the meeting, he said, he asked the committee staff

"in general about intelligence appropriations." He said he was told that the staff had been instructed to talk about those appropriations only with five senior members of the committee—chairman Allen J. Ellender (Dem.), Louisiana, and Senators John L. McClellan (Dem.), Arkansas; John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi; Milton R. Young (Rep.), North Dakota, and Margaret Chase Smith (Rep.), Maine.

Symington said he had the greatest respect for the five members, "but I do not believe that they, and they alone, should render final decision on both said authorizations and appropriations without the knowledge, let alone the approval, of any other Senators, including those on the Armed Services Committee who are not on this five-member subcommittee of appropriations, and all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee."

Symington quoted press estimates that put intelligence expenditures at 5 to 6 billion dollars a year. He said that despite his committee assignments he had been unable to say whether these estimates were accurate. Another Senate source termed them fairly accurate.

The Senator renewed his criticism of a reorganization of the intelligence machinery announced earlier this month by President Richard M. Nixon.

He said it could mean turning intelligence operations over to the military, thus leading to billions of dollars in additional and often unnecessary defense expenditures, because military estimates of enemy plans, programs and production tend to be higher than civilian estimates.

He objected also that the reorganization put policy control of intelligence in a new committee in the White House,

headed by Henry A. Kissinger, presidential assistant for national security affairs.

"This gives executive privilege to the final policymakers and therefore, except for the power of the purse, enables the policymakers to, in effect, take the entire question of intelligence out of the hands of Congress," he said.

Symington had charged earlier this year that Kissinger, rather than Secretary of State William P. Rogers, had become the President chief adviser on foreign policy and, unlike Rogers was not available for questioning by Senate committees.

He complained recently that the change in intelligence arrangements had not been discussed with anyone in the Senate. He said today that Kissinger had called him and said that Symington was correct and that the change should have been discussed with the proper committees of Congress.

Symington said it was nonsense for anyone to think that a high degree of secrecy was necessary for intelligence operations.

He pointed out that congressional and public discussions constantly referred to the costs of such new weapons as the nuclear aircraft carrier, the C-5A transport plane or the main battle tank. These discussions do not go into how these weapons would be used in a war, he said.

"By the same token, knowledge of the over-all cost of intelligence does not in any way entail the release of knowledge about how the various intelligence groups function or plan to function," he said.


"Why should there be greater danger to the national security in making public over-all intelligence costs than in making public other over-all security costs?"

STATINTL

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STATINTL

November 22 1971 50 cents



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WASHINGTON, D.C.
NATIONAL OBSERVER

WEEKLY - 524,212

NOV 20 1971

Stirring Up the Intelligence Alphabet Soup

The U.S. Government's various foreign-intelligence agencies employ some 200,000 persons, spend about \$5 billion a year, and make up a murky caldron of Federally brewed alphabet soup.

There's the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the State Department's Intelligence & Research (I & R), the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA).

All the agencies have needed to be corralled under co-ordinated administrative control, some observers have said, and last week President Nixon announced such a plan. The President's key lieutenants in the intelligence organization will be Henry Kissinger, Presidential adviser for national-security affairs, and George P. Shultz, director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Sontay Bloopers

Particular targets of the reorganization plan appear to be the military intelligence agencies. During the years since World War II they have expanded beyond their demonstrated usefulness, say some Administration critics. Bloopers such as the Sontay prison raid in Vietnam, in which Americans "liberated" an empty prisoner-of-war camp, may have added to the urgency of reorganization.

CIA Director Richard Helms will assume the top leadership job of "planning, reviewing, co-ordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence," the President's announcement said. Helms will relinquish the main operating responsibilities for the CIA to his deputy director, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

Helms will become chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board, a group that is to meet weekly to co-ordinate operations and planning. Other agencies to be represented on the board are the State Department, the National Security Agency, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Also to be included is the Treasury Department, a move designed to upgrade foreign economic-intelligence reporting.

In addition, Helms will head a new co-ordinating unit called the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, which will include representatives from State, Defense, the CIA, and the Office of Management and Budget. This committee will draft budgets and apportion funds.

Grumbling in Congress

Kissinger, will head another new intelligence committee under the National Security Council. It is to assess over-all intelligence needs and evaluate intelligence output on a daily basis. Its members are to include Helms, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Undersecretary of State John N. Irwin II, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Other consolidations slated in the reorganization: strategic-balance assessments to go under the National Security Council and a new unit called the Net Assessment Group (NAG); and cryptology, map making, and personnel security checks to be administered by Defense. The proposed organization changes are to take effect in a month unless Congress opposes them.

By week's end there was some Congressional grumbling. Democrat Stuart Symington of Missouri, the only senator to sit on both the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations committees, called for hearings to examine the President's proposals. He said access to U.S. intelligence activities is "already severely restricted," and that placing more power in the hands of Henry Kissinger would make it harder for Congress to supervise the intelligence community. Kissinger, as the President's national security affairs adviser, enjoys the protection of executive privilege and so may ignore congressional questioning.

STATINTL

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THE WASHINGTON TIMES
18 Nov 1971

STATINTL

Rep. Nedzi Probing U.S.

Probers

BY SAUL FRIEDMAN

Fres Press Washington Staff

WASHINGTON—One of the more determined watchdogs of the Pentagon has begun a quiet but intensive investigation into the alphabetical wonderland of American intelligence operations.

During the last several weeks, Rep. Lucien Nedzi, a Michigan Democrat and the new chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence, has visited the places where the cloak and daggers are issued.

On each occasion, for several hours Nedzi and members of his subcommittee have questioned officials of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (I&R) and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

FRIDAY NEDZI is to take a closer look at DIA. And in coming weeks he has scheduled official, though informal, quiz sessions at the super-secret National Security Agency (NSA), the FBI and the intelligence offices of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The subcommittee was organized years ago to keep watch over American Intelligence activities. But as with its Senate counterpart, which has not even met this year, the House subcommittee generally has allowed intelligence agencies to ram rather freely into the internal affairs of other countries—as well as of this one.

Nedzi's inquiries are aimed at putting some limits on the things our spooks can do. And although his visits are a modest beginning, they indicate the changes that may be coming. The four other subcommittee members, all of whom served on it for years until Nedzi took it over, had not visited the agencies until their new chairman took them.

Soon after Nedzi was given the subcommittee last July, he immersed himself in what has been written about American intelligence. He talked privately with former top-ranking intelligence and Pentagon officials. And he set himself the chore of learning more about intelligence operations than any member of Congress, the better to return some control over such activities to Congress.

In short, Nedzi has become the only member of Congress to devote most of his time to gathering intelligence on American intelligence.

HE HAS FOUND the agencies bristling with personality problems, empire-building and jealousies. They keep secrets from each other.

At the moment Nedzi said, military and the State Department intelligence types are angry over a White House reorganization of intelligence operations because it puts CIA Director Richard Helms in a position to oversee every other agency's budget. Opponents of the plan charge that Helms will favor his own agency.

Nedzi is more concerned that the reorganization will put the entire intelligence community too close to the White House, where intelligence could be perverted for political use or be forced to conform with White House policy.

Because of the nature of the business, Nedzi has found intelligence units within units, where spook competes with and against his fellow

spook, and where secrets are kept from even his highest ranking agency officials.

As a critic of the defense budget, Nedzi on occasion has had the rug pulled from under him by sudden, new intelligence estimates which show Soviet strength far greater than it really is.

Nedzi intends to expose this annual exercise, if he can. And he is aiming at those agencies which have deliberately twisted intelligence data to conform to their clandestine operations, however doomed they may be.

EVENTUALLY, NEDZI intends to hold formal hearings on American intelligence operations, and he wants to open at least some of them to the public for the first time. Former and present foreign and defense policy officials and intelligence officers will be invited to testify.

Nedzi, who has a reputation as a dove, was appointed subcommittee chairman by Rep. F. Edward Hebert, of Louisiana, Democrat, a hawk, because Nedzi has a careful style and because even the military's best friends were disturbed that the intelligence community got us where we are in Vietnam.

But Hebert made certain to put four conservatives on the subcommittee—Democrats Melvin Price of Illinois and O. C. Fisher of Texas, and Republicans William Bray of Indiana and Alvin O'Konski of Wisconsin—to keep an eye on their chairman.

Nedzi, a dogged and workmanlike prober, is not a man to be conned or dissuaded. But with Hebert above him, and four hawks on the subcommittee below him, Nedzi has yet to find out how far he can go.

STATINTL

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S 18431

out the year, I ask unanimous consent, with the approval of the acting minority leader, that beginning today and for the rest of the session the rollcall votes be limited to 15 minutes; with the proper notification, on the five-bell basis, to be in effect as it has been over the past several days.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, there was some suggestion yesterday by our able colleague (Mr. HUGHES) that the warning bells ring midway.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think that is a good idea in order to give Senators a little more time. I amend my request to that extent. I hope that the attachés on both sides will notify Senators of this situation and inform them that this will be the procedure for the rest of the session.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the majority leader? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following letter, which was referred as indicated:

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE

A letter from the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend title 28 of the United States Code to provide for the appointment of officers and employees of the Court of Claims, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and the Customs Court, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE RESOLUTION 192—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION TO CREATE A SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE COORDINATION OF THE U.S. ACTIVITIES ABROAD TO OVERSEE ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

(Referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations.)

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I submit a resolution, and I ask unanimous consent that it be jointly referred to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The resolution reads as follows:

S. RES. 192

Whereas, It is the responsibility of the Senate to exercise general oversight with respect to the foreign relations of the United States; and

Whereas all Ambassadors of the United States are the President's representatives in the countries to which they are accredited and are responsible for supervising and co-ordinating the activities of all United States Government agencies in that country; and

Whereas the activities abroad of all United States Government departments and agencies affect the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States: Therefore be it

Resolved, That there is hereby created, effective at the beginning of the Second Session of the Ninety-Second Congress, a select committee to be known as the Select Committee on the Coordination of United States

Government Activities Abroad (hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee) to consist of six Senators of whom three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations from among the members of that committee, and three shall be appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services from among the members of that committee. No more than two of the members appointed from each such standing committee shall be from the same political party. The chairmanship of the Select Committee shall alternate at the beginning of each new session of the Congress between the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations or their respective designee.

Sec. 2. (a) It shall be the function of the Select Committee to oversee the coordination of activities of United States Government departments and agencies, including the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency, operating abroad under the authority of the Ambassador and affecting the foreign relations of the United States. In carrying out its functions under this resolution, the Select Committee shall keep itself fully and currently informed of all such activities.

(b) The Select Committee shall meet at least once a month while the Senate is in session and at such other times as the Select Committee shall determine.

Sec. 3. (a) For the purposes of this resolution, the Select Committee is authorized in its discretion (1) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2) to hold hearings, (3) to sit and act at any time or place during the sessions, recesses and adjournment periods of the Senate, (4) to employ personnel, (5) to subpoena witnesses and documents, (6) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel, information, and facilities of any such department or agency, (7) to procure the temporary services (not in excess of one year) or intermittent services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, and to provide assistance for the training of its professional staff, in the same manner and under the same conditions as a standing committee of the Senate may procure such services and provide such assistance under section 202 (1) and (j), respectively, of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, (8) to interview employees of the Federal, State, and local governments and other individuals, and (9) to take depositions and other testimony.

(b) The Select Committee shall have a professional staff of at least three members appointed by agreement of the two senior members of the Select Committee from the majority party and the two senior members of the Select Committee from the minority party.

(c) Subpoenas may be issued by the Select Committee over the signature of the chairman or any other member designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or member. The chairman of the Select Committee or any member thereof may administer oaths to witnesses.

(d) A majority of the members of the Select Committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, except that a lesser number, to be fixed by the Select Committee, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of taking sworn testimony.

Sec. 4. All departments and agencies of the United States Government which conduct activities abroad under the authority of any Ambassador of the United States shall keep the Select Committee fully and currently informed of their activities abroad.

Sec. 5. The Select Committee shall take special care to safeguard information affecting the national security.

Sec. 6. The expenses of the Select Commit-

tee under this resolution, which shall not exceed \$250,000 through February 28, 1973, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the Select Committee.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

50—SUBMISSION OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE PRINTING OF HANDBOOK ENTITLED "GUIDE TO FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT" AS A SENATE DOCUMENT

(Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.)

Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, when I became chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, I immediately established a Subcommittee on Rural Development. I felt that the problems of the rural areas of the Nation demanded more attention and a greater effort on the part of the Federal Government.

The lack of job opportunities and economic activity in many of our rural areas has driven millions of people into the Nation's cities. The subcommittee has attempted to examine the causes of the decline of some of our rural areas and it has attempted to devise legislation which will revitalize rural America.

The subcommittee has held extensive hearings on the problems and the promise of rural America, both in Washington and in field hearings around the country. One recurring theme that has come from these hearings has been the local citizens' dismay and frustration in attempting to deal with a complex and confusing Federal bureaucracy. Not only are Federal rural development programs underfunded and scattered in a number of different Federal agencies, but there is no centralized coordination of programs in the executive branch designed to aid the people of rural America.

Our committee is attempting to deal with this problem through legislation. Two bills pending before the committee include provisions for the coordination of the rural development activities within the executive branch. My distinguished colleague from Oklahoma (Senator BELLMON), has proposed an amendment to S. 1612, the President's rural revenue sharing proposal, which would go a long way toward the coordination of rural development activities in Government.

One important provision of this amendment would require that an office be established as near as possible to the headquarters of every multijurisdictional planning and development district in the States. This office would have all the necessary information in regard to all rural development programs and it would accept the filing of applications for funds under these programs.

I believe that the Bellmon approach has considerable merit, for it attempts to coordinate Federal programs on the local level. It is the local level which is important to the average citizen. A citizen's impression of his government is formed primarily by his contacts with the officials in the local offices of government.

One of the things that the Subcommittee on Rural Development noted dur-

LOUISVILLE, KY.

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E - 173,180

NOV 11 1971

Symington Questions Shake Up in Intelligence

By PETER LISAGOR
 © Chicago Daily News Service

WASHINGTON--If the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and allied units in the government have been inefficient or unresponsive, Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., wants to know how and why.

Symington, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also wants an explanation of why appropriate congressional committees were not consulted in advance of administrative changes in the intelligence operations announced by President Nixon last Friday.

A White House spokesman says there were consultations with key congressional leaders before the changes were made. But Symington says that the CIA subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee has not met this year.

Symington's challenge centered on the administration's alleged failure to consult Congress. While he admitted the changes might be "constructive," he posed several questions based on the White House press release that described the reorganization as an effort to improve the "efficiency and effectiveness" of all U.S. intelligence.

It would provide an "enhanced leadership role" for the CIA's director and would give presidential adviser Henry

Kissinger responsibility for making a net assessment of all available intelligence.

Symington asked in a statement on the Senate floor how the role of CIA Director Richard Helms was being "enhanced" by the "creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs."

He also noted that the attorney general and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will sit on the new committee. Symington asked two questions about it:

"Has this new White House committee been given authority or/and responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA; and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency?"

"How can the integrity of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility for the most critical aspects of intelligence analysis is taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in a combination of military professionals and the White House staff?"

STATINTL

NEW YORK, N.Y.

POST

EVENING - 623,245
WEEKEND - 354,797

NOV 11 1971

Challenge Nixon on CIA Shift

By PETER LISAGOR

WASHINGTON (CDN)—If the Central Intelligence Agency and allied units in the government have been inefficient or unresponsive, Sen. Symington, (D-Mo.) wants to know how and why.

Symington, ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, also wants an explanation of why the appropriate Congressional committees were not consulted in advance of administrative changes in the intelligence operations announced by President Nixon last Friday.

A White House spokesman says there were consultations with key Congressional leaders before the changes were made. But Symington says that the CIA subcommittee of the armed services panel has not met this year.

Symington's challenge centered on the Administration's alleged failure to consult Congress. While he admitted that the changes might be "constructive," he posed several questions based on a White House press release that described the reorganization as an effort to improve the "efficiency and effectiveness" of all U. S. intelligence.

Kissinger at Top

The reshuffling would provide an "enhanced leadership role" for the CIA's director and would place re-

sponsibility for making a net assessment of all available intelligence under Presidential advisor Henry A. Kissinger.

Symington asked in a statement on the Senate floor how the role of the CIA's director, Richard Helms, would be "enhanced" by the "creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the advisor to the President for national security affairs."

The Senator also noted that the Attorney General and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also will sit on the new committee. And he asked two questions:

"Has this new White House committee been given authority or/and responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA, and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency?" And:

"How can the integrity of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility of intelligence analysis is taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in a combination of military professionals and the White House staff?"

White House sources said that the reorganization gives Kissinger no additional authority and was basically designed to evaluate the product of the intelligence community better.

STATINTL

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503

S - 867,810

NOV 11 1971

Washington Dateline

Senators Challenge Intelligence Shuffle

Sens. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) and J. William Fulbright (D, Ark.) said Wednesday that President Nixon had reshaped the nation's intelligence network to vest more control in the hands of White House adviser Henry Kissinger without Congressional advice.

"Symington, in a Senate speech, called for a full review by the Senate Armed Services Committee. He charged that critical aspects of intelligence analysis had been taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in the military and the White House staff.

Fulbright, asked for comment by a reporter, said the reorganization was "a further erosion of Congressional control over the intelligence community" on grounds that Kissinger, in his position as the President's national security adviser, was insulated from Congressional scrutiny.

The White House announced last Friday that intelligence activities were being restricted to improve their "efficiency and effectiveness." CIA director Richard Helms was given control over all intelligence activities while Kissinger was placed in charge of a subcommittee of the National Security Council to review intelligence operations.

ST. LOUIS, MO.
GLOBE-DEMOCRAT

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MORNING - 292,789
WEEKEND - 306,889

NOV 11 1971

Symington challenges

By EDWARD W. O'BRIEN
Chief of the Globe-Democrat
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, said Wednesday the "integrity" of U.S. intelligence analyses may be threatened by a recent White House move which he charged gives more power to presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger.

In a Senate speech Symington challenged the intelligence reorganization announced last Friday for the White House as designed to shift responsibility for "the most critical aspects" of intelligence interpretation and vest it instead in "a combination of military professionals and the White House staff."

Symington asked the Senate Armed Services Committee to hold hearings on the reorganization and obtain "answers" which have not been disclosed by the White House.

THE COMMITTEE chairman, Sen. John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi, made no immediate reply.

In his speech Symington noted acidly that the Senate central intelligence subcommittee, a unit of the armed services group, "has not met once this year."

The subcommittee is supposedly one of the key agencies which Congress uses to assure itself of proper supervision of highly secret intelligence operations around the world.

Though Symington mentioned Kissinger only by job title and not by name, his speech amounted to a renewed criticism that Kissinger, as President Nixon's top security assistant, has been given tremendous powers and yet is beyond the reach of congressional committees which want to question him.

IN A PREVIOUS headline-

intelligence shakeup

making speech, Symington charged that Kissinger is widely regarded around town as the real secretary of state.

In his latest speech, Symington suggested that the same downgrading may be happening to Richard Helms, the highly regarded chief of the CIA.

Symington's worry, he implied, is that such critical analyses as comparisons of the United States and the Soviet in strategic military weaponry may be influenced or manipulated to make them fit presidential and Pentagon policies.

The White House announcement Friday asserted that Helms will enjoy "an enhanced leadership role" in the new setup.

BUT SYMINGTON SAID:

"How is the leadership role of the CIA director 'enhanced' by the creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs (Kissinger), on which new board sits not only the attorney general but also the chairman of the Pentagon joint chiefs of staff?"

The effect of the reorganization, Symington said, will be to "bring the most important aspects of intelligence production and coordination directly under the White House."

Congress already is "severely restricted" in obtaining intelligence analyses, he said, and may find itself in worse shape through increased application by the President of the doctrine

of "executive privilege" in refusing to share secret information with Congress.

In an interview, Sen. J. W. Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, agreed with Symington that the reorganization means "a further erosion of congressional controls" over intelligence operations.

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Fulbright, Symington Hit Kissinger Powers

By Murray Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) expressed concern yesterday that new powers given to Henry A. Kissinger over U.S. intelligence operations might be used to deny information to Congress.

In part this is the latest version of a running controversy over what some senators see as the ever-growing power of the President's influential national security adviser, who is beyond the reach of Congress.

But it also represents suspicion that the White House may be creating new barriers for which could restrict Congress access to differing intelligence evaluations.

Symington, on the Senate floor, called for hearings to examine the purpose and consequences of the Nixon administration's reorganization of the control structure for the national intelligence systems, announced last Friday. He protested that there was no advance consultation, and that "the Executive Branch does not consider either the organization, or the operation, of the intelligence community to be matters of concern to the Congress."

Congressional access to information about U.S. intelligence activities is "already severely restricted far more than other aspect of the federal budget," Symington protested.

It may be that the reorganization "is a constructive move" to eliminate duplication and waste, said Symington, and that should be examined. However, he said, the new plan will lead to "the creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the president for national security affairs (Kissinger) . . ."

This arrangement, Symington said, can bring the most important aspects of intelligence production and coordination "directly under the White House" and "thus within the scope of what the President believes he can deny to the Congress through the exercise of executive privilege."

Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told newsmen that Kissinger's new authority represents "a further erosion of congressional control over the intelligence community." Fulbright earlier this year introduced what was dubbed "the Kissinger bill," to set up new rules to limit the exercise of executive privilege, which the President can invoke to keep Congress from questioning Kissinger and other White House advisers.

Symington said that last Saturday he wrote Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, urging hearings on the intelligence shift be held before either that committee or its Subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency.

As a senior member of both groups, Symington disclosed yesterday that despite claims that there is constant congressional supervision of the CIA, the Senate CIA Subcommittee "has not met once this year."

Symington is the only congressman who is a member of both the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees.

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PHILADELPHIA, PA.

BULLETIN

NOV 6 1971
E - 634,371
S - 701,743

Helms Ordered To Take Over All Intelligence

Nixon Designates CIA Director to Consolidate Agencies

Washington -- (UPI) -- President Nixon has ordered the nation's scattered military and civilian intelligence gathering operations to be consolidated under the leadership of CIA Director Richard M. Helms.

The White House said Helms would head some of his duties as director of the Central Intelligence Agency to spy and counter-spy agencies, central Intelligence Agency to coordinate the work of U.S. spy and counter-spy agencies as the result of a lengthy executive branch study of duplication of efforts in their operations.

Congressional committees have long been critical of alleged overlapping of intelligence activities and the new plan won tentative approval of one key lawmaker, Rep. George H. Mahon (D-Tex) chairman of the House appropriations Committee.

Helms will work with a new National Security Council intelligence committee headed by presidential aide Henry Kissinger and consisting of the attorney general, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the State and Defense Departments.

Mr. Nixon also ordered reconstruction of the United States Intelligence Board to be headed by Helms and to include representatives of the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Treasury Department, Atomic Energy Commission and the National Security Agency.

Rep. Lucian Nuzzi (D-Mich), chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee with supervisory responsibility for the CIA and Pentagon intelligence operations, said he had doubts "about the capacity of any one person to be able to oversee the entire intelligence operation and at the same time manage the CIA."

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, deputy director of the CIA, was expected to take over many Helms' operating responsibilities.

Other provisions include creation of a "net assessment group" within the National Security Council to evaluate all intelligence, and establishment of a "intelligence resources advisory committee," headed by Helms and which will advise on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget.

STATINTL

Spending at Heart of Spying Shakeup

By ONE KELLY

Star Staff Writer

The creation of a consolidated intelligence program budget is at the heart of the intelligence shakeup ordered by President Nixon, informed sources say.

Preparation of the intelligence budget should for the first time give the President and other top officials a clear picture of how much is being spent for intelligence, where it is being spent and what it is buying, these officials said.

Richard Helms, who now is head of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be responsible for preparation of the budget as part of what the White House announcement said would be his "enhanced leadership role" in the intelligence field.

Not 'Intelligence Czar'

Informed officials cautioned, however, that the changes ordered by the President would not make Helms an "intelligence czar" in the sense that he will tell the heads of other intelligence agencies within the government how to run their jobs. His control over the pursestrings will, however, give him much more control of the over-all intelligence activities of the government than he has had in the past.

The changes ordered by Nixon also give his assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, an enhanced role in the intelligence field by making him chairman of a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee—one of a growing number of similar committees he heads.

A new Net Assessment Group will be under Kissinger. Its job is to review and evaluate all the products of intelligence work

and to make comparative studies of American and Soviet capabilities. It will be headed by Andrew Marshall, a member of the National Security Council staff.

The changes, designed to bring greater control over the estimated \$5 billion a year spent and 200,000 people who work on intelligence, have been the subject of a lengthy dispute within the administration.

Packard Unimpressed

In a press conference Thursday, the day before the changes were announced at the White House, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, one of the most outspoken government officials, indicated he was not entirely pleased by the way the struggle had worked out.

"There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this over-all intelligence that things would be improved," he said. "I don't really support that view. After having experience with a lot of people in the White House the last couple of years, trying to coordinate all kinds of things, I think if anything we need a little less coordination from that point than more. But that's my own personal view."

Because the Defense Department spends most of the money and employs most of the people and machines involved in intelligence, the changes will have a major impact there.

Consolidation Is Key

The President ordered the consolidation of all Defense Department security investigations into a single Office of Defense Investigations and the consolidation of all mapping and charting activities into a Defense Map Agency. Defense officials

said these two changes won't be much of a problem.

But they said the order to set up a National Cryptologic Command under Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the National Security Agency, would "take some doing" because the Defense Department's code-breaking activities now are so fragmented.

Similarly, they said, the Defense Department faces some difficulties in reorganizing its tactical intelligence—the information used by field commanders rather than top officials in Washington.

National Terms

Although the tendency is to think in terms of national intelligence—the kind of information on which the President bases major decisions, for example—the bulk of the intelligence gathered by the various agencies is of a tactical nature, involving such things as the day-to-day movements of potentially hostile ships.

The White House said Helms a career intelligence officer, would turn over most of his CIA operational responsibilities to his deputy, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., so he can devote more time to the leadership of the over-all intelligence community.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee that has been looking into the nation's intelligence operations, said his concern is that the changes ordered by the President place an added burden on Helms who, he said, already has a "super-human job."

"One wonders if any human is capable of that kind of responsibility," he said.

11 OCT 1971

LOS ANGELES TIMES

STATINTL

Stennis Got Through Storm on 'One Aspirin'

Veteran Senator Steered Draft Bill,
Arms Budget to Hard-Won Victories

BY JOHN H. AVERILL

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON--It was an ordeal that would have taxed if not exhausted many a far younger man. But at age 70, John Cornelius Stennis showed few traces of having spent 10 weeks in the eye of the Senate's fiercest storms this year.

"I got through the whole thing on one aspirin tablet," the tall and husky Mississippi Democrat said with a grin as his ordeal ended last week--at least for the moment.

As chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it fell to Stennis to be floor manager of the year's two most controversial pieces of legislation--the extension of the draft and the \$21 billion defense procurement bill.

These are supposed to be difficult times for the military-industrial complex. If so, it was hardly evident at the end as Stennis steered both bills to passage still essentially intact. But there were some trying and uncertain moments.

Stayed Until Dusk

While the two bills were being debated, Stennis was seldom more than a few feet away from his center aisle desk toward the rear of the Senate chamber. Sometimes that meant being in the Senate by 9 or 10 a.m. and staying there until dusk.

In the lexicon of his stern Southern Presbyterian heritage, staying means just that to Stennis. Since he was first elected to the Senate in 1947, after 10 years as a Mississippi circuit court judge, Stennis has campaigned on the pledge: "I will plow a straight

bates. He plowed through to the end until he won. But those who confronted him were reminded more of an encounter with a heavy tank than with a plow."

During the seven weeks the draft bill was before the Senate last summer, 54 amendments were offered. When it returned from a Senate-House conference for another week of debate, a strenuous effort was made to kill it. More than 30 amendments were voted on during the two-week debate on the procurement bill.

Stennis opposed most of the amendments. He usually won in roll-call showdowns.

He was repeatedly on his feet warning how a particular amendment could jeopardize national security or cause mischief.

It became a familiar scene: Stennis, in his dark blue pinstripe suit, white shirt and red tie, standing, legs spread by his desk and pumping his arms as he lectured his colleagues. Stennis shuns the small microphone attached to each desk as part of the Senate's new sound amplifying system. The cord hinders his movements and he doesn't need the microphone.

When Stennis is aroused, his deep, Dixie baritone can be heard booming even outside the chamber.

He is not a particularly eloquent speaker. His voice has a gravelly quality. He constantly repeats himself. He sometimes doesn't complete a sentence.

Yet far more often than where it counts--on the roll-call vote.

While Stennis occasion-

even his few critics credit his victories more to diligent homework than anything else. Since he came within a single vote of being defeated two years ago on authorization of the Safeguard antiballistic missile system, Stennis has fended off by wide margins every major attempt to slash defense spending.

Since defense spending began coming under fire in the past three years, Pentagon critics have shown increasing sophistication in their attacks on costly and esoteric weapons systems.

But thus far they have largely failed to convince a majority of the Senate that they know as much about the subject as the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

His only major defeats this year were on non-spending issues.

They involved Vietnam and were the handiwork of one of the very few men who can match Stennis in prestige and the Senate's esteem--Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.).

Mansfield persuaded the Senate on two occasions to adopt his amendment imposing a fixed deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina, subject only to the release of U.S. war prisoners.

Warning in 1954

Although Stennis strenuously opposed both amendments, he has the distinction of being one of the first in the Senate to warn against U.S. involvement in Indochina. In 1954, when the Eisenhower administration was contemplating intervention to prevent a French disaster in Indochina, Stennis warned against such a move. In a Senate speech, Stennis said committing U.S. ground forces in Indo-

But once the decision for large-scale commitment was made 11 years later, Stennis became a loyal supporter of U.S. involvement.

In recent weeks, Stennis has shown another paradoxical side to his character. Despite his reputation as a champion of the Pentagon, Stennis joined such outspoken war critics as Sens. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) in advocating legislation to reassert the war-making power of Congress.

Stennis pulled his first major surprise in 1954. Although he had always been staunchly conservative, he became the first Senate Democrat to ask for censure of the Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.). Although it criticizing McCarthy's anti-Communist crusade, Stennis said McCarthy's conduct "is another blot on the escutcheon of the Senate, another splat and splatter."

Stennis is not without critics. Senate liberals, who have been active in pushing civil rights legislation and striving for cuts in defense spending, say they respect his ability and integrity but find it difficult to admire him.

Some Suspicion

Although Stennis is not regarded as a racist, civil rights forces view him with suspicion. It has been only with adept maneuvering that they have thus far blocked Stennis in his efforts to impose desegregation standards on schools in the North that qual those applied in the South. Most liberals contend the Stennis effort actually is designed to halt school desegregation in the South.

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Continued

That was his style in the

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THE CIA AND ABROAD: small a Step

STATINTL

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

STATINTL

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years

THEIR REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad; for what it has allegedly done as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big


This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U. S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is worldwide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-

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Mr. ALLOTT. Now, Mr. President, I am ready, if the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the committee, is ready, and I am perfectly willing to ask for a quorum call to be taken out of both sides. I want to be sure that we have a recorded vote on this matter, and when we have enough Senators in the Chamber, we can ask for yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have previously been ordered.

Mr. ALLOTT. If they have been ordered, Mr. President, I think we should have a short quorum call. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLOTT. If it is agreeable to the chairman of the committee, the manager of the bill, I am willing to yield back the remainder of my time, if he is willing to yield back his, and we can then proceed, the yeas and nays having been ordered, to vote on amendment No. 430.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if there is no one who wishes time, I am ready to yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. ALLOTT. I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). All remaining time having been yielded back, the question is on agreeing to the amendment No. 430 of the Senator from Colorado, as modified. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLYNGS), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKMAN), and the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) are necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TALMADGE) are absent on official business.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF)

corp), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY), and the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) would each vote "yea."

Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) is absent on official business.

The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), and the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER) are detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Senator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) would each vote "yea."

The result was announced--yeas 65, nays 4, as follows:

[No. 247 Leg.]

YEAS—65

Aiken	Fannin	Nelson
Allen	Fong	Packwood
Allott	Gambrell	Pastore
Anderson	Goldwater	Pearson
Baker	Gurney	Pell
Bayh	Hansen	Proxmire
Beall	Harris	Randolph
Bentsen	Hawfield	Roth
Bible	Hruska	Saxbe
Boggs	Hughes	Schweiker
Brooke	Inouye	Scott
Buckley	Jackson	Spong
Byrd, Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Staford
Case	Jordan, Idaho	Stennis
Chiles	Mansfield	Stevens
Cook	Mathias	Symington
Cooper	McClellan	Taft
Cranston	McGovern	Thurmond
Curtis	Metcalf	Tunney
Dominick	Miller	Williams
Ellender	Moss	Young
Ervin	Muskie	

NAYS—4

Fulbright	Smith	Stevenson
Kennedy		
NOT VOTING—31		
Bellmon	Gravel	Mondale
Bennett	Gruen	Montoya
Brock	Hart	Mundt
Burdick	Hartke	Percy
Byrd, W. Va.	Hollings	Ribicoff
Cannon	Humphrey	Sparkman
Church	Javits	Talmadge
Cotton	Long	Tower
Dole	Magnuson	Weicker
Eagleton	McGee	
Eastland	McIntyre	

So Mr. ALLOTT's amendment (No. 430) was agreed to.

Mr. DOLE subsequently said: Mr. President, this morning I was unavoidably detained in returning to Washington from Kansas and narrowly missed the rollcall on the amendment sponsored by the distinguished senior Senator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT). Had I been present it would have been my privilege to join with the overwhelming majority of my colleagues in approving the Senator from Colorado's proposal to provide substantial pay increases to members of the armed services. Having voted in favor of

the earlier Senate-passed version of the pay increase, I was gratified that Senate approval of this measure was achieved today.

It is important to keep in mind that raising military pay scales is a matter of high national priority for two very crucial reasons. First, by increasing the pay of our men and women in uniform we fulfill an obligation to recognize and reward the contributions they are making to the maintenance of our national defense. In many cases their pay is woefully inadequate and totally unjustified in terms of the responsibilities they bear and the obligations they owe to themselves and their families. And second, by putting military pay in closer competition with civilian wages we take a significant step toward ending the draft and creating an all-volunteer military force. For, only by making a military career attractive and secure monetarily, can we hope to draw to it the type of individuals needed to fulfill the requirements of modern national defense.

I commend the Senator from Colorado for his leadership in seeking to upgrade the pay scales of the Armed Forces and for his longstanding concern and devotion to the men and women who wear the uniform of the United States so proudly and with such great distinction to themselves and their Nation.

ORDER FOR STAR PRINT OF S. 2620

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a star print be ordered for S. 2620, the East-West Trade Exchange Act of 1971, introduced by the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) on Thursday, September 30, 1971. Due to an inadvertence, an incorrect text was attached when the bill was introduced for referral.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BENTSEN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 434

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STEVENSON). Pursuant to the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of amendment No. 434 by the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) proposes amendment No. 434 as follows:

"Sec. 505. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be

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Congress would like to know

What does the CIA do?

By Jack McWethy
Congressional Quarterly
Washington

Since Congress created the ultra-secret Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, a growing number of members have been itching to find out more about what their creation does.

The push is on again this year, with impetus being provided by disclosures that the United States is involved in a clandestine war in Laos that Congress didn't know about.

More than a dozen bills have been introduced this spring and summer aimed at removing some of the legal blinders Congress put on itself with respect to the CIA. Some would allow the legislative branch to share more fully in the agency's intelligence information.


In the last two decades, nearly 300 bills have been introduced aimed at easing the tension between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA. Not one bill has passed and only two have been put to a vote. As a result, the CIA remains a mystery even to the body that voted it into existence.

The agency is so secret that some members of Congress who are supposed to know about CIA activities — members of the four highly select intelligence oversight subcommittees — did not know how deeply the CIA figures in the continued existence of the Royal Lao Government. CIA oversight is supposed to be conducted by subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Much to the irritation of some members, the CIA oversight subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee not only keeps its business with the agency a secret, but also keeps the subcommittee's membership a secret from other members of Congress.

Explanation of Secrecy

Paul Wilson, staff director of the House committee, told Congressional Quarterly the membership "was a secret" because that "has always been."



The late Allen Dulles, former CIA director

Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington, a member of the Senate Armed Services CIA oversight subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on U.S. commitments abroad, had to send two staff members to the jungles of Laos to find out how extensive the CIA program was in that supposedly neutral country.

"In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos," Symington told a closed session of the Senate June 7.

Nine senators, including Symington, sit on one of the two Senate subcommittees designed to provide legislative oversight of the CIA.

Not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the

requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. To the CIA director, the law granted the authority to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds."

The Senate Appropriations Committee has a five-man subcommittee with the primary responsibility of reviewing the CIA budget, a figure which later is hidden in the accounts of other government agencies.

According to William W. Woodruff, the one-man staff of the Appropriations oversight subcommittee, the senators discuss more than just the CIA when its director, Richard Helms, testifies.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff said. He said Helms also provided the subcommittee with budget estimates for all government intelligence operations, including those not specifically under the jurisdiction of the CIA.

While the House Appropriations Committee veils its oversight operation in secrecy, the House Armed Services Committee just formed a new subcommittee to deal with all aspects of intelligence.

For the last seven months Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., chairman of Armed Services, used the full committee to weight CIA testimony.

"To say the committee was performing any real oversight function was a fiction," said freshman committee member Michael Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrat. The new subcommittee will be under the direction of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich.

No Quilting Society

"I find it very difficult to believe the oversight committee could not obtain some pretty accurate information on how much of that CIA money was going into Laos," commented Sen. Jack Miller, R-Iowa, during the Senate's June 7 closed session.

Sen. J. W. Fulbright, D-Ark., chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, retorted: "It has been said that we all know

ST. LOUIS, MO.
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POST-DISPATCH

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Planning Attack On Laos War

By RICHARD DUDMAN,
Chief Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2 — A broad new attack against the largely secret United States war in Laos and Cambodia is to be opened Monday by Senators Stuart Symington (Dem.), of Missouri, and Clifford P. Case (Rep.), New Jersey.

They will try to amend the pending Foreign Assistance Act to put ceilings on the amount that may be spent in Laos and on the number of U.S. military men that may be stationed in Cambodia.

Both have been expanding steadily for several years, but the increases have been concealed from the American people and from Congress until recently.

Five hours have been set aside Monday afternoon for debate on the U.S. involvement in Laos, which has been expanding as the U.S. ground operations in Vietnam have been reduced.

Symington has prepared a revised version of his amendment to put a ceiling of \$200,000,000 on U.S. expenditures in Laos this year for economic aid, military assistance and all other U.S. activities.

That would represent a cut of nearly 60 per cent, because testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee had disclosed that the total planned expenditures there this year amount to \$500,200,000.

That figure does not include about \$200,000,000 or more for U.S. air operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail system of infiltration routes into South Vietnam.

Nor would Symington's proposed ceiling apply to operations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By exempting those expenditures, he seeks to avoid the charge that his proposed limitation would endanger U.S. troops still in South Vietnam or

would otherwise hinder the Nixon Administration's withdrawal program.

The broad language of the amendment would cut the funds spent through the Department of Defense and the aid program as well as expenditures by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA, which gets its appropriations through funds hidden elsewhere in the federal budget, pays for the training and support of a clandestine army of Lao tribesmen and for a growing force of Thai soldiers fighting in Laos under U.S. direction.

Case's amendment would put a ceiling on the number of Americans that could be assigned to Cambodia. It would freeze the number at about the present level.

Symington, Case and other Senators contend that the Nixon Administration has been violating the spirit if not the letter of restrictions written into law last year to curb expansion of the war in Laos and Cambodia.

Symington has been laying the groundwork for several years for this new effort to curb the war. He has demanded repeatedly to know the facts about U.S. operations there, in his capacity as the only Senator who is a member of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee.

Last spring, two members of the staff of his subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad went to Vientiane at about the same time that Defense Department witnesses were asking the Armed Services Committee for a new authorization of \$125,800,000 for military assistance to Laos in the current 1972 fiscal year.

The staff members learned in the Laotian capital that the estimate of the 1972 military assistance program actually being planned for Laos was twice that amount -- \$250,100,000.

Other planned expenditures, including \$143,400,000 for U.S. air support in northern Laos and other areas excluding the Ho Chi Minh Trail area, brought the total for the current year to nearly \$500,000,000.

President Richard M. Nixon, after repeated questions on the subject, gave what he called a "precise description of our current activities in Laos" in a statement on March 6, 1970.

He said that the United States was providing regular and irregular Lao forces with equipment, training and logistics support. He said that the United States was also conducting operations to intercept the Ho Chi Minh Trail, reconnaissance

flights in Northern Laos, and on request from the Lao government, combat missions for Lao forces.

Mr. Nixon's statement made no mention of the CIA support of the clandestine army and the Thai troops. Nor did it convey any clear impression of the intensive campaign by the U.S. Air Force, including B-52 strikes in northern Laos.

Last year, both houses passed a bill, and the President signed it, prohibiting U.S. support for Viet Cong and "or other free world forces" in "actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the governments of Cambodia or Laos.

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Chiles
Cook
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Cotton
CurtisDole
Dominick
Eastland
Ervin
Fannin
Fong
Gambrill
Goldwater
Griffin
Gurney
Hansen
Hollings
Iruska
Jackson
Jordan, Idaho
Long
Magnuson
Mathias
McClellan
McGee
McIntyre

the purpose of deployment of an antiballistic missile system at any site or for the purpose of advanced preparation (site selection, land acquisition, site survey, or the procurement of long leadtime items) for any such system at any site.

(b) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to terminate and settle all contractual obligations relating to the deployment of an antiballistic missile system and to the advanced preparation for any such system which were entered into prior to the date of enactment of this title. The Secretary of Defense shall submit estimates to the Congress at the earliest practicable date regarding the amount of funds necessary to terminate and settle all such obligations. The Secretary shall keep the Congress fully and currently informed until all such obligations have been finally terminated and settled.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the use of funds appropriated for carrying out research, testing, development, and evaluation of an antiballistic missile system."

On page 14, line 5, strike out "(b)" and insert in lieu thereof "(d)".

Mr. HUGHES obtained the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 1 minute?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I observe that we have two amendments which provide on the first one for an hour and a half, with 45 minutes to a side, and on the other for 2 hours, with 1 hour to a side—3½ hours altogether.

I would judge, from the requests I have for speakers, that perhaps all the time will not be used. That is just a guess on my part. It may be that we can vote long before 8 o'clock. Thus, I would hope that all Senators would remain so that they can cast their votes.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. PROXMIKE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Iowa yield me 1 minute?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. PROXMIKE. Mr. President, the Senate has voted to continue with the F-14 program. If that is the will of Congress, of course I accept it. But I remain troubled over the prospect of a Grumman bailout. I introduce an amendment dealing with this Grumman bailout issue, which is designed only to clarify Armed Services Committee language.

I send the amendment to the desk and ask that it be printed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received and will be printed.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, consistent with the position I have held since the ABM issue was first debated in this body, I am once again offering an amendment to halt all deployment of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system.

While it is the intent of the amendment to continue and encourage research and development of antiballistic missiles, the amendment would terminate all existing contracts for military construction work and for operational components of the system. It would also order the settlement of all claims against the Government resulting from the termination.

I recognize that my insistence on halt-

ing all deployment differs with that of a number of my colleagues whose views on the arms race in general parallel my own and for whose intelligence and good judgment I have the highest regard.

But I believe this amendment also keeps faith with many Americans in the Congress and in the general public who have believed for a long time that this ABM system, like its predecessor, the Sentinel, is neither a credible deterrent nor a sound investment for our country.

The case against deployment of the Safeguard system has been clearly and completely set forth in extended congressional debate over a 2-year period. Silence on the subject now will not impair their validity or erase the arguments which I consider overwhelmingly persuasive from the record.

A little over 2 years ago, this body, by a single vote, agreed to initiating deployment of the Safeguard system. And last year, again by an extremely narrow margin, the Senate acceded to another billion dollar-plus installment. Today we are asked to underwrite still another.

Progress in the deployment of Safeguard over the past 2 years is also a matter of public record. At the most advanced site near Grand Forks, N. Dak., construction work on only the first of a number of structures will not be completed until July of next year. None of the hardware has yet been delivered—no missiles, radars, or computers are in place at any of the deployment sites. Of the \$9.5 billion in the Pentagon's four-site cost estimate, and the \$3.7 billion already authorized for the system, including research and development, less than \$2.5 billion had actually been expended by the end of fiscal 1971.

As you know, Mr. President, another billion dollars that has been approved by the House and endorsed by the Senate Armed Services Committee is included in the bill we are now considering and has not yet been added to the so-called sunk funds.

In other words, we have not progressed so far with Safeguard that we have, in any sense, reached a point of no return.

My amendment would save us \$748 million this year and several billions in the years ahead—money that would be a very strategic weapon in the country's losing war against inflation.

We are all devoutly praying for the success of the SALT negotiations currently under way. A year ago, it was argued that ABM deployment would constitute an effective "bargaining chip" for these talks. There is no more reason, in my view, to accept this as a valid premise today than there was a year ago. Then, as now, the most effective instrument for negotiation is the credible desire for peace.

If the Safeguard system did have any value as a "bargaining chip," which I do not believe, it would not be found in the earth that has been rearranged at three remote locations or the unfurnished concrete structures that can be found there.

Its value is in the technology we have developed—a technology that could easily be converted to research and development of an ABM system designed specifically for the Minuteman defense role,

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Expiugated Pentagon Papers Go on Sale to Public Monday

By Sanford J. Ungar

Washington Post Staff Writer

The official, expurgated U.S. government edition of the Pentagon Papers will go on sale to the public for \$30 a set next Monday morning.

Delivered without forewarning to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees by the Pentagon yesterday morning, the declassified version of the controversial secret study of the Vietnam war was turned over to the Government Printing Office by Rep. Edward Hebert (D-La.), chairman of the House unit, at 10:30 a.m.

Public Printer Adelphus N. Spence II confirmed that by 4 p.m. the GPO and several of its private contractors were at work producing a 12-volume photo offset edition.

Under Hebert's instructions, Spence said, about 700 copies will be sent to Capitol Hill Monday morning, another 700 distributed free to public libraries and the remainder of a 2,500-copy press run made available to the public.

Each of the individual volumes will sell for \$4.25, Spence said, with \$1.00 discount for anyone who buys all 12 at once.

Informed sources who inspected the Pentagon-produced documents yesterday said that a massive inter-agency declassification team had "deleted very little."

The sources listed these as the only omissions from the original Pentagon Papers:

- The four-volume "diplomatic section" of the study, dealing with American diplomatic contacts regarding the Vietnam war, which no newspaper or other private person has publicly claimed to possess;

- Several pages of the narrative dealing with American support for the 1963 coup

overthrowing South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem;

- A section of the narrative concerning South Vietnamese maritime operations in connection with the war effort;

- Portions of the running account dealing with "educating the American public" about Operation Rolling Thunder, the American bombing of North Vietnam; and

- All of the documents pertaining to the years when Lyndon B. Johnson was President.

In a letter accompanying the Pentagon's submission of the study to the congressional chairman, a Defense Department legislative liaison official told them the diplomatic section had been kept classified because it deals "exclusively with sensitive negotiations seeking peace and the release of prisoners of war."

Apart from the diplomatic section, Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim told newsmen, 95 per cent of the study is being made public.

Randy A. Johnson, assistant to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird for legislative affairs, said in his letter to Hebert and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) that "some of the material has been declassified solely on the basis of prior disclosures."

The declassification review, by a team of 100 drawn from various government agencies, "has been a difficult task," Johnson said, "complicated by the pattern of prior unauthorized disclosures and pending and potential actions in the courts."

The Pentagon papers were first disclosed by The New York Times and The Washington Post and later by other newspapers last June.

Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, a former Pentagon aide now with

the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who acknowledges having provided the Pentagon papers to the press, has been indicted under the federal Espionage Act.

The Justice Department has said it is pursuing further criminal charges against others before grand juries in Boston and Los Angeles.

On June 30 the Supreme Court affirmed the right of newspapers to publish articles based on the study, but did not rule out criminal prosecution in connection with the disclosures.

Most immediately affected by the Pentagon's release of its declassified version of the Papers was Beacon Press in Boston, which has scheduled publication Oct. 17 of a nearly complete version obtained from Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska).

Arnold Towell, editor-in-chief at Beacon, the non-profit publishing arm of the Unitarian-Universalist Association, said last night that "we're carrying on" pending an opportunity to inspect the Pentagon's edition.

The Beacon version, to be packaged in four volumes and sold at \$20 a set, reportedly contains several of the items deleted by the Pentagon.

Friedheim claimed yesterday that the Pentagon's action had nothing to do with the plans of Beacon and Gravel. He stressed that Laird had stated in a June 22 directive that the declassification review should be completed within 90 days, and that yesterday was only one day late.

Sources close to Beacon, however, said the publisher feared that the official edition of the Pentagon papers might cut into their sales or force reconsideration of their plans.

Spence said that by using the offset process and turning over the "lion's share" of the

production job to outside contractors, the GPO would keep the cost at a minimum.

The public printer said it took 5½ hours to begin production because the papers, as provided to Hebert by the Pentagon, were "an ungodly mess."

In his letter to the committee chairmen, Johnson acknowledged that "because of the time constraint imposed on the (declassification) review, it is possible, even probable, that errors of omission and commission have been made during the review."

"This, however, represents the best possible effort taking into consideration the time available and the numerous complicating factors which influenced the review."

15 SEP 1971

'Essential' in Laos

STATINTL

Testimony given in July before the Senate Armed Services Committee, and now made public, lifts a bit more the veil that has long obscured the extent and character of American military involvement in Laos. Among our activities there, we learn, is the sponsorship of a force of some 30,000 guerrillas, equipped, trained and paid by the Central Intelligence Agency.

They are described as indispensable to the carrying out of American policy. U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said at the hearings that "the absence of such support for the Lao government would undoubtedly lead to military and political collapse," and would free substantial North Vietnamese forces for use against South Vietnam. It was said further that the guerrillas were an essential part of the Nixon administration's policy of the "Vietnamization" of the war in Indochina.

Perhaps this was what Defense Secretary Laird had in mind when he told the committee that to halve the \$407 million budget for expenditures in Laos, as proposed by Senator Symington, would amount to an abandonment of the guerrilla effort.

We are reminded again that the war to Indochina, though indeed diminishing in terms of American ground troops in action, and American infantrymen killed, is still a war. We are also reminded again that American plans, so far as they can be discerned, foresee a continued war with continued American participation, whether by proxy or not; and that "Vietnamization" has many aspects not always mentioned by those who use it as a simple slogan, suggesting an easy conclusion to the American role in this tragic conflict.

15 SEP 1971

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The news briefly

U.S. operation in Laos reported

Washington

Administration officials say the United States is supporting 30,000 Thai troops in special guerrilla units in Laos, which are equipped and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee hearings in July was made public Monday.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said that to halve this year's \$607 million budget for the U.S. expenditures in Laos would amount to abandoning the program.

STATINTL

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**NEW REPORT TELLS
OF C.I.A.'S LAOS ROLE**

WASHINGTON, Sept. 13 (UPI)—A transcript of secret Senate testimony described today the Central Intelligence Agency's role in secretly training and supporting 30,000 guerrilla troops in Laos since 1952.

The material was contained in published closed-door hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

G. McMurtrie Godley, United States Ambassador to Laos, told the committee that the guerrilla units financed by the Central Intelligence Agency, "have been the backbone of the military effort in Laos" to repel the North Vietnamese forces.

"The irregular forces in Laos today . . . number about 30,000 men," he said. "These forces are organized into S.G.U. [Spec-

cial Guerrilla Unit] battalions and these battalions now comprise about 330 to 360 men each."

Last month a 23-page report was made public detailing the involvement of the C.I.A. in the Laotian war. That report was prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on foreign commitments by James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, two former Foreign Service officers.

Mr. Godley said that the guerrilla units operated everywhere in Laos except in the area around the capital, Vientiane.

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14 SEP 1971

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

\$490 MILLION A YEAR AND 30,000 GUERRILLAS

CIA'S SECRET WAR IN LAOS IS EXPANDING

(UPI) -- The war in Laos has grown to a \$490 million-a-year operation that includes a 30,000-man secret guerrilla army run by the CIA.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird gave these figures to the Senate Armed Services Committee July 22. A heavily-censored record of his testimony was released yesterday.

Mr. Laird said the \$490 million does not cover U.S. bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail thru Laos into South Vietnam. The funds cover only operations in direct support of Laos, including CIA training and equipping of Lao and Thai irregulars, tactical air operations against North Vietnam, economic aid and military assistance to government forces.

MILITARY ACTIVITIES

G. McMurtrie Godley, the U.S. ambassador to Laos who supervises all military activities

and runs the CIA operations, said the 30,000 guerrillas and an undisclosed number of Thai irregulars are "the backbone of the military effort in Laos."

Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson said that never before has the United States conducted military operations under the direction of an ambassador with the State Department having no operational control.

The number of CIA men in the area remained classified, but Mr. Godley said he did not see how a similar number of regular U.S. military men could accomplish the same job with the same number of people.

"They have, for example, in Laos men who speak the language, who know the terrain like the palms of their hands and who do what I consider to be an outstanding job."

Mr. Godley said some of the CIA agents

were former military men "but in no case has there been any what we call sheep-dipping. There has been no instance of a man seconded by our military forces to serve with the CIA in Laos."

He said the guerrilla units operated everywhere in Laos except in the capital area.

"The reason that no personnel has been recruited in the Vientiane area was that there were in the 1950s a series of coups," he said. "Military personnel played a rather prominent role, and the United States did not wish to become intimately involved in internal political machinations."

Mr. Godley said the CIA began assisting Lao irregulars in 1962 and 1963, when it became apparent that the North Vietnamese were not going to respect the Geneva Accords barring outside military interference.

14 SEP 1971

CIA Admits Training Irregulars in Laos

STATINTL

From News Dispatches

The Central Intelligence Agency is equipping, training and advising about 30,000 Lao troops fighting as irregular forces in Laos, it was confirmed yesterday.

The figure was given by G. McMurtrie Godley, U.S. ambassador in Vientiane, in secret testimony to a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 22. A censored transcript of the hearing was made public yesterday.

Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson told the committee that American financing of additional Thai volunteer forces supplementing the Laos did not violate the congressional ban of U.S. payment to third country troops in Laos.

The United States considered such Thai troops as local because they had severed their connections with the Thai armed forces and were under the control of the Laotian government, he said. Other sources have said that the Thai volunteers number more than 4,000.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), who helped push through the payment ban, described Johnson's logic in labelling the Thai troops as local as "reaching pretty far out."

"If there are Thai mercenaries in Laos, it is the opinion of our lawyers that that is against the law," he said.

The ambassador said CIA operations abroad were under the direction of an ambassador with the Defense Department having no operational control. The officials were supporting President Nixon's request for \$407 million for Laotian operations in the financial year which began July 1.

Dossier on the

CIA

by William R. Carson

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. --ex-President Harry S. Truman.

NOTHING has happened since that pronouncement by the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's development. As currently organized, supervised, structured and led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness. Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine operations. Possibly its reputation, regardless of the facts, is now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So American taxpayers provide upwards of \$750,000,000 a year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or to what extent the CIA fulfils or exceeds its authorized intelligence functions.

The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and legitimate activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does raise a very real problem of the proper place and control of agents who are required, or authorized on their own recognition, to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage but it can be — and has been — perverted to hide intelligence activities even from those with the constitutional responsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this indecision.

What we need to do is to examine how the U.S. gathers its intelligence, and consider how effective its instruments are and what room there is for improvement. Every government agency must be accountable, and in this case the CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society

of Newspaper Editors, be supervised by the Intelligence Agency. The time is long past for the supervisory role of Central Intelligence in the War. Under this CIA administration of inquiry by its Director and specifically requiring disclosure of titles, salaries and expenses of CIA; (ii) expectations on expenditure by the Director's office without adverse publicity; Government and the Government for staff abroad and their families; 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Director a license.

With so much of the world as is seen by man in the last three decades, in Guatemala, Mossadegh in Iran, the Cuban Revolution (failure). The President Kennedy, on May 28, 1961, was heralded as a new era. Because the agency's "military

representative of the unending gambitry and bigger-than-life human aspect of espionage and secret operations. At this level the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote noted in his *Handbook for Spies*, the average agent's "real difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administrative details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking life."

As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in 1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On arrival he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test does and was wired up, and the technician plugged the machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it blew out all the hotel's lights. The ensuing confusion and darkness did not cover a getaway by the trio. They were discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies.

By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old Peter Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the CIA set off a two-stage international incident between England and the United States, caused the Secretary of State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state, made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation wherein the United States Government lied in public — and was caught!

E - 58,773

AUG. 30 1971

U.S. Still Leads In Defensive Armaments But Soviet Union Is Close On Heels

(This is the first of three articles based on many interviews and briefings with diplomatic, military, political and economic analysts at the White House, State Department, Defense Department, Agency for International Development, National Science Foundation, Library of Congress and other governmental sources.)

By RAY CROMLEY
AEA Military Analyst

WASHINGTON — If an international contest were held missile building, submarine and today to determine which of the superpowers had the most space experiments. The growth defensive muscle, the United States would win -- but not by much.

But if the same contest were held a decade hence, the outcome might not be the same.

This clear consensus is the result of a private survey made by this correspondent in the course of a six-month study of the American and Soviet military establishments.

Don't be surprised if the old "missile gap" returns to the headlines, because many military strategists have begun to worry about it again.

The facts, at the moment, are these:

1. American missiles are more accurate than the Soviet varieties and are more invulnerable to enemy attack.

2. American naval power is superior to the Soviet Union's, mainly because the U.S. Navy

has had years of first-hand war experience. The Soviet navy has had no actual battle testing in 20 years.

3. The U.S. Army has also stood the test of battle for many

The Missile Gap

years, a plus factor, but has also been demoralized because of Vietnam, a minus factor.

4. The Soviet trend line is moving up at a steady rate in international contests held missile building, submarine and ship construction and in military superpowers had the most space experiments. The growth rate in numbers and, in some cases, technology, has been greater than the U.S. rate.

American strategists point out that the development of military technology in the Soviet Union and the accompanying research are moving ahead too rapidly for comfort.

In most situations, however, the Soviet Union is doing no more than catching up to the American position. No one yet knows where they will go when they do catch up, and by the time this is learned (the state of the intelligence arts being what it is), it could be too late to react.

But what makes many observers skeptical about this sort of information is that the country has been through the "missile gap" exercise before.

For example, in the 1950s, it was argued in very high places that there would soon be a bomber gap. Indications were

that the Soviet Union had embarked on large-scale bomber construction.

So the U.S. government ordered a hurry-up multi-billion dollar bomber program to combat the impending threat. Except that the Soviet Union did not build the bombers. They did build missiles.

In 1960, Sen. Stuart Symington "leaked" information that the Soviet Union would soon surpass the United States in intercontinental missiles and the "missile gap" was born.

Again, the United States crashed into a missile building program. But the "missile gap" never developed, if it ever actually existed in the first place.

And there was Sputnik. The Russians not only scored a clear space beat but also an education and propaganda triumph. The tiny satellite demonstrated that the Soviet Union could do what the Americans had not yet done. The "moon race" began and the Americans rushed to catch up and, ultimately, win the contest — at a cost not yet calculated.

Once again, we are being warned of a "missile gap" in the form of a new Soviet first-strike capability, the SS-9 ICBM and a possible improvement which may be off the drawing boards.

Obviously, it is no wonder that many are skeptical of dire warnings about an impending missile gap, especially when enunciated at budget times.

As Herbert Scoville, former CIA deputy director told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "In essentially all cases the threat to the U.S. deterrent is less than was estimated in 1969 and the United States already has programs in

being, or available for rapid deployment if required, which can insure the maintenance of a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future."

If one follows the odds, then, it's likely there will again be no "missile gap."

But the question remains: Can the U.S. government follow the odds when so much is at stake? Some men remain cautious.

If this government overreacts by building armaments which turn out to be unnecessary, the American long-term defense posture is seriously weakened. By spending billions on "today's" weapons, there is less to spend on long-term research and development.

If, on the other hand, the warnings are finally correct, the security of the country is seriously weakened.

It is a dilemma which this country is now facing.

(Newspaper Enterprise Assn.)

RACINE, WISC.
JOURNAL-TIMES
E - 38,807
BULLETIN
S - 38,729

AUG 29 1971

Congress in Park on CIA

We can't blame some Congressmen for wanting to know a little more about what the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is doing.

The agency is so secret that representatives who are supposed to know about CIA activities—members of four highly select intelligence oversight subcommittees—did not know how deeply the CIA is involved in Laos.

✓ Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington, a member of the Senate Armed Services CIA oversight subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on U.S. commitments abroad, had to send two staff members to the jungles of Laos to find out what was going on.

The report that came out was censored, but it revealed that the CIA maintains an "irregular force" in Laos as the cutting edge of the Royal Laotian army. Augmented by Thai troops, the force has been as large as 38,000 and now is about 30,000. The report also disclosed that despite the fact that U.S. expenditures for the clandestine war in Laos escalated to \$350 million in fiscal 1971 (exclusive of bombing costs), with more to be spent this year, the military situation there is growing steadily worse.

More southern Laotian territory is under North Vietnamese control than before the American-supported South Vietnamese invasion of Laos.

If the censored report conveys such a discouraging picture, one can only

speculate on how bleak the uncensored version may have been.

Since the ultra-secret Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 as an executive privilege agency, nearly 200 bills have been introduced aimed at easing the tension between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA. Not one bill has passed and only two have been put to a vote. As a result, the CIA remains a mystery even to the body that voted it into existence.

More than a dozen bills have been proposed this spring and summer aimed at removing some of the legal blinders Congress put on itself on the CIA's activities.

The proposals include setting up a joint committee on CIA intelligence operations and information which would include members of key committees from both the Senate and the House, establishing a procedure for regular and thorough CIA intelligence briefings of the two Armed Services Committees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House foreign affairs Committee or limiting the CIA to information gathering rather than military or para-military operations in other countries.

One way or another Congress should be kept informed on the CIA intelligence activities. We can't expect the agency to tell the world all the details of its cloak and dagger work, but at least congressional leaders shouldn't be kept in the dark.

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 STATINTL



On the
Issues

CIA: CONGRESS IN DARK ABOUT ACTIVITIES, SPENDING

Since the Central Intelligence Agency was given authority in 1949 to operate without normal legislative oversight, an uneasy tension has existed between an uninformed Congress and an uninformative CIA.

In the last two decades nearly 200 bills aimed at making the CIA more accountable to the legislative branch have been introduced. Two such bills have been reported from committee. None has been adopted.

The push is on again. Some members of Congress are insisting they should know more about the CIA and about what the CIA knows. The clandestine military operations in Laos run by the CIA appear to be this year's impetus.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the Armed Services Intelligence Operations Subcommittee and chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee dealing with U.S. commitments abroad, briefed the Senate June 7 behind closed doors on how deeply the CIA was involved in the Laotian turmoil. He based his briefing on a staff report. (*Weekly Report* p. 1709, 1660, 1268)

He told the Senate in that closed session: "In all my committees there is no real knowledge of what is going on in Laos. We do not know the cost of the bombing. We do not know about the people we maintain there. It is a secret war."

As a member of two key subcommittees dealing with the activities of the CIA, Symington should be privy to more classified information about the agency than most other members of Congress. But Symington told the Senate he had to dispatch two committee staff members to Laos in order to find out what the CIA was doing.

If Symington does not know what the CIA has been doing, then what kind of oversight function does Congress exercise over the super-secret organization? (*Secrecy fact sheet*, *Weekly Report* p. 1785)

A Congressional Quarterly examination of the oversight system exercised by the legislative branch, a study of sanitized secret documents relating to the CIA and interviews with key staff members and members of Congress indicated that the real power to gain knowledge about CIA activities and expenditures rests in the hands of four powerful committee chairmen and several key members of their committees—Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

The extent to which these men exercise their power in ferreting out the details of what the CIA does with its secret appropriation determines the quality of legislative oversight on this executive agency that Congress voted into existence 24 years ago.

The CIA Answers to...

As established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253), the Central Intelligence Agency was accountable to the President and the National Security

Council. In the original Act there was no language which excluded the agency from scrutiny by Congress, but also no provision which required such examination.

To clear up any confusion as to the legislative intent of the 1947 law, Congress passed the 1949 Central Intelligence Act (PL 81-110) which exempted the CIA from all federal laws requiring disclosure of the "functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel" employed by the agency. The law gave the CIA director power to spend money "without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of government funds." Since the CIA became a functioning organization in 1949, its budgeted funds have been submerged into the general accounts of other government agencies, hidden from the scrutiny of the public and all but a select group of ranking members of Congress. (*Congress and the Nation* Vol. I, p. 306, 249)

THE SENATE

In the Senate, the system by which committees check on CIA activities and budget requests is straightforward. Nine men—on two committees—hold positions of seniority which allow them to participate in the regular annual legislative oversight function. Other committees are briefed by the CIA, but only on topical matters and not on a regular basis.

Appropriations. William W. Woodruff, counsel for the Senate Appropriations Committee and the only staff man for the oversight subcommittee, explained that when the CIA comes before the five-man subcommittee, more is discussed than just the CIA's budget.

"We look to the CIA for the best intelligence on the Defense Department budget that you can get," Woodruff told Congressional Quarterly. He said that CIA Director Richard Helms provided the subcommittee with his estimate of budget needs for all government intelligence operations.

Woodruff explained that although the oversight subcommittee was responsible for reviewing the CIA budget, any substantive legislation dealing with the agency would originate in the Armed Services Committee, not Appropriations.

No transcripts are kept when the CIA representative (usually Helms) testifies before the subcommittee. Woodruff said the material covered in the hearings was so highly classified that any transcripts would have to be kept under armed guard 24 hours a day. Woodruff does take detailed notes on the sessions, however, which are held for him by the CIA. "All I have to do is call," he said, "and they're on my desk in an hour."

Armed Services. "The CIA budget itself does not legally require any review by Congress," said T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel for the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only staff man used by the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee.

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DISPATCH

E - 223,673
S - 318,040

AUG 22 1971

Low-Profile Michigan Solon Selected to Investigate CIA

Dispatch Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — If the best qualification for a super-sleuth is to be inconspicuous, then the government's hush-hush intelligence network had better watch its secrets.

They'd better watch them — because if all the 535 members of Congress were assembled together, Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., might be the least noticeable. And Nedzi has just been named to explore the intelligence network's hidden operations.

NEDZI IS a small, plump man with scanty hair, although only in his mid-40s, of paddling walk rather than purposeful stride, whose somewhat moonlike face is marked customarily by a somewhat bewildered expression.

He is, moreover, a dove. Members of the House establishment regard him as a rebel on the House hawk-like Armed Services Committee.

Thus it was that when Committee Chairman F. Edward Hebert, D-La., suddenly named the Michigan lawmaker, a veteran of less than 10 years in Congress and only the ninth-ranking member of the committee, as the House overseer of the intelligence establishment, there were gasps of amazement from all over.

TRADITIONALLY, the subcommittee that oversees Central Intelligence Agency operations is headed by the full committee chairman.

Presumably, that was the way it would be under Hebert, because the CIA traditionally

amendment, has opposed the BL bomber and the Safeguard missile system.

SO WHY DID Hebert jump Nedzi over several of his seniors? "Because he is an honest man, and will do an honest job," said Hebert.

Nedzi's explanation was that Hebert was interested in having "a review in this area . . . we understand each other. I know where he stands and he knows where I stand. I have never deceived him and he has never reflected deception to me. He feels that we need to call a spade a spade and he feels I'll do just that."

Hebert may be right. Nedzi's fellow subcommitteemen are four hawkish establishment men—Melvin Price of Illinois and O. C. Fisher of Texas, Democrats, and William G. Bray of Indiana and Alvin E. O'Konski of Wisconsin, Republicans—all of whom rank Nedzi in seniority.

LUCIEN NEDZI had been a part of the defense establishment, its ways not to be questioned too deeply.

So Nedzi's selection was a shock—at least to those who did not know Hebert once was an investigation-minded New Orleans city editor who directed the first exposé of the Huey Long empire.

AN EVEN GREATER surprise was when Hebert expanded the subcommittee's authority to include oversight of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the super-secret National Security Agency.

Nedzi's record on the Armed Services Committee has not been of the kind that had endeared him to the more senior, and generally more conservative, members of that panel—he had, as a matter of fact, been one of a quintet including Ohio's Charles W. Whalen Jr., R-Dayton, who had repeatedly infuriated Rivers, Hebert's predecessor

looking into the Pueblo affairs. He had met CIA Director Richard Helms. But he has never had any direct contact with CIA. He does not know Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, nor Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the National Security Agency.

Thus, he comes to his newly assigned task with clean hands and an open mind. But he knows what he wants to find out.

HE WANTS TO know if individual rights are being protected—that is, have the intelligence agencies cut out their domestic intelligence activities. He will check to see if it is proper for CIA to manage secret operations such as those in Laos and other covert operations not related to intelligence gathering as such; if there is too much overlapping and too little coordination between intelligence operations and if enormous budgets for these operations channel information to proper authorities at the right time; of the whole system of security classification should be revised; and what is the real and definitive basis for arriving at decisions in national intelligence estimates.

* There may be nothing wrong with the overall intelligence operation.

But if there is something wrong, those responsible had better not put in Nedzi's seeming vagueness any faith that he will not uncover their secret faults.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

Our National Security.

John Roche is on a brief vacation, but he will continue to write his columns, with prominent political figures occasionally contributing guest columns. Today's contributor is Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, D-Minn., former vice president and now a leading Democratic Presidential hopeful.

We have witnessed in recent years a gradual and potentially dangerous isolation and insulation of power within the Executive branch of government.


I am particularly sensitive to this situation, having served in the United States Senate for 16 years and as vice president for four.

Nowhere is the tendency toward isolation more apparent than in the field of national security. I believe it is at least in part responsible for some of the divisiveness and the search for scapegoats generated by the recent publication of the "Pentagon Papers."

WE SIMPLY HAVE NOT HAD the mechanism for adequate consultation between Congress and the Executive branch in the formulation of national security policy.

The President and key government officials meet occasionally with the leaders of Congress on an informal basis. There are several congressional committees that deal with some aspects of national security. But decision-making is fragmented.

I have proposed that we end that fragmentation and provide for closer consultation by establishing a permanent joint congressional Committee on National Security.



STATINTL

STATINTL

The committee would have these main functions:

○ First, to study and make recommendations on all issues concerning national security. This would include review of the President's report on the state of the world, the defense budget, and foreign assistance programs as they relate to national security goals, and U.S. disarmament policies as a part of our defense considerations.

○ Second, to review, study and evaluate the "Pentagon Papers," and other documents, whether published heretofore or not, covering U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

○ Third, to study and make recommendations on government practices of classification and declassification of documents.

○ Fourth, to conduct a continuing review of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the departments of Defense and State, and other agencies intimately involved with our foreign policy.

THE UNIQUE FEATURES of the committee would be the composition of its membership. It would have representation from those individual and committee jurisdictions that have primary responsibility in military, foreign relations and congressional leadership.

It would include the President Pro Tempore of the Senate; the Speaker of the House; the majority and minority leaders of both houses, and the chairman and ranking minority members of the committees on appropriations, foreign relations and armed services and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

It would not usurp the legislative or investigative functions of any present committees, but supplement and coordinate their efforts in a more comprehensive framework.

Nor is it designed to usurp the President's historic role as Commander-In-Chief, nor to put the Congress in an adversary relationship with the Executive branch.

IT IS, RATHER, A NEW BODY, to be composed of members of both parties and both houses of Congress, that will make possible closer consultation and cooperation between the President and the Congress.

The concentration of power within the Executive branch is quite understandable considering our experience in World War II and afterward. But times change, and so must our institutions and responses.

I cannot help but believe that if the Congress had shared more fully in momentous decisions, like those in Vietnam, we would be less divided as a nation by

A new framework for the formulation of national security policy, I believe, can bring us closer to the ideal we all share for lasting peace.

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August 6, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 61

be respected in any incomes policy. However, the evolution (or the failure to evolve) of the guideposts placed too much stress on economic rationality as opposed to workability and acceptance. For example, it was no doubt a mistake to have continued to insist on guideposts which were consistent only with complete stability of the price level at a time when prices had already begun to rise more than nominally.

3. The guideposts—or, more broadly, the intervention through public and private persuasion—had a noticeable and useful impact on wages and prices, even during the period 1966-68 when demand-management policy was inappropriate and highly inflationary. There was (in this writer's judgment) no damage to the allocation of resources, nor appreciable inequity—both of which were frequently charged.

4. Locating the administration of the guideposts and related interventions primarily in the Council of Economic Advisers was not ideal. To be sure, since the policy was voluntary, it benefited from a close association with the prestige of the Presidency and from the President's personal intervention at a few crucial points. Neither the Secretary of Labor nor of Commerce would have been a suitable administrator, given his office, and, in any case, the incumbents during most of the period were not supporters of the policy. A merger of the two Departments, or the Cabinet reorganization proposed by President Nixon, would provide a more suitable office in the future.

5. Given the seriousness of the problem and the inherent limitations of a purely voluntary policy, the author favours the establishment, by legislation, of a Price-Wage Review Board, with limited powers (a) to require prior notice of wage and price changes, (b) to suspend such changes for a limited period, (c) to investigate them (including power to compel testimony), and (d) to report to the public with recommendations.¹ The Board should be authorized to study and recommend—and possibly even be given limited powers of control—with respect to certain features of price-setting or of wage contracts (e.g., the conditions under which escalator clauses could be used), or to certain trade or employment practices that tended to raise costs or reduce competition. It would not, however, have power ultimately to limit or control any price or wage.

6. The President (but not the Wage-Price Review Board) should have at all times standby authority for the compulsory control of wages and prices, wholly or in any part, with the requirement that any use of this authority be reviewed by the Congress under a procedure which would permit a Congressional veto of the President's action.

7. To the maximum extent possible, the existence of a price-incomes policy (although not, obviously, the details of the policy) should cease to be considered a partisan issue, but rather come to be regarded as a regular and permanent aspect of the U.S. stabilization system.

8. A well-developed incomes policy should be in place and working before the U.S. economy next returns to the zone of full employment.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, the Chair recognizes the distinguished junior Senator from

Florida (Mr. CHILES), for not to exceed 15 minutes.

(The remarks of Mr. CHILES when he introduced S. 2458 are printed in the Record under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, in accordance with the previous order, the Chair recognizes the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) for not to exceed 15 minutes.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS AND PROPOSED HEARINGS ON S. 2224, A BILL TO AMEND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators BAXTER, BROOKS, CASE, EAGLETON, HARRIS, HART, HATTFIELD, HUGHES, HUMPHREY, JAVITS, MATHIAS, McGOVERN, PACKWOOD, PELL, RUBICOV, RORI, SCHWEIKER, STEVENSON, WILLIAMS be listed as cosponsors of S. 2224, a bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has approved my request to hold hearings after the recess on the bill. It is my expectation that among those who will testify are a number of former and present officials experienced in the field of intelligence and the analysis of facts obtained by the intelligence agencies.

In introducing the bill on July 7, I said that the facts and analyses of intelligence collected by the CIA and made available by law to the executive branch under the National Security Act of 1947 should by law be made available to the Congress.

A chief purpose of the hearings is to establish that the best intelligence must be made available to the appropriate committees of the Congress and through them to the Congress as the Congress make determinations respecting legislative authority and funding of policies and programs of the executive branch, in the field of foreign policy and security. It will also be the purpose of the hearings to consider proposals for establishing guidelines in matters of classification and declassification and in establishing for the Congress effective security procedures so that the material to the Congress would be responsibly used.

When the Senate returns from its recess in September, it is my intention to state in more detail the kinds of information that should be available to the Congress and to outline suggestions as to the way the appropriate committees would maintain security for the documents made available to the Congress.

It is my firm belief that this bill provides an effective and straightforward way—and I might say, legal way—based upon the sound precedent of the law which created the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and specified the duties of the Executive branch to keep; that Committee fully and currently informed, for the Congress to better carry out its responsibilities. It is a way to insure that the decisions made by the government of this country—both the executive and the legislative—on foreign policy and national security will be the result of the consideration of the best information obtainable.

I ask unanimous consent that my statement of July 7, 1971, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 7, 1971]

By Mr. COOPER:

S. 2224. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency. Referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, by unanimous consent.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the formulation of sound foreign policy and national security policy requires that the best and most accurate intelligence obtainable be provided to the legislative as well as the executive branch of our Government. The approval by the Congress of foreign policy and national security policy, which are bound together, whose support involves vast amounts of money, the deployment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war, yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in combat, and binding commitments to foreign nations, should only be given upon the best information available to both the executive and legislative branches.

There has been much debate during the past several years concerning the respective powers of the Congress and the Executive in the formulation of foreign policy and national security policy and the authority to commit our Armed Forces to war. We have experienced, unfortunately, confrontation between the two branches of our Government. It is my belief that if both branches, executive and legislative, have access to the same intelligence necessary for such fateful decisions, the working relationship between the Executive and the Congress would be, on the whole, more harmonious and more conducive to the national interest. It would assure a common understanding of the purposes and merits of policies. It is of the greatest importance to the support and trust of the people. It is of the greatest importance to the maintenance of our system of government, with its separate branches held so tenaciously together by trust and reason.

It is reasonable, I submit, to contend that the Congress, which must make its decisions upon foreign and security policy, which is called upon to commit the resources of the Nation, material and human, should have all the information and intelligence available to discharge properly and morally its responsibilities to our Government and the people.

I send to the table a bill amending the National Security Act of 1947, which, I hope, would make it possible for the legislative

¹The author made recommendations along these lines as early as 1958. See his paper in *The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth* (Compendium of Papers Submitted by Panels appearing before the Joint Economic Committee), 31 March 1958 (U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 634-6 and *passim*.

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DOVISH NEDZI'S NEW JOB**Overseer to Lift CIA's Lid**

By ORR KELLY

Star Staff Writer

Shortly after Congress returns from its August recess, five congressmen will turn off the George Washington Memorial Parkway at an unmarked exit, swing back across the parkway on than overpass and suddenly emerge into a spacious, tree-dotted parking lot surrounding a gleaming white building.

Only after they have parked and entered the building will they see their first solid evidence -- inlaid into the floor in a giant seal -- that this is the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Heading the little group of congressmen will be Rep. Lucien Norbert Nedzi, a 46-year-old Democrat who has represented the eastern portion of Detroit since 1962, and who has just been named -- to the surprise of many -- as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on central intelligence.

Nedzi's record has not been the kind that would, on the surface, endear him to the more senior -- and generally more conservative -- members of the committee. He co-sponsored an end-the-war amendment in the House, has opposed the B1 bomber and the Safeguard missile defense system, and is one of a tiny group of rebels on the 41-man committee known as the Fearless Five.

Why did Rep. F. Edward Herbert, a Democrat from Louisiana, choose Nedzi for one of the most important subcommittee assignments -- a post traditionally held by the chairman himself?

Nedzi Explains Choice

"The chairman was generally interested in having a review of this area," Nedzi explained in an interview. "My experience with him has been excellent -- we understand each other. I know where he stands, and he knows where I stand; I have never deceived him and he has never reflected deception to me."

"He feels that we need to call a spade a spade and he feels I'll do just that."

Nedzi comes to his new assignment -- which will cover all intelligence agencies, not just the CIA -- with few preconceptions and, in fact, **Approved For Release 2001/03/04** edge of the field.

"The senior members were on the Central Intelligence subcommittee and we were not privy to their deliberations. We had absolutely no information on the budgets of the agencies or what they were up to. Periodically, we got intelligence reports," Nedzi said.

The five-man subcommittee was, in the past, made up of the chairmen of the full committee and the two senior members from each party. The senior members serving with Nedzi will be Reps. Melvin Price, D-Ill., O. C. Fisher, D-Tex., William G. Bray, R-Ind., and Atvin E. O'Konski, R-Wis.

Nedzi had some brief exposure to the intelligence field when he served on a special subcommittee looking into the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo by the North Koreans.

Has Met Helms

He has met Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, on several occasions when Helms has appeared before the committee and he thinks highly of him. But Nedzi has never visited the CIA, has never called on the CIA for a special intelligence briefing, and does not know Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, or Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the super-secret National Security Agency.

The only time a top intelligence official has appeared in an open hearing in the last decade, was on June 2, 1961 when Helms, then No. 2 man in the CIA, testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee. Normally, Helms and other CIA officials not only testify in closed hearings but their names and the name of their agency are deleted before a transcript on the hearing is made public.

Sets Priorities

Despite his lack of experience in the area, Nedzi has a pretty good idea of the areas he would like to explore and he listed them this way:

1 -- Is there too much overlapping of functions among the CIA and the State and Defense Department intelligence operations?

2 -- Are the budgets the proper size -- and does all the information get to the man who needs it when he needs it?

3 -- Are individual rights being protected? Nedzi is aware that military intelligence people have been told to cut out their domestic intelligence activities, but he wants to make sure the new rules are being obeyed.

4 -- Is it proper for the CIA to manage operations such as those in Laos?

"There is a question of whether we should be involved in such operations and the further questions of whether this agency is the proper one to do it," Nedzi said.

5 -- Should the whole system of security classification be revised?

"That this is a difficult area, I realize," Nedzi said, "and I'm not sure we're going to be able to come up with a Solomon-like decision."

6 -- How are the national intelligence estimates arrived at? What really is the basis for arriving at decisions?

Since his selection for the new job announced earlier this week, Nedzi said, his phone has been constantly busy with callers volunteering information about U.S. intelligence operations.

"We will give them an appropriate audience," he said. "We are hearing from people with all sorts of axes to grind. We'll screen them all for substance, but no one is peremptorily dismissed."

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The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.

TIME TO STOP CIA SECRET WARS

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Speaker, the Nixon administration has now acknowledged, through a Senate subcommittee staff report, that the Central Intelligence Agency is financing and directing a 30,000-man army in Laos. This confirms news reports which have come from Laos in recent months and confronts Congress and the American people with some very basic questions involving our foreign and military policy, the war powers of the President, and the role of the Congress in determining where and under what circumstances this Nation will become involved in military combat operations abroad.

If our tragic and costly involvement in Vietnam has taught us one lesson it must be that Congress can no longer abdicate to the executive branch the power to commit this Nation to war, either overt or covert.

Earlier this year, I introduced legislation aimed at closing a glaring loophole in the National Security Act—a loophole which permits the CIA to organize, finance, and direct military combat operations if that is related to its intelligence mission. I feel strongly that the CIA should confine itself to the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence and I urge my colleagues to support my bill, H.R. 8371 when it is circulated for cosponsors after the August recess.

I would urge my colleagues also to examine carefully the debate in the House on June 17 of this year when I offered an amendment to the military procurement bill to prohibit use of the funds that bill authorized for CIA-run military or paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia. During that debate, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services asserted in response to a question:

The activity of the CIA in all sections of the world, in Laos, the Middle East and everywhere is the gathering of intelligence for the protection and security of the United States.

Only the most generous interpretation could construe the organization, financing, and direction of a 30,000-man army to be intelligence-gathering. The CIA is running a full-scale war in Laos and its army has become the main fighting force there. Unless the Congress specifically prohibits this kind of activity, the power of any President to commit U.S. men, materiel, and funds to war will remain virtually unbridled.

I have nothing but respect for the achievements of the CIA in the intelligence field, and certainly its reputation in this area was greatly enhanced by the disclosures in the Pentagon papers. For its own sake and the sake of our Nation, the CIA must be kept out of a combat role. Talk of preventing future Vietnams is idle rhetoric unless we are willing to take that step.

TRE THE CONTAGIOUS ANIMAL DISEASE BILL

(Mr. MELCHER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minutes, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MELCHER. Mr. Speaker, the Subcommittee of the House Agriculture Committee handling livestock legislation reported out a bill yesterday dealing with the threat of highly contagious diseases carried by animals, some of which may also infect man, giving the Secretary of Agriculture specific authority to work out cooperative programs of control and eradication when these diseases pose a threat to livestock, animals or people here in the United States. There are a number of diseases which are not present in this country which are invasion threats to us.

Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis, a disease primarily of horses but also infectious to humans, spread out of Venezuela to Central America and reached Mexico 3 years ago. While equine owners, American, veterinarians and public health officials were cognizant of the threat it posed for our country, no effective cooperative program was initiated successfully in Mexico, and we now have the disease in this country.

The Department of Agriculture testified last week before the committee that they wanted new legislation authorizing the Secretary to take bolder action to prevent the spread of these types of diseases into our country. The Department should have asked for this 3 years ago before VEE made its way over a thousand miles north through Mexico to this country. If a prod is needed to move the Department into action more quickly in controlling contagious diseases that threaten us, then this bill should serve that purpose. It must be passed promptly.

Passage of the bill would authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to work out cooperative agreements with foreign countries in the Western Hemisphere if in his judgment the health of animals or people in the United States are threatened.

African swine fever, now rampant in Cuba, has reached the Western Hemisphere for the first time. There is no vaccine, no treatment, and the only control is to kill all the swine that are infected, exposed, or anywhere within miles of known cases. It is highly contagious, and its presence in Cuba poses a real threat to the pig producers of this country. Department of Agriculture officials fear hoof and mouth disease, which affects all cloven hooved animals, domestic and wild, is also present in Cuba.

Again, this disease is only controlled by killing all of the animals either infected or exposed. Only 90 miles away from our shore, the invasion of either of these diseases from Cuba would have devastating affects on the animals that are affected by it. The livestock industry and ultimately consumers would pay dearly for meat products if either of these diseases spread in our country. It would require the immediate killing and burial of the diseased or exposed animals to halt the outbreak.

There is a great need for us to be sure that we do not let these diseases spread into our country.

and eradication are being followed in Cuba for African swine fever and also for hoof and mouth disease if it is also present, as U.S. Department officials fear.

Despite the lack of diplomatic relations with Cuba, our own best interests require that we leave no stone unturned to be sure that Cuba's efforts to eliminate these diseases succeed and her needs for assistance are met. Canadian officials are working through the Pan American Health Organization to assist Cuba, but their threat to Canada is not nearly as great as the threat to us, only 90 miles away. Either of the diseases can easily be hijacked into this country, brought in by refugees or carried in by beats which still travel between our country and theirs. American relationship with Cubans is not so strained but what our athletes and theirs cannot compete in Cali, Columbia. Certainly we can also establish direct communication between our Department of Agriculture scientists and theirs to make sure that neither of these diseases escape from Cuba and that both are eradicated on their shores.

The threats posed by these highly contagious diseases—VEE infecting equine, African swine fever infecting hogs, and hoof and mouth disease, infecting all cloven hooved animals including deer, antelope, elk, and moose, are not to be shrugged off lightly. Control and eradication of the diseases may cost millions of dollars but to ignore them and let them spread throughout our country would stagger us with billions of dollars loss besides the threat to human health that VEE poses.

GUIDEPOSTS TO DEMOCRACY

(Mr. WHITTEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Speaker, as a Mississippian I take great pride in the fine young people of our State, and it is with warmth of feeling that I share with you and our colleagues the award-winning speech of Miss Lydia Ruth Hodges of Dorsey, Miss. Miss Hodges, a senior in high school, presented this speech in the American Legion Oratorical Contest. She was the winner of the initial contest in Fulton, Miss., and then the winner in the district contest, the area contest, and the Mississippi State contest; and was runner-up in the regional competition.

I commend her to you for her fine spirit of patriotism and responsibility, as so clearly expressed in her fine speech, "Guideposts to Democracy," which is herewith presented in full:

GUIDEPOSTS TO DEMOCRACY

Freedom, liberty, justice, patriotism, heritage—are these just sentimental words from History? No! These are direct and vibrant challenges to all of us, the "New Generation." We, as American citizens, have the potential to benefit all mankind, but the only way to change this potential into progress is to maintain the rights and privileges that have made and kept us free.

How do we accomplish this seemingly impossible task in today's complex world? Our forefathers who built this country have laid clearly-marked guideposts to show us the way. These guideposts are stated in the Pre-

5 AUG 1971

Hill Session Assails U.S. Over Laos

The Nixon administration was accused during an extraordinary secret Senate session last June 7 of withholding information and misleading Congress about growing U.S. military involvement in the Laotian war.

The meeting was held at the request of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) to brief the Senate on a then-top secret staff report on Laos. The report was made public Monday and the transcript of the secret session was placed in the Congressional Record yesterday.

In clearing the transcript for release, the administration indirectly acknowledged the presence of Central Intelligence Agency advisers in Laos, despite the prohibition against U.S. advisory personnel in Laos and Cambodia written into the 1970 Cooper-Church amendment.

Rise in U.S. Aid

Symington told the Senate, on the basis of the report, that American military assistance to the Royal Laotian government has trebled since 1967 and is 25 times as large as it was when it began in 1963.

"We have been appropriating money for this war in the blind," said Symington.

During the June 7 session Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis acknowledged that the De-

fense Department had not been able to account fully for how it spent its \$2.5 billion in military spending authority for Southeast Asia during the last fiscal year. Said Stennis:

"The Department of Defense told us frankly, 'We are just not certain exactly how much money was spent through these funds in the various countries,' although they made an effort to keep up with it. With bombers flying everywhere and soldiers coming and going, and (detected) and everything going on, I can see the difficulty. I was not patient with it at first, but I came to understand it better."

Spending Limits Sought

Symington and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee have been trying to impose spending limits on the Pentagon for the war in Laos. The Missouri Democrat has proposed a \$200 million ceiling on assistance to Laos, exclusive of the costs of bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Some informed Senate sources estimate the annual costs of bombing the Trail at more than half a billion dollars.

The secret Senate exchange also revealed that Defense Secretary Melvin Laird refused on grounds of military sensitivity to respond to a Foreign Relations Committee query on U.S. military activities in Laos.

Symington said that all but one of the questions Laird declined to answer were answered by U.S. civilian and military officials stationed in Laos and Thailand during a two-week field trip by two committee staff members.

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Senate Armed Services Panel Cuts \$1.2 Billion From Pentagon Budget

The Senate Armed Services Committee cut \$1.2 billion from the Pentagon's fiscal 1972 budget request yesterday and voted to limit construction work on the Safeguard missile defense system this year to two sites rather than the three the administration requested.

In announcing the unanimous committee action, Chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) stressed that work on the country's major strategic weapons systems would be unaffected by the reductions. These systems include the Navy's Polaris/Poseidon missile-firing submarine fleet, the proposed successor to Poseidon, called ULMS, and the Air Force's proposed new B-1 bomber.

The \$21 billion measure approved by Stennis' committee is \$900 million less than that approved by the House Armed Services Committee.

The Senate version is expected to go to the floor for debate after the congressional recess. After floor action, differences in the two bills will have to be worked out in a House-Senate conference committee.

Despite the cuts, Stennis predicted yesterday that the bill would face "a very rugged trip" through the Senate.

Floor fights are anticipated over money ticketed for further development of the B-1 bomber and of the Army's trouble-plagued MBT-70 tank. Also, further attempts to restrict secret U.S. support of guerrilla operations in Laos with Laotian and Thai irregular forces are expected.

The committee's single biggest cut and the major action differing from both the administration request and the House-passed version involves the Safeguard antiballistic missile system.

In reducing the administration's original \$1.27 billion request for Safeguard by \$161.4 million this fiscal year, the Senate committee voted 11 to 5 to limit the remaining funds to deployment only at the two bases where construction is already well under way—Grand Forks, N.D., and Malmstrom AFB, Mont. The administration had requested permission to start construction on a third site this year at Whiteman AFB, Mo., and to "take steps toward deployment of a fourth site" at either Warren AFB, Wyo., or around Washington.

The committee's action completely eliminates any defense ring around the nation's capital and restricts work at Warren and Whiteman to site preparation activities with no deployment authorized.

Stennis said that as a matter of policy, the committee fully supports Safeguard "as necessary to assist in the protection" of U.S. Minuteman ICBM bases. He said the cutbacks and restrictions were made basically because work at the first two sites had fallen one year behind schedule due to construction delays and bad weather. Those sites were originally set for completion in 1973.

The committee action, if it is sustained, could complicate the official U.S. position at the strategic arms limitation talks where the stated U.S. negotiating position involves allowing Safeguard missiles around three Minuteman bases to balance the Soviet ABM net around Moscow. American officials have indicated privately that a compromise on the number of sites would be reached.

Other changes in the Pentagon request made by the committee include:

- A cut of \$75.8 million in the \$472 million requested for the C-5A supertransport plane. The committee called this a financing adjustment involv-

ing funds which could be cut this year without affecting deliveries.

- \$62.8 million was added to the Army's request for \$27.5 million to complete development of the new Main Battle Tank and build six models for testing. Both the House and Senate committees, however, refused to allow any money for mass-producing the controversial new vehicle.

- A \$155.7 million cut out of almost \$374 million the Navy wanted to pay off claims due to cost overruns in its shipbuilding programs. The committee said the Navy didn't need all that money this year.

The committee's biggest single area of cuts came in the Pentagon's research and development budget, where \$321 million was eliminated, including a portion of the total Safeguard request. Stennis noted, however, that even with these reductions, \$7.6 billion for military R & D still was left in the new budget and this was \$600 million more than was appropriated last year.

Stennis' committee, as did its House counterpart, voted to keep \$801 million in the budget for the Navy's swing-wing F-14A fighter but insisted that the Navy get no fewer than 48 planes for their money this year.

Stennis also said that an amendment proposed by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) aimed at prohibiting CIA support for Thai troops fighting in Laos was voted down, 11 to 3. Other attempts are expected to revive this measure when it comes to the Senate floor.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks

trait Gallery maintain the regular hours of 10 a.m.-5:30 p.m., daily.

National Zoo buildings are open from 9 a.m.-6 p.m. daily.

Anacostia Neighborhood Museum hours are from 10 a.m.-6 p.m. weekdays; 1-6 p.m. weekends.

Dial-A-Museum—737-8811 for daily announcements on new exhibits and special events.

Dial-A-Phenomenon—737-8855 for weekly announcements on stars, planets and worldwide occurrences of short-lived natural phenomena.

FORUM STUDY TOURS

The Smithsonian has organized several special tours concerned with archaeology, the arts, museums, private collections, and natural history, for members of the National and Local Associates. All 1971 tours are full. For further details on the 1972 tours, listed below, please write to Miss Kennedy, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 20560.

Mexico and Guatemala: Jan. 3-22. Dr. R. H. Howland will accompany the group through the historic sites of Yucatan, Oaxaca, Mexico City, Tikal, Antigua, etc.

St. Croix and Puerto Rico: Feb. 1-14. Enjoying the sun, studying early Danish and Spanish architectural heritages, and visiting historic preservation projects.

Australia and New Zealand: Late March-April. This unusual tour will go out via Fiji and return via Tahiti, and will include visits to Canberra, the Australian Outback, and Christchurch with its areas of historic interest.

No-Tour Tour: Dulles-Paris-Dulles. May 29-June 19. Air France Excursion. Members make their own arrangements for travel in Europe.

Greece and Yugoslavia: June 15-July 8. The classical tour of Greek archaeological sites plus Yugoslavia's Adriatic Coast and inland sites. There is a possibility of including Romanian churches and other locations as well.

No-Tour Tour: New York-Frankfurt-New York. July 3-24. Qantas Excursion. Members make their own arrangements for travel in Europe.

King Arthur's England: July 12-Aug. 2. This archaeological, architectural and literary adventure will be directed by Mrs. Francis Pickens Miller, author of *Realms of Arthur*.

The Pilgrimage Road: Sept. 11-Oct. 9, traversing Burgundy, southwestern France and northern Spain, the route of the medieval pilgrims to Santiago de Compostela. Emphasis on architectural history, food, and viticulture.

No-Tour Tour: Dulles-London-Dulles. Sept. 11-Oct. 2. BOAC Excursion. Members make their own arrangements for travel in the British Isles.

Pakistan and Afghanistan: Oct. 10-Nov. 15. Overnight stops en route in London and Paris; motoring through the provinces of Pakistan; Dr. R. H. Howland and John J. Sloane will lead the tour and will be joined by local scholars at the sites.

CONTINUING EXHIBITIONS

Anacostia Neighborhood Museum
(2305 King Avenue, S.E.)

Science: Man's Greatest Adventure. Black scientists are honored with this exhibit, which covers achievements from the earliest times to the present and projects future roles. Through Nov. 7.

Arts and Industries Building
(900 Jefferson Drive, S.W., Air and Space Museum)

Space and Artists. Realistic illustration, Impressionistic and abstract paintings and sculpture inspired by the space program.

Freer Gallery of Art

(12th and Jefferson Drive, S.W.)

Chinese Album Leaves and Lacquer Ware. Twenty-four painted album leaves dating

from the Sung through the Ch'ing dynasty, and five examples of Chinese lacquer ware that represent the change in style from 1280 A.D. through the late 15th century. Through September.

Japanese Screen Paintings. Bird and flower screens from the Freer collection ranging in date from the late 15th century to the 18th century. Through Sept.

Museum of History and Technology

(14th and Constitution Ave., N.W.)

Slovenes in America: An Instance of Cultural Impact. The sustained cultural durability of emigrants from the Eastern European region of Slovenia and their descendants depicted by examples of Slovenian life in America. Through August 31.

The Campbell Museum Collection. Antique silver and porcelain soup tureens, bowls and ladles from around the world dating as far back as 1735. Second floor, through Labor Day.

Do It the Hard Way: Babe Goldberg and Modern Times. Featuring cartoons, writings, sculptures and cartoon "inventions." On display through Labor Day.

Museum of Natural History

(10th and Constitution Ave., N.W.)

Society of Animal Artists. 28 paintings and sculptures of wildlife from around the world. Through Labor Day.

Insect Zoo. Live insects including a bee hive, termites, cockroaches, mosquitoes and dragonfly nymphs. Also included are tarantulas and spiders spinning webs. Through Labor Day—10 a.m.-4 p.m.

National Collection of Fine Arts

(8th and G Streets, N.W.)

American Master Prints from the Smithsonian Collections. A survey of three centuries of graphic art in the United States. Through September 12.

Romare Bearden: Prevalence of Ritual. Fifty-six works by contemporary black artist Bearden, including an 18-foot collage-mural entitled "The Clock," which mirrors life on a Harlem street. Through September 26.

Photographic Competition. Entries of D.C. youth aged 10-18 in a competition sponsored by the Black Women's League of Washington and the NCFA. Through August 31.

Hidden Aspects of the National Collection of Fine Arts. Objects representing the entire range of collections held by the NCFA, particularly objects not previously exhibited. Through October.

National Portrait Gallery

(8th and F Streets, N.W.)

Mary McLeod Bethune. The late Mrs. Bethune, noted black educator and adviser to U.S. Presidents from Coolidge through Truman, is honored by this commemorative exhibition. Through August 31.

"A Glimmer of Their Own Beauty": Black Sounds of the Twenties. Educational exhibit focusing on the jazz of Louis Armstrong, the blues of Bessie Smith and "Ma" Rainey, and the poetry of Langston Hughes and Claude McKay as an expression of black life in the period of the Harlem Renaissance. Through October 15.

RADIO SMITHSONIAN

Radio Smithsonian is broadcast every Sunday night on WGMS-AM (570) and FM (103.5) from 9-9:30 p.m. The program schedule for July:

1st—*Sing for Your Votes.* A short history of political campaign songs from 1800-1938, with Herbert Collins, curator of Political History, National Museum of History and Technology.

8th—*A Zoo for Insects,* with Dr. Ronald Goor, National Museum of Natural History; *How Do You Serve Your Soup?* A look at soup tureens through history with William Parker of the Campbell Museum in Camden, New Jersey.

15th—*Folk Concert.* West Virginian Franklin George and some of his friends

play tunes on the banjo at the Smithsonian.

22nd—*Prints as Art.* A conversation with Jacob Kainen, artist, author, and consultant to the National Collection of Fine Arts; *The Prevalence of Ritual.* An interview with artist Romare Bearden on black life as reflected in his work.

29th—*Concert.* Catharina Meints, James Caldwell, violists da gamba and James Weaver, harpsichordist, playing works of Saint-Colomban and Marais.

In the Washington area, the program is also heard on WAMU-FM (88.5) Tuesdays at 1:30 p.m.; WETA-FM (90.9), Mondays at 9:30 p.m.; and in New York City on WNYC-AM Sundays at 10 p.m., and FM Mondays at 9 p.m.

APOLLO 11 CAPSULE—NEW DISPLAY SHOWS LUNAR VEHICLES, SUPPORT SYSTEMS

The National Air and Space Museum has placed an exhibit in the Arts and Industries Building one of the key artifacts of the historic Apollo 11 mission—the command module Columbia.

It was the mother ship Columbia that stayed aloft in orbit when the descent to the moon's surface was made for the first time in the lunar module (LM). Later the Columbia brought the Apollo crew safely back to earth. Columbia was designed with a compact blunt shape to withstand the fiery temperatures generated when it re-entered the earth's atmosphere at 24,000 miles an hour. Char marks on the craft's surface can still be seen.

The Columbia's lunar module companion ship, Eagle, was not designed to return to earth, but the NASM currently has on view an identical LM recently presented to it by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The two-story high (23 feet) two-stage craft, built by Grumman Aerospace, is in the rotunda of the Arts and Industries Building, a few feet away from the Columbia.

Around the Columbia and the LM are exhibit cases containing other unique artifacts associated with the historic Apollo 11 flight. Many of them are on public display for the first time, including the space suit worn by Apollo 11 astronauts, Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr.; lunar sample collection tools employed on the mission or in training, including scoops, tongs, core sample tubes, and a box that held the lunar rocks; and a selection of guidance and navigation equipment—computer, star charts, etc.

Also on view is a display of health and hygienic materials used on the voyage—a medical kit, human waste disposal systems, shaving gear and toothbrushes; and a selection of the freeze-dried and canned foods and drinks that were part of the Apollo life support system. Replicas of the American flag planted on the moon during the Apollo 11 mission and the plaques left on the moon by the Apollo 11, 12 and 14 crews are on display, as well as a photographic exhibit that allows the viewer to see close-up stereo photos of the moon's surface.

THE SECRECY OF CIA OVERSIGHT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON
OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 3, 1971

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, under the leave to extend my remarks, in the Record, I include the following:

Mr. Speaker, recent reports of a CIA training program for Cambodian soldiers in Laos should serve to focus public attention on the weakness of legis-

STATINTL

Notes on PeopleNew C.I.A. Watchdog

✓ F. Edward Hébert, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has appointed an active antiwar Congressman, Lucien N. Nedzi, a Michigan Democrat, chairman of the House subcommittee that keeps an eye on the Central Intelligence Agency.

Why? "Because he's a good man, even though we're opposed philosophically," said Mr. Hébert, who instructed Mr. Nedzi "to make periodic inquiries into all phases of intelligence activities within the Department of Defense and within the agencies established under the National Security Act."

Mr. Nedzi said that Mr. Hébert, a Louisiana Democrat, had placed "no restrictions of any sort" on him, even though he's been highly critical of the war in Vietnam and Pentagon policies.



United Press International

Lucien N. Nedzi

4 AUG 1971

War Critic

To Check

On CIA

United Press International

The pro-military chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has named an active antiwar congressman to head the subcommittee that keeps watch on the Central Intelligence Agency.

Chairman F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), turning down the post himself, appointed Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.), a leading Pentagon critic, to head the special subcommittee on intelligence.

Asked why he chose Nedzi, Hebert said, "Because he's a good man, even though we're opposed philosophically."

Hebert's predecessor, the late L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.), considered the subcommittee chairmanship so important that he assigned himself to fill it.

Not only did Hebert not take the post, but he told Nedzi "to make periodic inquiries into all phases of intelligence activities within the Department of Defense and within the agencies established under the National Security Act, and to make legislative recommendations when appropriate."

Besides the CIA, Nedzi will have jurisdiction over the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, two highly secret branches of the Defense Department.

One of his first acts, said Nedzi, would be to hold public hearings on U.S. intelligence-gathering activities. An eight-year veteran of the full committee, he said Hebert had placed "no restrictions of any sort" on him.

One of his first goals, Nedzi said, would be "to reconcile the public's right to know with the national security."

Although the Michigan Democrat has been critical of the Vietnam war and Pentagon policies, he said he had a high regard for CIA Director Richard Helms.

"I have been tremendously impressed by Mr. Helms. From the few occasions he has appeared before the Armed Services Committee," Nedzi



PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

STATINTL

M - 463,503
S - 867,810

AUG 4 1971

Dove to Keep an Eye-on-CIA

One of the most active doves and Pentagon critics in the House has been named chairman of a super-secret subcommittee charged with keeping tabs on the CIA and other intelligence agencies.

Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D., Mich.) said one of the first things he will do is visit the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley, Va.

After that, said Nedzi, he hopes to hold public hearings on U. S. intelligence gathering activities.

The subcommittee Nedzi is taking over was considered so vital by Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D., S. C.) that the late chairman of the Armed Services Committee always reserved that chairmanship for himself.

Besides the CIA, Nedzi will have jurisdiction over the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, two hush-hush branches of the Pentagon.



Rep. Nedzi

3 AUG 1971

PHOENIX PROGRAM DETAILS

'Sterile, Depersonalized Murder' Plan

By MARY McGRORY
Star Staff Writer

In 1968, when he was 21, K. Barton Osborn, a reddish-haired young man with long sideburns and a quick mind, was a big operator, James Bond style, in DaNang, South Vietnam.

He was only a PFC, but 50 Vietnamese agents were in his network, and he had no superior officers to report to, and nobody questioned him. He used a cover name and had four separate sets of papers identifying him as a civilian with the Department of the Army, a GS-9 with AID, an infantry lieutenant and a sergeant, E-5.

He got his pay from an Army captain, wearing civilian clothes who passed it to him under the table at a Navy Officers Club.

He had been trained at intelligence school in "illegal but condoned" methods of undercover work at Fort Hollabird, and he never heard of the Geneva Convention and the treatment of civilians which he still confuses with the Geneva Accords, which in 1954 were supposed to end the Vietnam war.

His agents fingered villages and villagers for extinction, the former by B-52 strikes and artillery fire, the latter by death, often after torture.

A major at the C.I.A. operation headquarters in DaNang provided him with unlimited funds for "incentive gifts" to his agents—cigarettes, whiskey, and for his principal agent—whom he was subsequently instructed to eliminate with extreme prejudice (he refused)—a motorcycle.

The major at the C.I.A. was the coordinator for the Phoenix program, a grisly operation which the House subcommittee on Foreign Government Operations is desperately trying to uncover and stop.

According to Ambassador William J. Colby, until recently in charge of the parent program, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, run jointly by the U.S. and South Vietnam, the purpose of the exercise is "to provide permanent protection for the villagers."

Permanent protection of a sort has been conferred on 20,578 Vietnamese. At least it is permanent. 20,578 have been killed under the program. This year, through May, the State Department admitted reluctantly, 3,650 have died. One is reminded of the official report of My Lai—in which it was recounted that the "civilians had been assisted to safety."

Osborn, who is now a student at American University, says that Phoenix is nothing but "a sterile, depersonalized murder program."

Abuses Admitted

Colby, testifying before the committee on July 19, cautiously conceded "unjustifiable abuses," since corrected by the two governments. Osborn and a fellow rebuttal witness, former 1st Lt. Michael J. Uhl, say the program has been "intensified" under Vietnamization.

Colby was categorical about one thing: Americans play only a supporting minor role in the bloody business. They help with the "collection of information against V.C. suspects, with the filling out of dossiers, and "working out techniques" for the handling of them.

"The American," Colby said emphatically, "would not be the man who reached out and grabbed the fellow."

But the Americans, according to Osborn, gave the orders and not only grabbed the fellow, but pulled the trigger.

A Marine first lieutenant gave the order to push a Vietnamese detainee, beaten and bound, out the door of a helicopter flying over DaNang. This was what was called "an airborne interrogation."

"This happened, not once, as an aberration," Osborn said, "but twice."

He watched a Vietnamese woman starved to death in a cage at a Marine interrogation center. When he inquired about her, he was told "she had died of malnutrition."

"They Were Embarrassed"

He saw a prisoner who had a device driven into his ear — they hit the brain too soon

and killed him. "They were embarrassed," he said.

Osborn's Chinese interpreter, a woman, was shot, casually, in the back of the neck by an Army captain, who yearned to be an agent handler, and thought the woman was "dangerous." The incident was not reported. "She was only a slope," the captain said afterwards.

As for the process of detention, interrogation, trial and disposition described in detail by Ambassador Colby, neither Osborn nor Uhl had ever seen it happen.

"I never knew of a detainee to leave the interrogation center," said Osborn. "The majority were tortured to death."

He never tried to tell a superior officer. He knew they didn't want to know of the atrocities occurring in the field.

Congress hasn't wanted to know either. Uhl and Osborn told their stories to an ill-attended meeting called by the Commission for the Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes last winter. They told them again to Rep. Ron Dellums' "informal" hearings on atrocities right after the Vietnam Veterans Against the War held their encampment.

The hearings before Rep. William E. Moorhead's subcommittee were the first legitimate forum granted them. If Moorhead and the other indignant doves — among them Ogden Reid, R-N.Y., and Paul J. McCloskey, R-Calif. — try to go higher and call the commanding officers, they will run into jurisdictional problems with the House Armed Services Committee. If they call AID and State Department officials they will be told what they knew nothing of, such abuses and that besides, atrocity is not the "official policy" of the U.S. — in sharp distinction to "the other side."

Reid says that it's hard to tell the difference, really, between their terror and ours.

STATINTL

Why IJ&S?

Sen. John Sherman Cooper, long known and admired for his good common sense, has offered a good common-sense proposal to the Congress, namely, that the National Security Act of 1947 be amended to require the Central Intelligence Agency to keep the "germane" committees of the Congress "fully and currently" informed by means of "analyses in regular and special reports" incorporating the intelligence gathered by that agency.

The argument for the proposal is clear enough: Congress is entitled to the same information that the executive receives in order to pass considered judgments on matters pertaining to its responsibilities. And why not? Surprisingly, the existing legislation does not specifically bar dissemination of CIA-gathered intelligence to Congress, but neither does it require that Congress be informed. So, by a familiar bureaucratic process, the practice developed of using this intelligence to brief the executive, leaving Congress out in the cold to scrounge around and get what intelligence it could. This is one of the principal causes of the exclusion of the Congress from deciding on when to start wars and when to end them. Of course it retains the power of the purse, but few members of either House are courageous enough to stop a war by withholding funds—it leaves them open to the accusation that they are letting down "our boys," which can prove fatal at election time.

Under the Cooper amendment, CIA information would have limited Congressional circulation. It would be made available to the Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, whose members could pass along pertinent portions to other legislators and staff members working on national security matters, subject to the normal security requirements.

Note, in contrast, how the CIA reports are used under the present arrangement. The President, for his purposes, leaks a CIA report to, say, *The New York Times* or, say, the POW proposals of the North Vietnamese Government. Does the President call in the reporters and tell them candidly that here is a "A report of general interest which I am divulging to all of you?" He does nothing of the kind—he would rather play the leaking game. That is one reason why the executive prefers to hoard the information and withhold it from the Congress: he wants to be able to leak it when it serves his purpose to do so.

The damaging effects of this system are obvious. The Congress and the public are denied information on which vital decisions are based. The denial applies not only to military information but substantially to all data except what the executive chooses to share, which is always what will benefit him politically by enhancing his image and making him look, if not infallible, at least pretty close to it. The effect is to multiply errors as well as to hide them. The executive lacks the benefit of valuable feedback from the public and the press.

Senator Cooper has taken an important first step to limit the secrecy factor which bedevils our foreign relations. His remedy would broaden support for foreign policy and save us from involvement in another Indochina mess.

Hawk Appoints Dove Head of Sensitive House Intelligence Panel

By Gerald Washington Bersee

WASHINGTON -- In an unexpected and potentially important move, the conservative, hawkish chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has appointed a liberal dove to head the super-sensitive Subcommittee on American Intelligence Operations.

The new subcommittee chairman is Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D., Mich.), who became deeply disillusioned by the Vietnam war and recently sponsored unsuccessful legislation calling for a pull-out by the end of the year.

Nedzi was notified of his appointment by Committee Chairman F. Edward Hebert (D., La.), who put no strings on Nedzi's ability to probe into the operations of all intelligence organizations, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council.

Hebert sent Nedzi a formal "mandate" to make "periodic inquiries into all intelligence activities."

Despite the fact that Hebert, as the full committee chairman, maintains an ex-officio seat on the subcommittee and other members are conservatives, it will be the first time in recent years that perhaps the most sensitive subcommittee in the

House will be headed by a liberal.

Until his death earlier this year, former Committee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers (D., S. C.), who was extremely conservative, maintained tight control of the intelligence subcommittee and kept liberals off.

Hebert, for a time, put the full committee in charge of intelligence supervision, but he recently decided to reappoint a subcommittee.

Although Nedzi declined to say what inquiries he will pursue, he has publicly challenged the basis for national intelligence estimates the Pentagon has used to ask for new weapons systems.

Hebert appointed Nedzi, in Congress since 1961, over seven other senior committee members. It was speculated that Hebert, in addition to Nedzi's reputation for hard work and competence, is seeking more harmony with the moderates and liberals on the committee.

Others who will serve on the subcommittee with Nedzi are: Melvin Price (D., Ill.), C. C. Fisher (D., Tex.), Alvin E. O'Konski (R., Wis.) and William G. Bray (R., Ind.).

STATINTL



MAINTAINING EQUITY

Congress Wants CIA Briefings

CIA officials are very concerned about a new Senate move to require their secretive agency to give detailed global intelligence to congressional committees on a regular basis.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has scheduled hearings this September on a controversial measure that would greatly expand the number of senators who have access to classified CIA evaluations and information.

The bill, proposed by Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., would require the CIA to brief the full Senate and House Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on a routine schedule, similar to the system under which the agency briefs top foreign policy officials of the executive branch.

ALARMED CIA OFFICIALS view the proposal as potentially jeopardizing their clandestine operations around the world. There are 119 congressmen on those four committees, and that's a lot of people to keep a secret. Consequently the CIA's three congressional liaison agents are trying quietly to have the measure killed.

The Senate however, is in a mood to expand its influence over Presidential foreign policy-making, and better intelligence is a vital tool toward that goal. The measure already has considerable supporters, including Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, and Sen. Stuart Symington, the only senator on both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

The CIA now reports only to five special subcommittees of the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Those groups are concerned primarily with the CIA budget and operations. The CIA does not regularly brief Fulbright

or other congressmen whose major interest is in the field of foreign policy.

SENATE LEADERS COMPLAIN that they are asked to authorize and fund Presidential decisions that may result in U.S. soldiers going into combat but are told little more than the general public about the information and analyses that prompted those decisions. Cooper, a long-time opponent of the war in Vietnam, introduced the bill in the wake of the Pentagon Papers. He was angry to discover from the papers that the CIA had warned President Johnson full-scale bombing of North Vietnam might not frighten Hanoi into giving up.

CIA officials fear that congressmen privy to intelligence secrets will not be able to resist the temptation of leaking — and perhaps misinterpreting — snatches of information that serve their own political purposes or can get them publicity. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular has long had a reputation for being a sieve.

But congressmen retort, justifiably, they are no worse at keeping secrets than the White House itself. It is common practice for White House and State Department officials to leak classified documents and secret foreign intelligence when it suits their purpose. For instance, the administration recently surfaced intelligence warnings of new Soviet missile sites to help generate support for military budget items.

Even so, the administration keeps reasonably tight control over the number of officials who have access to CIA intelligence and who have permission to leak selected secrets at the appropriate moments. Congress has no such control over its members, and the odds that an individual congressman might make a grievous error in judgment about what is safe to make public are not incon siderable.

STATINTL

DETROIT, MICH.

FREE PRESS

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M - 530,264

S - 578,254

JUL 29 1969

NEDZI GETS POST

House Dove Heads Spy Watchdogs

BY SAUL FRIEDMAN
Free Press Washington Staff

WASHINGTON--In an unexpected and potentially important move, the conservative hawkish chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has appointed a liberal dove to head the supersensitive subcommittee on American intelligence operations.

The new subcommittee chairman is Rep. J. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., who became deeply disillusioned by the Vietnam war and recently sponsored unsuccessful legislation calling for a pullout by the end of the year.

Nedzi was notified Wednesday of his appointment by committee Chairman F. Edward Hebert, D-La., who put no strings on Nedzi's ability to probe into the operations of all intelligence organizations including the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

Hebert sent Nedzi a formal mandate to make "periodic inquiries into all intelligence activities."

ALTHOUGH Hebert, as the full committee chairman, maintains an ex-officio seat on the subcommittee and other members are conservatives, it will be the first time in recent years that perhaps the most sensitive subcommittee in the House will be chaired by a liberal.

Until his death earlier this year, former committee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., who was extremely

conservative, maintained tight control of the subcommittee and kept liberals off.

Hebert, for a time, put the full committee in charge of intelligence supervision, but recently decided to reappoint a subcommittee.

Why he would choose Nedzi, who has been critical of intelligence estimates on the Vietnam war and on Soviet military strength, was a mystery that had House members buzzing Wednesday when they learned of the appointment.

Sources close to the situation suggested it was an indication that Hebert and other committee conservatives have become concerned at the secrets the Executive Branch has been keeping from Congress and at the extent of American interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

ALTHOUGH Nedzi declined to say what inquiries he will pursue, he has publicly challenged the basis for national intelligence estimates which the Pentagon has used to ask for new weapons systems. He may therefore be expected to renew his challenge in the subcommittee, which almost always meets behind closed doors.

Nedzi, in Congress since 1961, was one of the original members of the "Fearless Five," a group of liberals on the generally conservative committee who fought against increases in defense spending and weapons like the anti-ballistic missile.

Hebert appointed Nedzi over seven more senior committee members. It was speculated that Hebert, in addition to Nedzi's reputation for hard work and competence, is seeking more harmony with the moderates and liberals on the committee.

Others who will serve on the subcommittee with Nedzi are: Melvin Price, D-Ill., O. C. Fisher, D-Tex., Alvin E. O'Konski, R-Wis., and William G. Bray, R-Ind.

DETROIT, MICH.

NEWS

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0160

E - 592,616

S - 827,086

Nedzi named chairman

House unit to probe U.S. intelligence net

By RICHARD A. RYAN

News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON -- How do the many government intelligence agencies function? How does the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) differ from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)?

How are the many agencies funded? Whom do they investigate? Do they overlap and duplicate their efforts?

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Detroit Democrat, intends to seek the answers to these and other questions about the supersecret intelligence organizations.

Nedzi yesterday was appointed chairman of a new intelligence subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. The subcommittee was organized and its chairman appointed by Rep. F. Edward Hebert, Louisiana Democrat, chairman of the parent committee.

Serving with Nedzi will be the two ranking Democrats and Republicans of the Armed Services Committee -- Democratic Reps. Melvin Price of Illinois, and O. C. Fisher, of Texas, and Republican Reps. Alvin E. O'Konski, of Wisconsin, and William G. Bray, of Indiana.

"WE KNOW we are spending billions in the field of intelligence," Nedzi said in an interview after his appointment, "but no one really knows how much. The budgets for the various agencies are not a matter of public knowledge."

"I want to review their physical operations and determine the scope of their activity. And I think it is appropriate to inquire whether we need all that intelligence."

The veteran Detroit legislator said he is certain there is duplication of effort among the CIA, DIA and the intelligence arms of the military services.

As a member of the subcommittee that investigated the Jan. 23, 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans, Nedzi said it was apparent from facts uncovered then that there was much duplication of effort.

"We also learned that much of the information gained by the Pueblo never reached the people it should have reached," Nedzi said.

The congressman feels the intelligence sub-

in Congress in that it must "reconcile national security with basic constitutional rights."

Military intelligence activities came under Senate scrutiny earlier this year when John M. O'Brien, a former Army intelligence agent, said in a letter to Senator Sam Ervin, North Carolina Democrat, that the Army had kept several political figures under surveillance for alleged anti-war activities.

AMONG THOSE mentioned by O'Brien were Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III, Illinois Democrat, who was Illinois state treasurer at the time, and Rep. Abner J. Mikva, Illinois Democrat.

The Army denied the charges but Ervin conducted Senate hearings on the whole question of military surveillance.

The extent of the surveillance was underscored by a former Air Force intelligence sergeant who testified that of the 319 persons attending an anti-war demonstration on Sept. 1, 1969, outside Carson, Colo., 53 were intelligence agents or members of the press.

Assistant Defense Secretary Robert J. Froehlke told the committee that the DIA had cards on 25 million "personalities" and on 760,000 organizations and incidents.

The new subcommittee, Nedzi said, is required to make periodic inquiries into all aspects of intelligence activities and, when appropriate, make legislative recommendations.

The subcommittee also will look into the whole problem of classification of official documents, Nedzi said.

"WE WANT to find out what is required from a national security standpoint in the way of classification," Nedzi said. "It may be that more information can be given to the public without jeopardizing national security."

Document classification became a national issue with the publication of the Pentagon papers.

This is the first subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee that Nedzi has chaired. The Detroit congressman fell out of favor with the former committee chairman, L. Mendel Rivers, for repeatedly opposing the autocratic chairman on military bills.

When Rivers, who died earlier this year, was committee chairman, he personally headed what was then known as the CIA subcommittee. Its activities then were limited and secret. When Hebert ascended to the chairmanship, he reorganized the subcommittee.

He re-formed it yesterday, however, but at the same time gave it a much broader scope.

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CIA committee.

States pursuant to article V of the Constitution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). Without objection, it is so ordered.

S. 1318

At the request of Mr. FANNIN, the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BROOK) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1318, a bill to deny tax exemption under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

S. 1442 THROUGH S. 1445

At the request of Mr. MOSS, the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1442, a bill to provide that the first \$3,000 received as civil service retirement annuity shall be excluded from gross income; S. 1443, to eliminate the survivorship reduction during periods of nonmarriage of retired employees and Members, and for other purposes; S. 1444, a bill to increase the contribution by the Federal Government to the costs of employees' health benefits insurance; and S. 1445, a bill to provide increases in certain annuities payable under chapter 83 of title 5, United States Code, and for other purposes.

S. 1659

At the request of Mr. FANNIN, the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 1659, a bill to amend the National Labor Relations Act.

S. 2223

At the request of Mr. TALMAGE, the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. GAMBRILL), the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSEN), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARKEEN), and the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) were added as cosponsors of S. 2223, a bill to amend the Consolidated Farmers Home Administration Act of 1961, and for other purposes.

S. 2258

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN, the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE) and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) were added as cosponsors of S. 2258, the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Acceleration Act.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 62

At the request of Mr. GRIFFIN, the Senator from Illinois (Mr. STEVENS) and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 62, authorizing the display of the flags of each of the 50 States at the base of the Washington Monument.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 99

At the request of Mr. CASE, the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 99, a joint resolution proposing establishment of a National Collegiate Press Day.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 114

At the request of Mr. CURTIS, the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 114, a stable purchasing power resolution of 1971.

**SENATE CONCURRENCE RESOLUTION
35—SUBMISSION OF AN ORIGINAL
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION FAV-
ORING THE SUSPENSION OF DE-
PORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS**

(Ordered to be placed on the calendar.)

Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following original concurrent resolution:

S. CON. RES. 35

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress favors the suspension of deportation in the case of each alien hereinafter named, in which case the Attorney General has suspended deportation pursuant to the provisions of section 244(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (66 Stat. 204; 8 U.S.C. 1251):

A-0657873, Chan, Chuen.
A-17049342, Chin, Jean.
A-6816785, Funk, Thomas Fredrik.
A-13293197, Moy, Huey Nai.
A-10495000, Torres de Bejarano, Socorro.
A-11593573, Yee, Soon Hing.
A-8429088, Terrazas-Barrio, Efren.
A-4316706, Tomilides, Gabriel Constantinos.
A-1861708, Herrera-Marquez, Aurelio.
A-18196866, Juan, Wah Guan.
A-3212781, Candaneza-Liza, Rogelio.
A-6199744, Cartier, Paul August.
A-12027264, Liu, Lai Chih.

**MILITARY PROCUREMENT
AUTORIZATIONS—1972**

AMENDMENT NO. 294

(Ordered to be printed and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.)

**CLOSING LOOPILES: AN AMENDMENT TO END
U.S. FINANCING OF FOREIGN MERCENARIES IN
LAOS**

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, last year many of us thought that the Congress, by means of amendments to the Defense authorization and appropriations bills, had made it unlawful for the U.S. Government to pay Thai troops to fight in Laos or Cambodia. Today there are Thai troops in Laos and they are being paid by the U.S. Government. The State Department has finally admitted that we are paying the Thais, but the Thai Government still asserts there are no Thai troops in Laos.

In our discussions with the executive branch, we have encountered two lines of legal argumentation being used to justify the U.S. role in this bizarre affair. First, it is argued that the legislative history of last year's amendments indicates that the amendments' sponsor, whose avowed purpose in proposing the amendments in the first place was to prohibit payment for Thai troops in Laos or Cambodia, had, by inference, condoned the very practice he was seeking to prohibit. Second, it is argued, that, even if this had been the sponsor's intent, the legislation enacted contained loopholes which permits the executive branch to do lawfully what the sponsor had sought to prohibit. Either way, they say it is legal for the United States to hire Thais to fight a war in Laos which the Lao are no longer able to sustain with their own manpower.

For those who find this situation dif-

icult to comprehend, a brief review of the facts will be helpful before I propose a legislative solution to this problem.

Following the U.S. incursions into Cambodia in May 1970, it was recognized that language of the defense authorization and appropriations legislation providing \$2.5 billion for "support for Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces" could possibly be interpreted as permitting U.S. financing of Thai troops in Cambodia and Laos. Indeed, in August 1970, the State Department acknowledged that a "tentative agreement" had been reached between the United States and Thai Government regarding the sending of Thai troops to Cambodia.

It was generally understood at the time that the provision of any troops to Cambodia by Thailand would be contingent upon the furnishing of financial support by the United States.

It was in the light of these facts that an amendment was added to both the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts which provided that nothing in the authorization to support "Vietnamese and other free world forces in support of Vietnam forces" could be construed "as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world forces in actions designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos."

This amendment was originally proposed by the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee who declared that his intention was to prevent our paying for South Vietnamese or Thai forces to expand their military activities in Cambodia and Laos so that we would become involved in large-scale operations in close support of the Government of Cambodia or the Government of Laos.

Nevertheless, despite this amendment, a Department of State spokesman admitted on June 7 that there were Thai forces in Laos and also that the United States was supporting them, although he described them as "volunteers."

This spokesman did not say that these Thai forces are operating principally in the war in northern Laos, a war that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan has said has "nothing to do with military operations in South Vietnam or Cambodia."

The amendment included in the Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for fiscal year 1971 never defined "local forces in Laos and Thailand" and the prohibitions written into the Appropriation Act applied, of course, only to "appropriations available to the Department of Defense during the current fiscal year." Thus, it might be argued that Central Intelligence Agency funds were not covered by the amendment.

In addition, it has been argued by the executive branch that the Thai forces in Laos are "local forces in Laos," even though they are Thai nationals who were recruited and trained in Thailand, are transported by us from Thailand to Laos; then they are sent back to Thailand

S 11038

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Miners work hard to supply our Nation with the coal which is used to generate power. Theirs is a dangerous profession, and many of those fortunate enough to survive die slowly of pneumoconiosis—the occupational disease that slowly incapacitates and finally kills. The proposal I introduce today is intended to insure that these men receive the disability payments they deserve.

By Mr. HUMPHREY:

S. 2290. A bill to establish a Joint Committee on National Security. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I am introducing a bill today which would establish a permanent Joint Congressional Committee on National Security.

I believe this committee will enable Congress to address itself in a more comprehensive way than ever before to a thorough and ongoing analysis and evaluation of our national security policies and goals.

I propose that the committee have these main functions:

First, to study and make recommendations on all issues concerning national security. This would include review of the President's report on the state of the world, the defense budget and foreign assistance programs as they relate to national security goals, and U.S. disarmament policies as a part of our defense considerations.

Second, to review, study and evaluate the "Vietnam Papers," and other documents, whether published heretofore or not, covering U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Third, to study and make recommendations on Government practices of classification and declassification of documents.

Fourth, to conduct a continuing review of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of Defense and State, and other agencies intimately involved with our foreign policy.

For too many years, the Congress has had inadequate information on matters concerning national security. We in the Congress have had to accept partial information, often in limited context, and as a result have been unable to weigh the total picture.

It is often difficult for Congress to obtain adequate disclosure of Government documents. On several important occasions heads of the Defense and State Departments and members of the National Security Council have claimed executive privilege and have refused to answer congressional inquiries on matters concerning our national security.

While the President and key Government officials meet occasionally with the leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives on an informal basis, there is no forum for a regular and frank exchange between the Congress and the executive branches on the vital issues affecting our national security. I am particularly sensitive to this missing link, having had the special experience of serving as a U.S. Senator for 16 years and as Vice President for 4 years.

The Joint Committee on National Security would provide that link.

It would function in the national security field in a manner comparable to the Joint Economic Committee, which conducts a systematic review and analysis of the President's Annual Economic Report.

Its unique feature would be the composition of its membership. It would have representation from those individual and committee jurisdictions that have primary responsibility in military, foreign relations and congressional leadership.

It would include the President pro tempore of the Senate; the Speaker of the House; the majority and minority leaders of both Houses, and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Committees on Appropriations, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

It would not usurp the legislative or investigative functions of any present committees, but supplement and coordinate their efforts in a more comprehensive framework.

Nor is it designed to usurp the President's historic role as Commander in Chief, or to put the Congress in an adversary relationship with the executive branch.

It is, rather, a new body, to be composed of members of both parties and both Houses of Congress, that will make possible closer consultation and cooperation between the President and the Congress.

In recent years, we have seen a gradual isolation and insulation of power within the executive branch. The Constitution, I suggest, intended something quite different when it called for a separation of powers.

I believe the divisiveness and the search for scapegoats generated by publication of the "Vietnam papers," is at least in part a result of this isolation.

We have not had the mechanism in our national security apparatus for adequate consultation between the two branches in the formulation of national security policy.

This point is illustrated very convincingly in Mr. Stephen Rosenfeld's article which appeared July 9 in the Washington Post.

Mr. President, I would like to quote from that article as it relates to the point I have been discussing and ask unanimous consent that the entire article be printed in the RECORD.

In discussing our Vietnam experience, Mr. Rosenfeld suggests that "national security is too important to be left to the national security apparatus."

The remedy he offers is in line with my own thinking. We must have an amount of institutional change "by public demand and if necessary by legislation, the executive branch must be required to share some part of the special information and to surrender some part of the initiative which it now commands in the conduct of foreign affairs."

There are reasons for the concentration of power which has developed within the executive branch which are quite understandable considering our experi-

ence in World War II and afterward. But times change, and so must our institutions and responses.

In an article in Foreign Affairs, July 1959, I expressed my concern over this development. I noted that the Congress "with its power of the purse, and through the right to investigate, to criticize, and to advocate—does exert a significant influence on the quality and direction of U.S. foreign policy."

I found that the Congress must have its own vehicle for educating itself and expressing ideas on this question and the more general issue of national security.

Such independent expertise is absolutely necessary if the House and Senate are to fulfill their Constitutional responsibility of surveillance and initiative. Without competent independent sources of fact and wisdom they cannot make discriminating judgments between alternative programs and proposals.

I, therefore, suggested that "the Congress prompt the executive to put its house in order by itself creating a Joint Committee on National Strategy, to include the chairmen and ranking minority members of the major committees of the House and the Senate."

Such a committee's purpose would be to look at our total national strategy—military, political, economic and ideological. This committee would not usurp the functions of any of the present committees, but supplement them by endowing their work with a larger frame of reference.

The Chairmen of the Committees represented would come away from the meeting of the new Joint Committee with a greater appreciation, for instance, of the relationship between fiscal policy and national productivity and how both factors relate to our defense posture and our negotiating position. Responsible statesmanship consists precisely in the capacity to see complex relationships in a perspective as broad as the national purpose itself.

Mr. President, I made that proposal in 1959. Had it been adopted, perhaps the history of the past 12 years might have been different. I cannot help but believe that if we had shared more fully in momentous decisions, like those in Vietnam, we would be less divided as a nation by the bitterness and hatreds which confront us today.

But I submit, Mr. President, that now is not the time for regrets. It is a time for careful and responsible decision; it is a time to adapt our institutions to change; above all, it is a time to act.

It is not enough for the Congress to insist upon its prerogatives if it is not prepared to cope with its responsibilities.

The executive branch, recognizing the deep interrelationships between issues of foreign affairs, military policy, and some crucial domestic issues prepared itself to fulfill its responsibilities to the Constitution by forming a National Security Council.

It is fitting, therefore, that the Congress adopt a similar, parallel and counterpart mechanism: a Joint Congressional Committee on National Security, which could draw on the experience and expertise of legislative leaders in various national security areas.

Our existing congressional committees lack coordination. The joint committee

STATINTL

ASHLAND, KY.

INDEPENDENT

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Keeping Tabs On The CIA

The problem of making Congress privy to the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency without impairing its effectiveness is not a simple one. The CIA has traded on this circumstance in the past, using it to head off any serious move for congressional surveillance of CIA operations and spending.

Some reasonable compromise ought to be arrived at, however. In recent years it has become increasingly evident that the super-secret agency--so secret that Congress had only the roughest idea of its expenditures and virtually no information about what it did until after the fact--engages in clandestine activity about which the most serious questions can be raised. There have been indications that the CIA may manipulate internal affairs of other countries and even engage in military operations--all without the knowledge, let alone the consent, of Congress.

As noted above, the difficulties posed by the nature and function of the CIA are not the sort that can be easily dealt with. The intelligence agency cannot be an open book; that would render it ineffective. It would be unrealistic to make public reports on what the CIA is currently involved in.

The bill just introduced by Sen. John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky would not demand this. However, it would require that Congress, through its appropriate committees, be kept informed by being supplied with current CIA activity reports. Cooper's rationale in offering the legislation is sound: he argues that at present Congress must make important national security judgments without having access to anything like all the pertinent data.

2001/03/04 1021 CIA-RDP80-0160

STATINTL

Many In Congress Happy To Stay Ignorant

Some Want Information,
But House Voted To
Keep Status Quo

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Does Congress really want to know everything the United States government does?

On balance, the answer is probably no, despite a renewed drive in Congress to dislodge foreign policy secrets from the executive branch.

Resolution Rejected

In fact, the House last week rejected, 261 to 118, a resolution asking the State Department for documents related to U.S. bombing and CIA operations in Laos.

Representative Joe D. Waggonner, Jr., (D., La.) said during the debate: "There are some things that some people in this country had better not know for the security and future well-being of this country. Therefore, they [the administration] must keep some information from me and they must keep some information from you for the benefit of the future security of this country. It is better that information as a rule be overclassified than underclassified."

Mr. Waggonner also expressed a widely held view that some members of Congress, if given secret information, could not resist the temptation of leaking some of it "to the New York Times or some other whistle blower."

The debate underscored a tacit assumption long held in Congress that the country is better served if legislators—except for a select few—are not told of everything the United States has done or is currently doing in the field of foreign affairs.

Being Challenged

This assumption, however, is now being challenged, unsuccessfully in the case of the House resolution asking for more information on Laos.

But an even more sweeping bill has been introduced in the Senate by John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.), who wants to give every member of Congress regular access to all intelligence reports and **Approved For** CIA.



SENATOR COOPER
Seeks more disclosures



RICHARD HELMS
Knows all the secrets

Mr. Cooper is one of the most highly regarded members of the Massachusetts Republican, was quoted recently as saying when he was in the Senate, and this is a factor of some importance in its club-like atmosphere in which the success [the CIA] do things I'd just as or failure of a bill can hinge on soon not know about." who its sponsor is.

But Senator Cooper—a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee—must get his bill through the Armed Services Committee, which together with the Appropriations Committee has jurisdiction over the CIA. And even without national security considerations, congressional committees instinctively resist encroachment upon their areas of competence.

The last time an attempt was made to break the Armed Services Committee's lock on the CIA was in 1966, when then Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (D., Minn.) made a comparatively modest proposal to create a special CIA committee, made up of representatives of Armed Services, Appropriations and the Foreign Relations committees.

The late Senator Richard B. Russell (D., Ga.), then chairman of the Armed Services Committee, blocked the bill from coming to a floor vote on a procedural point, effectively killing the measure.

The Cooper bill is not likely to get far in the legislative process either. Aside from the jurisdictional problems, most members of Congress appear to be equivalent about being told too much.

Of Secrets

Senate sources indicate that senators, too, impose a certain amount of self-censorship during these intelligence briefings. One source said he has never heard a question pertaining to the so-called "dirty tricks" aspect of CIA operations.

"For example," he said, "we've never asked, 'Mr. Helms, how many people did you lose in your clandestine service last year?' Maybe we should ask it, but we never have."

But it is virtually impossible to ascertain precisely what even the select few who attend CIA briefings know about the agency's activities.

As Mr. Mahon, the Appropriations chairman, notes, he picks only those "who won't talk." Then, he refused to say who they are.

He said he was opposed to the Cooper bill, saying, "If you give it [CIA information] to every member of Congress it would be like giving it to the New York Times."

Chairman Hebert of Armed Services questioned the need to know everything.

"I don't know everything," he said, "and I'm not biteming about it."

On the other side of the issue, critics of the present system say that Congress had deliberately remained ignorant to avoid responsibility.

Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) said during the House debate last week: "I fear Mr. Speaker, that many of us did not want to know all of the facts of our involvement in Vietnam in 1965 or 1968 or even yesterday. I think that the Congress has remained much too long in self-imposed insulation . . . We feared that more knowledge would mean more responsibility for us."

Others argued that the information the House was seeking was already well known to the enemy so it could not be withheld for national security reasons. As the House vote indicated, they represented a minority view.

For the moment, at least, the CIA-RDP80-01601R0014002F0001-8 to share fully in executive branch secrets.

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STATINTL

STATINTL

House Rejects Call For More Facts On Laos

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, July 7—The House rejected today a resolution asking the administration for information about its military operations in Laos, while in the Senate two bills were introduced to provide Congress with CIA information and greater budgetary control over the agency.

The rejected House resolution was offered by Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. (R., Calif.). It would have directed the secretary of state, "to the extent not incompatible with the public interest," to turn over to the House documents containing policy instructions given to the U.S. ambassador in Laos.

The period covered by the resolution was from January 1, 1964, to June 21, 1971. Specific information the resolution sought pertained to:

1. Covert CIA operations in Laos.
2. Thai and other foreign armed forces operations in Laos.
3. U.S. bombing in the country, other than along the Vietnam-related Ho Chi Minh trail.
4. U.S. armed forces operations in Laos.
5. U.S. Agency for International Development operations in Laos connected with CIA or military operations.

The House voted to table, or lay aside permanently, the resolution by a 261 to 118 vote. The House Foreign Affairs Committee opposed the resolution on the grounds that the information sought was of a "highly sensitive nature," that its disclosure "would not be compatible with the public interest" and that the administration already has privately briefed appropriate committees on the subject.

Cooper Proposal

In the Senate, John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.) introduced a bill to require the CIA to give to certain congressional committees all information, including intelligence analyses, that the agency gives to the executive branch.

The committee would be the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

These committees, in turn, would be required to make available the CIA information that they receive to any member of Congress who asks for it, in accordance with rules and procedures each committee may establish.

Senator Cooper's proposal is drafted as an amendment to the 1947 National Security Act. Mr. Cooper noted that the law does not prohibit the CIA from giving intelligence information to Congress, but it does not require the agency to do so.

At present, the CIA reports regularly to a small group of senators and representatives within the appropriations and armed services committee of both houses. But other members of Congress are not given access to this information.

In introducing his bill, Senator Cooper noted that Congress is asked to support the administration's foreign and national security decisions by providing money for the deployment of weapons, stationing American troops abroad and sending them into combat, and by approving binding commitments to foreign countries.

Such congressional approval, he said, "should be given upon the best information available to both the executive and legislative branches."

Right To Secrecy

Senator Cooper said his bill would not touch upon the constitutional question of the government's right to secrecy, which was raised recently by the publication of the "top-secret" Pentagon papers. But he said he believed that his bill, if enacted, would "result in much declassification of information for the Congress and the public as a whole."

Senator George S. McGovern (D., S.D.) introduced a bill to require all expenditures and ap-

propriations for the CIA to appear as a single line in the executive budget. The measure would require the CIA to disclose only its total annual budget.

At present, CIA expenditures are hidden in the budgets of other agencies, and only a few members of Congress—members of small subcommittees within the appropriation committees of both houses—know how much the CIA is spending.

McGovern's Complaint

"I believe that CIA funding is now so substantial," Senator McGovern said, "that such a single-line item for the agency in the budget would not communicate usable information to potential adversaries."

Because Congress does not know how much it is actually appropriating for the CIA, he said, it cannot set priorities and balance expenditures for intelligence operations with other domestic and defense needs.

Senator Clifford Case (R., N.J.) said he will introduce tomorrow three other bills, all designed to restrict CIA activities abroad. The bills, which Mr. Case outlined last month, would place congressional controls over CIA military operations abroad, including the hiring of foreign mercenaries and the use of U.S. surplus weapons.

In the House, several other resolutions requesting more information were rejected by voice vote after the roll-call on the first McCloskey resolution.

Other resolutions, also offered by Mr. McCloskey, asked for documents related to U.S. bombing operations in northern Laos, together with aerial photographs of 196 Laotian villages that Mr. McCloskey says have been damaged or destroyed by the bombing, and documents pertaining to the U.S.-supported pacification program in South Vietnam.

But the main fight was over the first McCloskey resolution, which its supporters said would turn over to the House only information that already is well known to the enemy.

Maryland Roll-Call

Opponents contended, however, that disclosure of the information could endanger national security. Representative Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen (R., N.J.) argued further that if the information were made available to members of Congress, there might be those who would "leak" it to the public.

On the roll-call, the Maryland delegation voted as follows: Goodloe E. Byron (D.), Edward A. Gurnatz (D.) and William O. Mills (R.) voted against the resolution; Gilbert Gude (R.), Clarence D. Long (D.), Warren J. Mitchell (D.) and Paul S. Sarbanes (D.) voted for it. Lawrence J. Hogan (R.) was absent.

LOUISVILLE, KY.
COURIER JOURNAL
JUL. 8 1968
M - 239,949
S - 350,303

"We need information"

Cooper offers bill seeking CIA data

By WARD SINCLAIR

Courier-Journal & Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—In another move aimed at reasserting congressional authority, Sen. John Sherman Cooper introduced legislation yesterday that would require the executive branch to regularly share its intelligence reports with Congress.

Cooper's bill, amending the National Security Act of 1947, calls on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to "fully and currently" keep appropriate congressional committees apprised of security matters.

The Kentucky Republican said he had planned to introduce such a measure last year, but that it was sidetracked by other activities of the Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is a member. He acknowledged, however, that new motivation came from the ongoing debate over newspaper publication of the so-called Pentagon papers, the extensive classified study of the roots of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Wants Congress to have all information

Cooper said his intention is to help provide Congress with sufficient and adequate background intelligence information—the same data available to the executive—for making decisions in the foreign policy field.

"We in Congress are called upon to support these activities with men and money; there is the possibility of engaging in commitments with other nations that could lead to combat—this has been the source of confrontation between the executive and the legislative," he said.

"I hope this amendment can lead to more harmonious relations between the two branches of government," he added.

The Kentucky senator said he felt that recent disclosure of the Pentagon papers showed "we didn't get the information" needed to assist Congress in determining its support of successive administrations in prosecuting the Vietnam involvement.

Cooper said he had not notified the White House in advance of his action yesterday. He speculated that the Nixon administration might resist his proposal, but he feels it will have considerable support in Congress.

Informing Congress not forgotten

"I think the prospects for passage are good," he said. "It would have an effect on the increased declassification of documents . . . it would be along the lines of establishing the standards the Supreme Court referred to" in its decision last week that allowed newspapers to resume publication of the Pentagon papers.

Cooper said the 1947 security act did not prohibit the CIA from giving Congress the same intelligence data that it provides the executive branch. But, he added, it did not specifically call for such action, either.

"Oh, we have gone to the CIA and had briefings and the CIA has been helpful, but it is not a matter of how that they must provide the information to Congress," he said.

His amendment, he said, would require the CIA to keep the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees and their counterparts in the House regularly briefed on security matters.

Cooper said the intelligence apparatus of the government on occasion has appeared before these committees upon request, but he said there were other times when such had not been the case.

"I am aware of when we on the Foreign Relations Committee asked for information from both Presidents—Johnson and Nixon—and it didn't come or it came too late," he noted.

He also mentioned that the Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., had tried without success some time ago to get the administration to turn over the Pentagon papers.

Cooper's action yesterday was another in a series he has spearheaded during the past several years in an attempt to reassert the constitutional role of Congress in sharing foreign policy decisions with the executive branch.

These efforts have included the Cooper-Church amendment on Cambodia, the national-commitments resolution and a sense-of-the-Senate resolution limiting the presidential field of military action in Laos and Thailand.

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JUL 1971

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400210001-6
Cooper Aims to Force C.I.A. to Report to Congress

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 7 — John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, one of the most influential Senators on foreign policy matters, introduced legislation today that would require the Central Intelligence Agency to give detailed intelligence information to Congress regularly.

Mr. Cooper, a Republican, said that Congress needed this kind of evaluation and analysis, now available only to the executive branch, to participate in the formation of foreign policy.

Meanwhile, the House rejected a series of resolutions demanding that the Nixon Administration provide Congress with additional information on United States operations in Laos.

Two other Senators also offered proposals relating to the C.I.A.

Senator George McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, suggested that expenditures and appropriations for the intelligence agency appear as a single-line item in the budget. Agency funds are now concealed in other items in the budget.

Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, said he would offer measures that would prohibit such C.I.A. activities as the funding of Thai troops to fight in Laos.

Senator Cooper emphasized in a Senate speech that his proposal was not aimed at any C.I.A. operations, sources or methods, but was "concerned only with the end result — the facts and analyses of facts." "Congress would be in a

much better position to make judgments from a much more informed and broader perspective than is now possible," he said.

Senator Cooper, an aide said, had been considering the legislation for three years but disclosures in the Pentagon papers on United States involvement in Vietnam had now provided an impetus.

The aide referred specifically to C.I.A. analyses during the Johnson Administration that full-scale bombing of North Vietnam would not be effective in halting infiltration or breaking the will of Hanoi.

Senator Cooper's proposal was supported on the floor by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, the only Senator belonging to both the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

Mr. Symington said that it was "no secret that we on various committees have not been entirely satisfied with the intelligence information we have obtained."

"If the proper committees are not acquainted with what we're doing," Mr. Symington went on, "how we can function properly?"

Because Senator Cooper is so influential, it seemed likely that his proposal would be the subject of hearings and, perhaps, floor debate this year.

A measure of the respect said his views came from Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader. "Anything John Cooper says would be given the most serious consideration by me," Mr. Mansfield said.

Regular Reports Asked

Senator Cooper's proposal would require the C.I.A. to make regular reports to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and to the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. The agency would also be required to make special reports in response to inquiries by these committees.

Mr. Cooper said that the agency would have to decide for itself what information to present to the committees, but he specified that the data would have to be "full and current."

There are now "oversight" committees in the House and Senate, composed of senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, that review the C.I.A. budget and operations. But these committees are not concerned with the substance of the information the agency gathers.

In the House debate today, the major fight came over a

documents dealing with operations of the United States military and the C.I.A. in Laos from 1964 to the present.

The resolution, which was sponsored by Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Republican of California, was set aside by a vote of 261 to 118. Critics of the measure contended that the information was too sensitive to be given to Congress.

Following this vote, the House, without debate, set

aside resolutions seeking information on bombing operations in northern Laos and on the Phoenix program, which is designed to neutralize the effect of underground Vietcong operations. The House also set aside a resolution seeking another set of the Pentagon papers that the Administration made available to Congress last week.

The supporters of the resolution were, for the most part, Democrats opposed to the war.

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July 7, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

approximately \$70,000, much of which he used for the benefit of harassed debtors of the bank. This defendant was no motivated by personal gain in most of the embezzlement, instead he manipulated the books of the bank to cover up the accounts of delinquent depositors. The judge was on assignment from another district and imposed the sentence without securing even a presentence report by the probation officer.

In 1961, two bank embezzlers were committed to the same Federal institution from the same district within the same week. Yet, sentenced by different judges, one received a term of six months, to be followed by eighteen months probation, and the other received a term of 15 years.

The above are not isolated examples. In the fiscal year ended June 30, 1969, the average sentence for transportation etc. of stolen motor vehicles varied from 13.5 months in the District of Massachusetts to 48 months in the Southern District of Iowa and 50.5 months in the District of Minnesota. Terms for forgery ranged from an average of 12 months in the Southern District of Georgia to 70.3 months in the District of Kansas. In fact, the overall average of time imposed varied from 24.2 months in the Middle District of North Carolina and 23.1 months in the Western District of Wisconsin to 74.7 months in the District of Maryland and 75.3 months in the Northern District of Oklahoma.

By Mr. CRANSTON (for himself, Mr. MONTOYA, Mr. ALLOTT, Mr. MR. BAYH, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. DOMINIEK, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. HARTKE, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. MOSS, Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. PELL, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. TOWER, Mr. TUNNEY, and Mr. WILLIAMS):

S. 2230. A bill to designate a certain traffic circle in the District of Columbia as the "Benito Juarez Circle." Referred to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

BENITO JUAREZ CIRCLE

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, Senator MONTOYA and our fellow cosponsors, I introduce today, a bill calling for the designation of a circle in Washington, D.C., as the Benito Juarez Circle.

Recently the Government of Mexico presented to this Capital City a magnificent statue of Benito Juarez, which stands on a grassy plot in the middle of the traffic circle formed by the intersection of New Hampshire and Virginia Avenues and 25th Street NW. The circle which grew out of urban redevelopment and the new street construction has no name.

Benito Juarez, a Zapotec Indian, led a revolt against the Spanish Conquistadors who continued to oppress the peasants long after the Republic of Mexico achieved independence. Juarez was an accomplished lawyer and served as Governor of Oaxaca before he became President of the Republic.

We believe that naming the circle would be appreciated by our neighbors to the south who have often honored our national leaders. It would also be a gesture of this Nation's esteem for a Mexican leader who is a hero to all Americans, North and South, who love freedom.

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Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I am pleased to join today in cosponsoring the bill which will designate the circle in the District of Columbia upon which the statue of Benito Juarez rests as Benito Juarez Circle. The Government of Mexico presented this statue to the United States as a gesture of friendship between our two people. Benito Juarez was a strong believer in freedom and the rights of the individual and a strong admirer of Abraham Lincoln, whose contemporary he was.

Benito Juarez stands as a symbol of what a man can do with determination. Against overwhelming odds, he fought against the French invasion of Mexico and the establishment of the empire. This occurred at the same time that we were experiencing the Civil War in this Nation. Sometimes nearly alone, he stood as a symbol of the hope of the eventual return to republican government in Mexico. Through his example and hard work, the Mexican people were eventually able to reassert their independence and chart their own destiny once again.

Benito Juarez made the Indians in Mexico part of the ruling class, being a Zapotec Indian himself. I believe that it is altogether fitting and proper that we honor Juarez in this fashion, for his example has meant much in this country as it has in his native Mexico. By honoring Juarez we honor all Mexicans everywhere who have given so much to the culture of our continent.

By Mr. McGOVERN:

S. 2231. A bill to require that appropriations be made specifically to the Central Intelligence Agency. Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill which would require that proposed appropriations, estimated expenditures and appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency should be required to appear in the Budget of the United States. Each of these items would be shown as a single sum.

This bill would also prohibit the use of funds appropriated to any other department or agency of the United States from being spent by the CIA.

There can be no doubt that our Nation requires the services of a major intelligence agency—the function served by the CIA. And by the very nature of its activities, the CIA cannot afford to have its detailed programs made public through an itemized budget. But we have been led into a practice which is completely contrary to our democratic principles and perhaps to the Constitution itself by hiding the expenditures for this agency in the budgets of other government agencies.

The American people have a right to know the purposes for which their tax dollars are used. Their elected representatives have the right to decide the priorities of the Nation as expressed in the Federal budget.

The Federal Government provides the Nation with a supermarket of services, and the taxpayer should be able to decide how much money is spent on each of the various items including intelligence.

But we cannot, at present, decide how much we want to allocate for intelligence activities. If the CIA budget were a single item in the budget of the United States, we would be in a position to judge if we wanted to spend more on intelligence operations and clandestine wars than on improvement of the environment or on education or even on other aspects of national defense.

Thus, one major purpose of this legislation would be to allow the Congress to exercise its constitutional powers over Federal finances by knowing where the administration proposed to allocate each tax dollar. This would not endanger national security, because the only choice available to Congress would be on national priorities—the CIA as opposed to other agencies and programs—not specific CIA activities.

Congressional oversight of the CIA would remain as at present.

I believe that CIA funding is now so substantial that such a single line item for the agency in the budget would not communicate usable information to potential adversaries. Indeed it would merely demonstrate what is already known—that the United States maintains a massive intelligence operation.

The second major purpose for the legislation is to allow Congress and the taxpayer to know the exact amount of money going into other Government programs. As it stands now, some Federal programs and agencies must have greatly inflated budgets in which CIA funds are hidden. As a result, we are led to believe that some programs are better financed than, in fact, they are. We have no way of knowing what these programs and agencies might be.

Personally, I am concerned that some of the money apparently allocated to American agriculture is CIA money. The needs of the American farmer are not adequately met as it is, although some people are critical of our farm support programs. If CIA funds are being hidden in agriculture funds, our debate over aid to agriculture is unreal.

I cite agriculture as an example. The same would be true of any agency or programs whose budget was the hiding place for CIA funds.

Because it is a matter of simple commonsense, I propose that the one hidden item in our budget be made subject to congressional and public scrutiny. We are talking about hundreds of millions of dollars. The people have not only the right but the need to know how their dollars are spent.

Mr. President, I ask that the text of the bill be printed following my remarks.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 2231

A bill to require that appropriations be made specifically to the Central Intelligence Agency

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That commencing with the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1972—

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S 10508

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

July 2, 1971

would perform the function of governing the local agencies, as the Farm Credit system now operates.

Another agency, the Rural Development Investment Equalization Administration, would handle the subsidy end of this proposal. It would be handled separately to avoid problems of getting loan and grant money mixed into the same financial pot.

It has been alleged by those who claim that industry will not move to rural America that it costs more money to operate away from the population centers, and as a result, the chance for a major dispersal of industry is doomed to failure.

The sponsors of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act do not necessarily agree with this conclusion, but a number of states have proved that investment incentives do draw industries.

Rather than provide under-the-table or backdoor subsidies, this legislation would make open subsidies available, but only under stringent and controlled circumstances, and this would be done on a *national* basis rather than the state-by-state effort now going on.

It must be stressed that these would not be relief payments to fiscally healthy industries, but they would be incentives to American industry to disperse.

There would be two kinds of subsidies:

1. Interest supplements: If a firm cannot pay his interest out of local earnings without dipping into its capital, the company can be given an interest supplement by the Rural Development Investment Equalization Administration. The payment could not bring the firm's interest level lower than one-percent.

2. Rural Development Capital Augmentation Payments: If a community wanted to build a sewer system, a calculation would be made of how much such a system would cost, and then it would be determined how much the people in the community could reasonably be expected to pay for it. The difference between these two figures would be the Rural Development Capital Augmentation payment. The same formula could be used for development of new industry, but again it must be stressed that this procedure would be under strict controls so that this money would not be used for fly-by-night or doomed-to-fail businesses.

THE REORGANIZATION

Under this bill farm and non-farm credit would come under a new Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. Under him, in two separate agencies, would be the Farm Development Administration, which now handles all farm credits (under the title Farmers Home Administration) and the Rural Enterprise and Community Development Administration, which would handle all non-farm rural credit.

The new assistant secretary would be assigned to no other duties than to oversee all rural credit. At present, the assistant secretary handling this task, must also supervise a wide range of other activities.

The 19 members of the Rural Development Credit Board would have five members appointed by the President of the United States; five nominated by the President Pro tempore of the Senate; and five nominated after consideration of the recommendations of the Speaker of the House.

The Secretary of Agriculture would appoint the same person who is his representative to the Farm Credit Board. The governor of the Farm Credit Administration would be another member of the board. The Executive Director of the Rural Development Credit Agency, and the Rural Development Investment Equalization Administration would sit on the board as ex-officio members.

By Mr. COOPER:

S. 2224. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, to re-

the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency. Referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, by unanimous consent.

by, the Committees on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate regarding intelligence information collected by the Agency concerning the relations of the United States to foreign countries and matters of national security including full and current analysis by the Agency of such information.

(h) Any intelligence information and any analysis thereof made available to any committee of the Congress pursuant to subsection (g) of this section shall be made available by such committee, in accordance with such rules as such committee may establish, to any member of the Congress who requests such information and analysis. Such information and analysis shall also be made available by any such committee, in accordance with such rules as such committee may establish, to any officer or employee of the House of Representatives or the Senate who has been (1) designated by a Member of Congress to have access to such information and analysis, and (2) determined by the committee concerned to have the necessary security clearance for such access."

The bill would, as a matter of law, make available to the Congress, through its appropriate committees, the same intelligence, conclusions, facts, and analyses that are now available to the executive branch. At the present time, the intelligence information and analyses developed by the CIA and other intelligence agencies of the Government are available only to the executive as a matter of law. This bill would not, in any way, affect the activities of the CIA, its sources or methods, nor would it diminish in any respect the authority of already existing committees and oversight groups, which supervise the intelligence collection activities of the Government. My bill is concerned only with the end result—the facts and analyses of facts. It would, of course, in no way inhibit the use by the Congress of analyses and information from sources outside the Government. It is obvious that with the addition of intelligence facts and their analyses, the Congress would be in a much better position to make judgments from a much more informed and broader perspective than is now possible.

The National Security Act of 1947 marked a major reorganization of the executive branch. This reorganization made it possible for the executive branch to assume more effectively the responsibilities of the United States in world affairs and the maintenance of our own national security. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the unified services as we now know them.

now know them.

Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, established the Central Intelligence Agency under a Director and Deputy Director, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Under the direction of the National Security Council, it was directed to advise the National Security Council on matters relating to national security and "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities."

The language does not specifically bar the dissemination of intelligence to the Congress, but it does not provide that

STATINTL

2 JUL 1971

STENNIS TOLD WILSON IN '54 TO STAY OUT OF VIET WAR

On Jan. 29, 1954, Sen. John C. Stennis wrote a letter urging the Eisenhower administration not to send American troops into Indochina.

The Mississippi Democrat, now chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Eisenhower's secretary of defense, Charles E. Wilson, "we should certainly stop short of sending our troops or airmen to this area, either for participation in the conflict or as instructors."

"As always, when we send one group, we shall have to send another to protect the first and we shall thus be fully involved in a short time," Stennis said.

His letter, part of the "Pentagon archives" obtained by The Star, was written just a day before Eisenhower's special committee on Indochina recommended that the U.S. send aircraft and mechanics to help the French in their unsuccessful war with the Communist Viet Minh. Stennis warned against even sending mechanics.

Congress Gets Pentagon Papers, Locks Them Up

By MARJORIE HUNTER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 28 — The Pentagon papers, packed in cardboard boxes marked "top secret," were delivered to Congress today and quickly placed in locked vaults.

In sending the report to Congress, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird issued a warning that disclosure of information in the secret study would pose "grave and immediate dangers to national security."

Members of Congress will be allowed to read the multivolume study of the Vietnam war but will be barred from taking notes or divulging the contents.

Pentagon spokesmen said that many of the documents would be made public, probably within 45 days. However, Secretary Laird said that some of the documents were still so sensitive that they must remain secret indefinitely.

One set of volumes will be kept in the Capitol office of Francis R. Valeo, Secretary of the Senate, until the Senate determines whether to refer them to the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee or both.

Joint Hearing Possible


The Senate Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, said that tentative agreement had been reached for a joint hearing by the two committees on publication of the papers in The New York Times and other newspapers. The suggestion for a joint hearing was endorsed by the Republican Senate leader, Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania.

The first Senator to ask permission to examine the volumes was Harry F. Byrd Jr., independent of Virginia, a member of the Armed Services Committee. He is owner of two Virginia newspapers, The Winchester Star and The Harrisonburg News Record.

Later in the day, Senator Charles H. Percy, Republican of Illinois, asked to examine the documents.

A duplicate set of volumes was sent to the House Armed Services Committee in the Rayburn Building. The committee, in a mid-afternoon meeting, authorized its chairman, F. Edward Hébert of Louisiana, to set up rules under which House members could examine the documents.

Mr. Hébert said he would issue the rules in a day or two. Among them, he said, will be the bans on divulging the contents.



The New York Times/George Tamas

Boxes of the Pentagon papers being wheeled into Senate yesterday. At left is Hugh Scott, Republican leader.

Mr. Hébert also said that guards would be on duty around the clock.

But while members of Congress have been cautioned some leaders in the Senate and House appeared dubious that the contents of the papers would be kept secret.

"I don't think you could keep a secret in Washington if you told it to a mirror," Representative Hébert said.

Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, President pro tem of the Senate, when asked if he thought the papers would remain secret, replied: "If I'm to judge from past experience, the answer is no."

Others Seeking Copies

Meanwhile, seven members of the House Government

acting under a law requiring any executive agency to submit "any information requested of it in relation to any matter within the jurisdiction" of the Government Operations Committee when requested by at least seven members of the committee.

Joining him in requesting the information from Secretary Laird were four other Democrats—Henry S. Reuss of Wisconsin, Bill Alexander of Arkansas, John E. Moss of California, and John Conyers Jr. of Michigan—and two Republicans — Ogden R. Reid of Westchester and Paul N. McCloskey Jr. of California.

Guarded by several Army majors and sergeants, the Pentagon papers were rolled into the Capitol on wheeled carts shortly after noon.

One set was taken to the office of Senator Ellender, the Senate President pro tem. Pasted on one box was a piece of white paper, lettered "Top Secret, Volumes 1-30; on the other & "Top Secret, Volumes 31-47."

Senator Ellender signed a receipt handed to him by Rady Johnson, Secretary Laird's legislative aide, then turned the boxes over to the Senate leaders, Mr. Mansfield and Mr. Scott. Mr. Scott opened one volume, thumbed through it, but made no comment. The boxes then were wheeled to a vault in the office of the Secretary of the Senate.

At about the same time, a duplicate set was wheeled into the Capitol by other Army personnel, accompanied by David O. Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration.

Speaker Carl Albert, summoned from the House chamber, received the documents and signed a receipt. The boxes then were rolled to the House Armed Services Committee offices.

By late today, only one House member, Robert R. McClory, Republican of Illinois, had asked to see the documents.

Rostow Charges Distortions

Prof. Walt W. Rostow, former White House adviser, said yesterday there were systematic distortions in The New York Times's account of the Pentagon's study of American involvement in Vietnam.

He said that the papers were an incomplete record and did not reflect discussions between the President and his advisers or Congressional leaders. He explained some of the

20 JUN 1971

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Senator Proposes Curb on Secret CIA Activity

Case's Move Prompted by Disclosure Spy
Agency Is Financing Operations in Laos.

BY JOHN H. AVERILL

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — In a move to end clandestine U.S. military involvement in Laos, Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) proposed legislation Saturday to bar the Central Intelligence Agency from financing military operations in any country without congressional authorization.

Case's proposal was prompted by disclosures that the CIA is financing and supervising the use of between 4,500 and 5,000 Thai troops against Communist forces in Laos.

"I do not direct criticism against the CIA, for it has only been following orders issued by several Presidents," Case said.

"I simply question whether a secret intelligence organization should be assigned a war-making role abroad. Certainly this was not the intent of Congress when it originally voted to establish the CIA."

Case, who has become an increasingly outspoken critic of U.S. involvement in Indochina, advanced his proposal in a speech before the New Jersey Press Assn. at Spring Lake, N.J. The text was released here.

In an interview, Case said he planned to offer his legislation as amendments to the Administration's foreign aid bill pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which Case is a senior member.

No End Runs
"My purpose," he said, "is to prevent the CIA and the Defense Department from making a run around the Cooper-Church and Fulbright amendments."

Hidden Budget

The CIA budget, estimated to run annually anywhere from \$500 million to \$1 billion, is hidden among the budgets of various departments and only key members of Congress are aware of its magnitude and the purposes for which it is intended.

In his speech, Case described his proposals as "a means of forcing our government to conduct foreign policy in the open so that the public may know what is going on and have the controlling voice in important decisions."

"To be perfectly frank," Case continued, "our system has gotten out of whack and it is time to restore a better balance. The Constitution does not give the President authority to declare a secret war and I do not accept that there are any precedents in our history which would permit him now to do so."

Dovish Committee

It has been disclosed in recent weeks that the United States is spending at least \$350 million annually in military and economic assistance to the royal Laotian government. This presumably includes the cost of financing the Thai mercenaries. The Administration acknowledges spending only \$52 million in Laos and that for economic assistance.

With his proposed amendments, Case said he hopes to prevent the CIA from claiming exemption from the Fulbright amendment. Since Fulbright's amendment applies specifically to Defense Department appropriations, Case proposed that the Fulbright ban be broadened to include all funds and all government agencies — including the CIA.

By attaching his amendments to the foreign aid bill, Case would put them within jurisdiction of the predominantly dovish Foreign Relations Committee rather than the hawkish Senate Armed Services Committee, which has jurisdiction over the CIA.

Case said, however, that he might offer his proposals as amendments to the Armed Services Commit-

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Senator Would Bar CIA From Combat

**Case Seeks To Prevent Secret Wars Fought
By Agency Behind Congress's Back**

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, June 19—Senator Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) announced today that he intends to introduce legislation to prevent the CIA from secretly engaging in military operations.

The legislation will be drafted as amendments to the foreign aid authorization bill, which is expected to reach the Senate floor next month. The series of amendments would:

1. Extend congressional restrictions on the use of Defense Department funds overseas to all government agencies, including the CIA.

Specific Authorization

2. Prohibit any U.S. government agency from financing military operations abroad without specific congressional authorization.

3. Extend the existing limitations on the use by the Defense Department of surplus arms to all government agencies.

Mr. Case said he did not believe his proposal would completely cut off the executive branch's ability to wage secret wars, but said he was approaching the matter "piecemeal" because he did not believe Congress was ready to pass more comprehensive legislation.

The reluctance of Congress to assert its full authority was demonstrated, he said, by the defeat in both houses earlier this week of legislation to impose a deadline for total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina.

Foreign Mercenaries

The House, in fact, also rejected by a 172-to-46 vote an amendment similar to what Senator Case is proposing. The defeated amendment would have prevented the CIA from using Defense Department funds for conducting "paramilitary" operations or hiring foreign mercenaries to fight in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.

Representative F. Edward Hebert (D., La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, opposed the amendment, saying its enactment would be "very dangerous to the security of our country."

Mr. Hebert, as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is one of a handful of congressmen who have access to information pertaining to the CIA.

While all CIA operations are officially secret, there have been numerous newspaper reports as well as statements by congressmen and senators on the agency's operations in Southeast Asia.

The most publicized activity of the CIA has been its operations in Laos, where the agency reportedly has equipped and trained a secret army of Meo tribesmen and now is supporting Thai mercenaries to fight there.

Without disclosing his sources, Mr. Case also suggested that the CIA is financing Cambodian troops in Laos as well as Thai troops in Cambodia.

He said he has also received reports that the CIA has relatively unrestricted use of surplus arms in its covert military operations.

Only Following Orders

"I do not direct criticism against the CIA," Mr. Case said, "for it has only been following orders issued by several Presidents. I simply question whether a secret intelligence organization should be assigned a war-making role abroad. Certainly this was not the intent of Congress when it originally voted to establish the CIA."

The rationale behind secret military and paramilitary operations is that the United States should have some means of militarily protecting its interests abroad, short of engaging in open warfare.

Mr. Case said that while he agreed that secret operations might in certain instances be useful he felt they were incompatible with "an open system of government."

Kennedy Seeks Secret Vietnam Data

Kennedy Wants Data

By MARJORIE HUNTER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 17 -- Senator Edward M. Kennedy called today for full disclosure of secret Government data on Vietnam policies and actions during the Administration of President John F. Kennedy.

"I don't have any idea what is in it or how it will turn out," Senator Kennedy said. "But the American people ought to be the final judge of the whole period of the 1960's, and before, in Vietnam."

His demand for the disclosure of portions of a Pentagon study relevant to the Kennedy years came as Congressional protests continued over the Government attempts to block further publication of a series by The New York Times on the Vietnam study.

There were these developments. More than 20 House Democrats announced that they would ask United States District Judge Murray I. Gurfein for permission tomorrow to intervene in the pending injunction proceedings by filing a "friend of the court" brief supporting the position of The Times.

A House subcommittee on Government information announced that it would open hearings, probably next Wednesday, into Government policies on withholding "vital information" from the American people.

Senator Carl T. Curtis, a conservative Nebraska Republican, generally regarded as hawkish on the war, commended The New York Times for printing the series and criticized the Government's extensive use of "secret" and "top secret" classification of documents.

Mike Mansfield, the Senate majority leader, disclosed that "one high official" mentioned in the Pentagon study had called him and volunteered to testify if there is a Senate committee inquiry into the matter. Senator Mansfield declined to identify the call.

New Yorkers Protest

Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Republican of California, a vocal critic of the war, attempted to have the House adjourned today in protest over the Administration's efforts to prevent further publication of the secret documents. The move was rejected, 368 to 30.

Representative Bella Abzug, Democrat of Manhattan, introduced a resolution of inquiry, demanding that the Administration give Congress the text of the Pentagon study and more recent studies of United States policy in Indochina.

The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, George Romney, speaking in Charleston, W.Va., last night, said that the Pentagon study confirmed a charge he had made six years ago that the American people were "brainwashed" about the war. "I faced the fact and came to the conclusion years ago, before it was fashionable, that I had been deceived and the American people had been deceived on Vietnam," Mr. Romney said.

The move by the group of House Democrats to intervene in the pending injunction proceedings is being led by Representative Bob Eckhardt, a liberal Texas Democrat and critic of the war.

Explaining the group's position, Mr. Eckhardt said: "If litigation prevents The Times from publishing [the remainder of its series] the intervenors will be denied important information bearing on matters before Congress."

The group has hired Thomas Emerson of the Yale Law School to represent them. Appearing in court tomorrow in New York with Mr. Emerson and Mr. Eckhardt will be two others in the group, William F. Ryan of Manhattan and Abner J. Mikva of Illinois.

The group includes nine other New Yorkers: Edward I. Koch, Mrs. Abzug, Charles B. Rangel, all of Manhattan; Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Queens; Bertram L. Podell, Brooklyn; James H. Scheuer, the Bronx; Lester L. Wolff, Nassau; Herman Badillo, Manhattan-Bronx-Queens; and John G. Dow of upstate New York.

People Hoodwinked

"People of this country are being hoodwinked and we want to put a stop to it," Mr. Dow

of this secrecy business. Washington reeks of it."

The inquiry into Government information policies will be conducted by a House subcommittee headed by Representative William S. Moorhead, Democrat of Pennsylvania. The ranking Republican is Representative Ogden R. Reid of Westchester.

In a joint statement announcing the hearings, Mr. Moorhead and Mr. Reid said:

"The New York Times case is sparking an agonizing reappraisal by the Congress of laws and regulations that prevent a free flow of information about our Government and its activities to the American public and its elected representatives in Congress."

They said that they hoped to have five days of hearings, all of them open unless they found it essential to hold executive sessions to hear matters of top security.

Among those who will be asked to testify are Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security affairs.

Two law professors, Joseph Bishop of Yale and Philip Kurland of the University of Chicago, have agreed to testify, Mr. Reid said. Others to be asked to testify will include representatives of the news media and members of Congress.

Meanwhile, Senator Mansfield continued today to press for a Senate inquiry into the origins of United States involvement in Vietnam. He said that the proper forum would be the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee or a joint panel of both. If neither acts, he said, his own subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee would hold hearings.

"The only way to face up to this is to lay it all out, not to look for scapegoats, not to issue subpoenas, not to look for sources but to give those involved a chance to explain their positions."

Out of such an inquiry, he said, "perhaps we'll learn some lessons so there will be no future Vietnams and perhaps there might emerge a closer relationship between the Executive and the Congress, perhaps

with the President in times of crises, and, if asked to, give advice and counsel."

Newspapers Commended

Noting that Senator Kennedy had urged disclosure of relevant data dealing with the Kennedy decisions in Vietnam, Senator Mansfield said that he would "welcome having my confidential reports [on Southeast Asia trips he made] to President Kennedy in 1962 and President Johnson in 1965 made available."

Senator Curtis's speech in the Senate, commending The Times and criticizing Government classification of information, was viewed as significant because of his generally conservative views and his support of the Nixon Administration.

"I do not believe the serious problem here, either to the American people or to the Government of the United States, is the fact that The New York Times began publishing a series of articles on the document," he told the Senate.

"In short," he continued, "I do not find fault with The New York Times, I commend The Times and all other newspapers and newspapermen and women who are constantly digging to bring out the truth and keep it squarely before the American people.

"I do find very serious fault, Mr. President, with the information classification and document security system of this country . . . the classification system should never be used to cover up a lie or a documented case of public deceit by the officials of any agency or government."

Senator James L. Buckley, Conservative-Republican of New York, told newsmen today that he was not at this point "throwing darts at The New York Times," but he said that "two elements disturb me."

One, he said, is that foreign governments might be disturbed if information they entrust to the United States might not be secure. The other, he said, is the possibility that persons within any Administration might "draw in their horns" and not speak freely in the development of alternatives to policy for fear of future disclosure of their views.

However, Senator Buckley said that while he had not yet read all the published documents, he did not feel what he had read endangered national security.

June 17, 1971 STATINTL CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

127-3405

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BADILLO

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BADILLO: Page 7, line 4, before the quotation marks insert the following new sentence: "Nothing in clause (A) or (B) of the first sentence of this paragraph or in the immediately preceding sentence shall be construed to authorize the use of any of such funds by the Central Intelligence Agency (or by any agency or person operating on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency) to engage, in any manner or to any extent, in the organization, supervision, or conduct of any military or paramilitary operation of any kind in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand (including any operation of the kind commonly called 'guerrilla warfare' operation) which will be executed by forces composed in whole or in part of (i) mercenaries, (ii) regular or irregular personnel of any armed force of any foreign nation or area, or (iii) personnel other than those listed in clause (i) or (ii) who are under arms and are indigenous to any foreign country or area."

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, this is a very specific amendment limiting the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency to the gathering of intelligence, and specifically prohibiting the Central Intelligence Agency from conducting guerrilla operations in Southeast Asia. The necessity for the amendment arises because the enabling act which created the Central Intelligence Agency provides that the CIA may perform "such other functions and duties related to intelligence and affecting national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

There has been clear evidence from news accounts over the years, which I am sure all of you have read, that the Central Intelligence Agency is conducting guerrilla operations in Laos and Cambodia. This last week, as you know, the Senate had a secret session involving our activities in Laos and Senator SYMINGTON in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD indicated as follows:

In the case of Laos one is unable to cite a figure for the total cost of this war to the United States. First, because what the United States is doing, and the cost of what we are doing, continues to be cloaked with official secrecy by the executive branch. Second, one cannot cite a figure for the total cost to us of the war in Laos because, it must be said in all frankness, neither you, nor I, nor any other Member of Congress is in position to know what those costs actually are.

Yesterday, my colleague the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE), questioned the chairman of the committee as to whether this bill specifically included funds for the Central Intelligence Agency, and the chairman answered that it does. The chairman also refused to say what the amounts were, and said that only he and the ranking minority member of the committee knew.

The gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) also asked the chairman as follows:

What is the purpose of the CIA activity in Laos?

The chairman answered as follows:

Mr. HEBERT. The activity of the CIA in all sections of the world, in Laos, the Middle

East and everywhere is the gathering of intelligence for the protection and security of the United States.

If that is the understanding of the activities of the CIA by the chairman, then he should be in support of this amendment, because all I am saying is that that should be precisely the activity of the Central Intelligence Agency, to gather information, and not to engage in guerrilla activities. But because we do not know exactly what funds are available either in this body or in the Senate, and we do not know exactly to what purpose they are being put, this amendment is prepared so that we can be sure that the activities are limited.

I seek only to insure that the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency be limited to those specified in the law, and that is to the gathering of intelligence. Certainly after the recent disclosures it becomes all the more important that we insure that the agencies of the executive department comply with the mandates of the Congress.

Even before the New York Times published parts of the Pentagon study of our involvement in the Vietnam war, it had become apparent that the CIA had literally been running the entire military operation in Laos, including the hiring, training, and leading of a mercenary army of Thais and Mao tribesmen and the tactical control of an air war which has made the Laotian people refugees in their own land.

As early as 1964, the CIA recruited Thai pilots to fly planes with markings of the Royal Laotian Government against Communist forces in Laos and there is evidence these Thai pilots are still flying missions in Laos, under CIA control and supervision. Reliable estimates given recently to the Senate indicate that the CIA currently is paying about 5,000 Thais to fight in Laos.

Enactment of this amendment is necessary if Congress is to regain some measure of meaningful control and oversight in the field of foreign affairs. Regardless of how individual Members might feel about the recent articles in the New York Times, it is clear that the nature and extent of our involvement in Southeast Asia has repeatedly been hidden from and misrepresented to the American people and their elected Representatives. I strongly suspect that the pattern of subterfuge and outright misrepresentation continues. This amendment represents a step toward squaring with the American people. I urge its adoption.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. Would the amendment preclude the CIA from supporting such things as have been reported in national magazines, such as the pay for personnel in the Saigon Police Force, which police force is being used, of course, for campaign purposes to support the Thieu government in Southeast Asia?

Mr. BADILLO. Yes it would, because it would seek to limit the Central Intelligence Agency to the gathering of intelligence and to its functions as approved

by the Congress. Specifically it excludes the support of activities commonly called guerrilla warfare, support of mercenaries, support of regular or irregular personnel of any armed forces of any foreign nation or area within Southeast Asia.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. CONYERS. I want to commend the precision with which the gentleman has formulated this amendment. I believe it is an exceedingly important one. I applaud his courage and support him.

Mr. BADILLO. I thank the gentleman very much.

(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

The gentleman's amendment seeks to place a restriction upon the use of any funds authorized in this proposed act for military or paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia organized or supervised by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Central Intelligence Agency was established by the National Security Act. It functions under the National Security Council under the President of the United States. It initiates no activities of its own without direction from the President and/or the National Security Council.

I do not propose to debate on the floor of the House the activities or functions of the Central Intelligence Agency. I will state categorically that the intelligence activities conducted by our Government are essential to the security of this Nation.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, as I read it, seeks to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from organizing, supervising, or conducting any so-called military or paramilitary operation of any kind in Southeast Asia which would be executed by mercenaries, regular or irregular personnel of any armed force of any foreign nation or area, or any other personnel of a foreign nation. I will not go into the ramifications of such a restriction should it be enacted. I will merely tell the House that in my opinion, as well meaning as this amendment may be, it is very dangerous to the security of our country. Secrecy is one of the prices we must pay for survival. Today, there seems to be a penchant for exposing Government secrets which unwittingly or unwittingly give aid and comfort to the enemy.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from New York would seriously restrict our intelligence activities in Southeast Asia and would certainly most seriously affect, and perhaps even prevent, the further withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam.

I am not going to expand upon my statement any further.

I urge the House to overwhelmingly defeat this amendment.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

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U.S. ASKING COURT FOR ORDER TO SEE TIMES DOCUMENTS

Opponents of War In Congress Decry U.S. Suit on Study

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 16—Congressional opponents of the war in Indochina criticized the Nixon Administration today for having sought and obtained a court order temporarily preventing The New York Times from publishing further material from a secret Pentagon study on Vietnam.

In Los Angeles, however, Vice President Agnew questioned the judgment of The Times in publishing the material for three days before the court order was issued yesterday.

Two members of Congress—Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Republican of California—asked The Times to turn over to them copies of unpublished material, since the Administration has refused Congressional access to the documents. The Times refused both requests.

At the White House, Ronald L. Ziegler, President Nixon's press secretary, said that no consideration was being given to declassifying—removing the official secrecy from—the documents published by The Times.

Asked why the Administration had moved against The Times when it had never before attempted to prevent publication of information, Mr. Ziegler said, "I don't know that there

are other cases . . . where a publication stated that it intended to publish highly classified material."

A major figure in the Pentagon study, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, who was Ambassador to South Vietnam from the summer of 1964 to the summer of 1965 said in a television interview tonight that The Times had initiated "a practice of betrayal of Government secrets."

Response by Taylor

Asked on the Columbia Broadcasting System's evening news program how his position squared with "the people's right to know," General Taylor responded:

"I don't believe in that as a general principle. You have to talk about cases. What is a citizen going to do after reading these documents that he wouldn't have done otherwise? A citizen should know those things he needs to know to be a good citizen and discharge his functions, but not to get into secrets that damage his Government and indirectly damage the citizen himself."

The Times' disclosures, General Taylor said, were "laying a foundation for bad history."

The disclosures in The Times series published on Sunday, Monday and Tuesday and the temporary court order that was issued yesterday were major topics of discussion on Capitol Hill today.

Sixty-two members of the House of Representatives, nearly all of them Liberal Democrats, signed letters to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and Attorney General John N. Mitchell, asking Mr. Laird to make the Pentagon study available to Congress and protesting to Mr. Mitchell about what they termed his "harassment" of The Times. The letters were initiated by Representative Jonathan B. Bingham, Democrat of the Bronx.

Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic leader, said again, as he had said yesterday, that regardless of the outcome of The Times court case, Senate hearings would be convened on the disclosures in the Pentagon

study. He said he did not know whether they would be held by the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, or, perhaps, jointly.

Scott Finds Damage

Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the minority leader, said that both the publication of the classified documents and the contents of the documents damaged public confidence in the Government.

'The public must question the Government's security now, Mr. Scott said, but he added that: it was "perfectly clear that American people were not told things [about the war in

Indochina] that they should have been told."

In the House, the Information subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee announced hearings next week on the Government's classification procedures and on the policies of withholding data from Congress and the public on the ground of "executive privilege."

Representative Ogden R. Reid of Westchester County, the subcommittee's ranking Republican member, said he hoped to call officials from the State, Defense and Justice Departments and the White House staff.

To Save Some Red Faces'

The subcommittee is headed by Representative William S. Moorhead, a Pennsylvania Democrat. He said that the classification of the Pentagon study "was done not so much to save the security of the United States but to save some red faces."

Vice President Agnew, the highest Administration official to comment on the disclosures, was interviewed by reporters after he discussed the Administration's revenue-sharing program at a meeting of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.

"In my opinion, what is the proper amount of classified information that should be released is a matter for professional judgment," the Vice President, a frequent critic of the press, said.

A reporter asked his opinion about the judgment of American officials in withholding information about the war from the public. Mr. Agnew replied: "The Nixon Administration has a great deal more confidence in the judgment of elected officials than it does in The New York Times."

'Secretive and Clandestine'

Mr. Agnew said that The Times knew that the material was secret and that it succeeded to publish it in a secretive and clandestine fashion."

Among the few public statements of Congressmen critical of The Times was one from Senator John G. Tower, Republican of Texas.

He said that the published information had been "particularly interesting," but he questioned whether "the publication of classified documents remains within the excellent and responsible motto of which The New York Times prides itself—'All the news that's fit to print'."

Another piece of criticism came from W. Averell Harriman, who served as President Johnson's delegate to the Paris peace talks. At a breakfast meeting with newsmen, Mr. Harriman said that he believed that the public had not been "misled by the publication of a lot of miscellaneous documents."

Another member of the Johnson Administration, Senator H. Humphrey of Minnesota, the former Vice President, discounted reports that McGeorge Bundy and Walt W. Rostow, Mr. Johnson's assistants for national security affairs, had been the men closest to the President on war matters. Senator Humphrey said that "day in and day out" Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara were the key officials.

Most members of Congress who commented publicly today are, like Mr. Harriman, now critics of the war.

Senator George S. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, said in a statement that the Justice Department's use of espionage laws to "harry The New York Times" not only violates the constitutional principle of freedom of the press "but also shuts off a free flow of vital information to the public."

Senator Fulbright, in a letter to Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, president and publisher of The New York Times, said that the information published by The Times had not breached the national security and that it was within The Times's right under the First Amendment to print it. The Senator, who was in London, added, "Too often, national security as an excuse for secrecy has been invoked solely to prevent personal embarrassment."

Representative McCloskey, in a letter to A. M. Rosenthal, managing editor of The Times, said that if he were given copies of the secret material he would have it printed in The Congressional Record.

Representative Andrew Jacobs, an Indiana Democrat, told the House of his opinion on the matter in the form of a parable:

"Once upon a time a little paper boy discovered great gauze in the credibility in which the emperor claimed to be clothed. So the emperor sued the paper boy and put him in jail for finding out."

"And nobody lived quite the

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Russian

Missile

Faulted

Study Finds SS-9 Warheads Lack Accuracy

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

A new study sponsored by the Pentagon and CIA estimates that multiple warheads flight-tested thus far with the giant Soviet SS-9 intercontinental missiles are not accurate enough to knock out U.S. Minuteman ICBMs in a surprise attack, according to informed government sources.

Furthermore, the study is said to estimate that the warhead accuracy probably cannot be improved enough with the techniques now being used to achieve a first-strike capability.

The study, which was completed in April, was carried out for the government by TRW Inc., a large defense contractor in California with an excellent technical reputation.

Informed officials say there is no evidence that the Soviets have flight-tested any new kind of multiple warhead for the SS-9 beyond those discussed in the study.

While some additional tests of the big missile are expected later this year, officials say they are uncertain whether these flights will reveal a new and more accurate version of the SS-9 or will merely be tests of existing missiles launched from protective silos the Soviets are building.

In any event, some government weapons analysts view the new study as lessening still further. Pentagon fears that by 1975 the Soviets could deal a surprise knock-out to all but a handful of America's 1,000-missile Minuteman force.

Last year, TRW made a similar technical assessment of the SS-9 for the Pentagon. In that study, officials say the firm gave a "lukewarm" endorsement, based on earlier SS-9 testing, to the idea that the Soviet triplet warheads could be of the MIRV type in which each of the three warheads can be sent to a separate Minuteman silo with enough accuracy to knock it out.

The new study, officials say, reverses that earlier opinion that MIRVs were involved.

Weapons experts in a number of government agencies, including the Pentagon, estimate that it would take the Soviets two to three more years to perfect and begin deployment of a more accurate MIRV. It would then take several more years to equip the entire force of SS-9s, which now numbers about 288.

Agreement Sought

The Pentagon has estimated that the Soviets would need some 450 such MIRV-equipped missiles to wipe out the Minuteman force. At the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, the United States is trying to work out an agreement that would limit the SS-9s to about 300.

The new study also appears to contradict recent Pentagon estimates that the Soviets will have a MIRV "capability" in 1972. However, some officials say it is true that the current Soviet multiple warhead system could be viewed as a MIRV, except that it is not a very good one.

The Soviets are said to use a system of small rails inside the nose cone of the SS-9 to launch the three warheads to separate targets that are reasonably close together. By varying the time each warhead moves down these rails, the missiles can be made to land in a pattern that has, in tests, resembled the layout of Minuteman silos.

This, at first, led some analysts to believe that the Soviets were developing a MIRV to attack Minuteman in a surprise first strike.

Now, however, it has apparently been concluded that the technique is both inaccurate

and also inflexible. Minuteman patterns vary widely.

The U.S. MIRV now being deployed on the Minuteman and Poseidon submarines is more sophisticated, using a so-called "space bus" with its own guidance system to target each warhead accurately in the bus to a widely separated target before it is launched.

Less Powerful Weapons

The U.S. MIRVs, however, are only a fraction as powerful as the huge Soviet weapons, and the Pentagon has declared that this lack of nuclear punch also means that Minutemen are no threat to Soviet missiles buried in underground silos.

On Capitol Hill yesterday, the SS-9 also figured in sharp questioning of high-ranking Pentagon officials by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.).

Symington, at an open session of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on disarmament, claimed that Pentagon witness were saying different things about a possible U.S.-Soviet agreement at SALT than had the chief U.S. negotiator, Gerard Smith, before the same committee in a closed hearing on Tuesday.

Appearing at yesterday's session was Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. John S. Foster Jr., the Pentagon's chief scientist.

Both officials, under questioning, said that any SALT agreement must include simultaneous limitation on offensive missiles as well as ABM defense systems.

"Your position," Symington said to Foster, "is not the same as Smith's." Symington said he understood Smith to say in closed session that the hoped for SALT agreement would provide for an ABM agreement while talks continue on the offensive weapons question. Foster said it was his understanding that "any controls would go in simultaneously."

Symington pressed Foster to say if Smith's interpretation was "right or wrong." Foster hesitated, then said he did not feel it was helpful "to get engaged in semantics."

Foster said he did not think there were any differences in his understanding of the

hoped for agreement and Smith's, although defense officials later conceded privately that it was not yet clear if the Soviets completely understood or agreed to U.S. goals on limiting offensive missiles.

After Moorer mentioned the SS-9 threat against the "survivability of our ICBMs," Symington, who is also a member of the Armed Services Committee -- including the CIA subcommittee -- said he did not agree with "the assessment that the SS-9 was accurate enough for a first strike."

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

June 16, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Can the gentleman tell me in what portion of the bill those funds are contained?

Mr. HÉBERT. No, I cannot tell the gentleman that.

Mr. WALDIE. Is it available so that a Member of this House of Representatives can go to the committee and examine the classified documents involving the amount of money available for the Central Intelligence Agency in this bill?

Mr. HÉBERT. No, sir, it is not. The chairman takes the full responsibility of not discussing the matter further.

Mr. WALDIE. So whatever those sums are and to whatever purpose they will be put, that is only known to the chairman of the committee?

Mr. HÉBERT. It is known to the chairman and the ranking minority member of the committee. This is a policy which has prevailed throughout the years in all administrations.

Mr. WALDIE. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I think I understand the policy that no other member of the committee knows that information.

Mr. HÉBERT. That is correct.

Mr. WALDIE. May I ask this question?

In title IV there is a prohibition against using any of the moneys appropriated in this bill for the payment of free world forces serving in Laos. Are there any funds being appropriated by this bill for the payment of any forces in Laos?

Mr. HÉBERT. No, there is not any provision for the payment of those forces. The only moneys that are involved in this bill are those providing for the intelligence agencies of this country.

May I make a further correction, I do not want to mislead anybody by saying that the chairman and the ranking minority member know about these funds and only them, because the entire committee is briefed by the CIA on its functions. So I do not want to have that misconception carried away that the members of the committee do not know of the activities of the CIA and of the other intelligence agencies, this we do know. This year, for the first time in the history of the committee, at the chairman's request, the CIA was invited to appear before the entire committee. Its director, Mr. Helms, appeared and subjected himself to all kinds of questions and all the questions were answered by the director, Mr. Helms.

Mr. WALDIE. May I ask the chairman one final question?

What is the purpose of the CIA activity in Laos?

Mr. HÉBERT. The activity of the CIA in all sections of the world, in Laos, the Middle East and everywhere is the gathering of intelligence for the protection and security of the United States.

Mr. WALDIE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HUNGATE).

(Mr. HUNGATE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, we will soon be called upon to vote on the Nedzi-Whalen amendment or some House ver-

sion of the McGovern-Hatfield amendment. Since I fear there may have been a considerable amount of high-pressure, slick, oversimplification of this problem, I believe the following editorial in the Washington Post is illuminating:

CONGRESS VOTES ON THE WAR

The McGovern-Hatfield and Nedzi-Whalen amendments, which are to be voted on today in the Senate and House respectively, would not "end the war" or automatically retrieve the American POW's or guarantee the safe exit of American forces or, least of all, assure a Vietnamese reconciliation. Any such claim promises more than either amendment can deliver and invites further frustration and disillusionment. Not only does fulfillment of claims like these lie to a great extent in other than American hands. But the American system of Government gives the President broad authority to conduct a war. It is idle to pretend while the fighting goes on that Congress can remove that authority; in fact, McGovern-Hatfield explicitly concedes the point.

So it is misleading the public to talk of these proposed congressional restraints in terms of a "date certain" for our withdrawal, however comforting and convenient that piece of shorthand may be to supporters of both measures; Vietnam has given us enough deceptive shorthand, and also enough easy—and offensive—sales pitches...

My colleagues, as you are well aware, I voted in favor of fixing December 31, 1971, as the date for withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Southeast Asia. I have voted three times this year to end the draft on June 30, 1971, in the belief that if wars in Southeast Asia can be fought with volunteers, they will prove they have the popular support of the American people. If they cannot, and I would assume this one cannot be fought with volunteers since 80 percent of combat troops are draftees, then the President could come to Congress and ask us for troops and prove his justification for the request. Then we could restore to Congress a meaningful voice in foreign policy.

However, since a majority of this Congress sees fit to draft our young men and ship them halfway around the world to fight 10,000 miles from home, I find it difficult to vote against funds to provide them with supplies, equipment, arms and ammunition they need to defend themselves and our country's position, even though we might not have selected their mission in Southeast Asia. As one who served in the combat infantry in World War II, I would consider it irresponsible to send a draftee into a combat zone without providing him with all the support those fortunate enough to stay at home can provide.

Therefore Mr. Chairman, I must oppose the Nedzi-Whalen amendment.

Mr. NEIDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. NEIDZI. Did the Washington Post editorial recommend voting for or against?

Mr. HUNGATE. The Washington Post wrote these very skillful lines, I thought, with which I agree and found that in essence my construction would be meaningless and then it came out for it.

I think it is very much like the story you have all heard of a man coming in

the House and speaking about 10 minutes, and another Member said I heard you speak and I cannot tell where you stand. Can you tell me whether you are for or against it? The guy speaking said—

I watched the gentleman when he came in this House and raised his hand and took the oath to become a Member and I said, "There is a man, and no matter how long he is here, he will never know what's going on."

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GUBSER. Would you not summarize the Washington Post editorial this way—that they gave all the reasons for voting against Nedzi-Whalen in order to justify their point that you ought to vote for it?

Mr. HUNGATE. The gentleman's point seems accurate to me.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WHALEN. I would just like to read for the Record the editorial's conclusion.

The amendments as written are by and large thoughtful and responsible, though limited. A wise Congress would enact them, and a wise President would welcome them as reinforcement of his own policy and his own concern for the Nation.

Mr. HUNGATE, I appreciate the gentleman's contribution, but I would say as to the expression "a wise Congress," I presume its wisdom will be revealed in the future hours today.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ARENDS. When you must make a decision on what the Washington Post article sets forth as to whether this is a wise Congress or not—that is a far stretch of imagination.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. ABZUG).

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from New York is recognized.

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, we have all been very concerned about the shocking revelation in the last few days, that there have been secret military and political decisions by our Government without the consent or knowledge of this great body. These decisions were all the more shocking because they indicate that Government policy on Vietnam was constructed and conducted by lies and deceptions. There was a discussion that took place earlier in the debate between two members of your committee, Mr. Chairman, in which they suggested that classified material concerning the needs of our defense was available for inspection to the Members of this House.

Subsequent to this an inquiry was made of you, Mr. Chairman, by the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) with respect to information available concerning the CIA, and you indicated that it was not available for inspection by Members of either the Armed Services Committee or the House.

My question to you, sir, is this: Is classified material concerning the needs of our defense and the matters about

STATINTL

Goldwater Says He Knew Johnson Planned

to Widen the War

By RICHARD JALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 14—

Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican Presidential candidate in 1964, said today that he had known one month before the clashes in the Gulf of Tonkin that President Johnson was planning to widen the war in Vietnam.

"I did not know the exact details," the Senator said in a television interview, "but I knew that a scenario was written that would give an excuse for war."

He also said that he knew during his Presidential campaign that Mr. Johnson was planning to bomb North Vietnam and to send American soldiers to fight in South Vietnam.

"See, I was being called trigger-happy, warmonger, bomb-happy, and all the time Johnson was saying he'd never send American boys," the Senator said. "I knew damn well he would."

Pentagon Study Raised

The Senator was interviewed by Marvin Kalb for the Columbia Broadcasting System and by Paul Duke for the National Broadcasting Company.

Mr. Goldwater was asked to comment on articles being published in The New York Times

on a secret study, made in the Pentagon, on American participation in the Vietnam war.

Mr. Goldwater, who was re-elected to the Senate in 1968, was asked whether he thought the Johnson Administration had lied to the American people. "I would have to say yes," the Senator replied.

"It was too bad that the President would not level with the American people," Mr. Goldwater added. "It would have been better for the American people to have known about it."

A spokesman for the Senator, in response to inquiries after the television interview, said that Mr. Goldwater had had

access to some information as a member of the Armed Services Committee. He was also then a brigadier general in an active reserve unit and had many friends in the military service who gave him bits of information, the spokesman said.

Security Involved

One unit commander, for instance, called the Senator to tell him that he was being ordered to Southeast Asia but that his command was not properly equipped. The spokesman said that the Senator was asked whether he could do something about it.

The spokesman said that Senator Goldwater was convinced that other members of the Armed Services Committee had come to the same conclusions that he had. He did not name them.

The spokesman said that Mr. Goldwater did not use the information in the Presidential campaign because he felt he did not have sufficient credibility to stand up to the commander in chief on such a serious charge.

Moreover, the spokesman said, the Senator knew that the security of American military forces was involved. He said that the Senator believes in a certain amount of secrecy when a strategic military operation is being mapped.

CIA SAID TO DOUBT PENTAGON'S VIEW ON MISSILE THREAT

Senate G.O.P. Sources Say
Agency Thinks Soviet Silos
Are for Existing Arms

PROTECTIVE STEP SEEN

Moscow Is Believed to Be
'Hardening' Installations
for Its SS-11's

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 25 — Senate Republican sources reported today that the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that at least two-thirds of the large new silo holes recently detected in the Soviet Union were intended for the relatively small SS-11 intercontinental missile and not for a large new weapon as the Defense Department has suggested.

This assessment casts a different light on Moscow's strategic intentions at a crucial time in the negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve some limitation on defensive and offensive strategic weapons.

It now appears to some arms control specialists that the Soviet Union, rather than seeking to achieve a first-strike capability against the United States with large new missiles, is following the American course of trying to protect its missiles against attack with "hardened" silos.

60 New Silos Detected

Some 60 large new missiles silos in the Soviet Union have been detected in recent months by means of reconnaissance satellites. The C.I.A. was said to have concluded that at least two-thirds were intended for the SS-11 intercontinental missile, which is comparable to the Minuteman ICBM of the United States.

Some non-Governmental sources with access to Central Intelligence Agency information said that all but 15 of the new holes were situated in existing SS-11 missile fields.

The Senate Republican sources said they had been informed of the C.I.A. assessment by non-Governmental arms control experts who earlier had been briefed by the intelligence agency. These sources declined to be identified by name.

The Defense Department declined today to comment on the reported C.I.A. assessment because, as a department spokesman put it, "We would not have any comment on a speculative report like that."

But the spokesman said the department still held to the interpretation that the Soviet Union was deploying a modified version of its large SS-9 intercontinental missile or an entirely new missile system.

Much of the concern and speculation over the intended purpose for the new silos has sprung from their unusual size.

According to data obtained by the satellites, the holes were larger than those that had previously been dug for the SS-9, a large intercontinental missile that Defense Department officials have suggested the Soviet Union may be deploying as a "first strike" weapon against the United States's Minuteman force. This in turn gave rise to official speculation that the Soviet Union was planning to deploy an improved version of the SS-9 or perhaps an even larger, more powerful weapon.

Senator Henry M. Jackson, who first disclosed the detection of the new silo holes on a national television program March 7, said at the time that "the Russians are now in the process of deploying a new generation, an advanced generation of offensive systems." The Washington Democrat, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, described the development as "ominous indeed."

The Defense Department took a somewhat more cautious interpretation, saying that it had detected new ICBM construction but was not sure what the Soviet Union's intentions were.

But in a television appearance on March 10, Melvin R. Laird, the Secretary of Defense, said that the silo construction "confirms the fact that the Soviet Union is going forward with construction of a large missile system."

"We cannot tell at this time whether it is a modified version of the SS-9 . . . or whether it is an entirely new missile system," he said.

Secretary Gives Warning

Then, in a speech April 22 before the American Newspaper Publishers Association, Mr. Laird said the United States had fresh intelligence information "confirming the sobering fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a new--and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program."

He warned that if this Soviet missile build-up continued, the Defense Department might find it necessary to seek a supplementary appropriation for more strategic weapons.

Last week, Administration officials were reported to have said that the Soviet Union was pressing ahead with its new missile program so rapidly that test firings of an improved SS-9 or an entirely new and larger missile were expected by this summer.

On the basis of new intelligence information, the C.I.A. was said today to have concluded that the larger holes could be explained not by a Soviet move to a larger missile but by an engineering step intended to protect the existing Soviet missile force.

According to the intelligence agency's analysis, the larger holes can be explained as an effort to "harden the silos, by emplacement of a concrete shell around them, to protect the weapons against the blast effects of a nuclear explosion. The larger hole is required to accommodate the concrete liners, according to the C.I.A. analysis.

Old Missile Fields Utilized

It was said that the first evidence that the Soviet Union might be "hardening" its missile sites rather than developing a new missile system appeared in the fact that the new holes were detected primarily in existing SS-11 missile fields.

If the Soviet Union was deploying a new weapon, it presumably would not situate the new missile emplacements among older missiles, according to the C.I.A. view.

The conclusive piece of evidence was said to have been received early last week when reconnaissance satellite pictures were received showing silo liners arriving at the missile holes. The photographs were said to have indicated that the liners at neither the SS-11 nor the SS-9 sites were big enough to accommodate larger

sites did not seem intended for weapons of altered design.

The United States started hardening its Minuteman silos some years ago as it saw the Soviet Union expanding its ICBM forces, and then began "superhardening" them as the Soviet Union began deploying the SS-9 missile.

Some arms control specialists now maintain that the Soviet Union now is turning to hardening its SS-11 and SS-9 missiles as it sees the United States deploying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, or multiple warheads, known as MIRV's, which potentially could acquire the accuracy to strike precisely at Soviet missile sites.

This was a point made today before the Senate Appropriations Committee by Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., a former official of the C.I.A. and the Disarmament and Arms Control Agency, now chairman of the Strategic Weapons Committee of the Federation of American Scientists.

A hardening of the Soviet missile sites, he observed "would not contribute to a first-strike capability and, if anything, would be an indication that a first strike was not a critical Soviet policy objective."

If it now turns out that the Soviet Union is only hardening the SS-9 and SS-11 missile silos, he said, "We must ask ourselves how many times we are going to allow the 'weaponeers' to come before the Congress and the people shouting 'missile gap,' when in reality they are only creating another 'credibility gap.'"

CIA on CIA

"I am the head of the silent service and cannot advertise my wares." — Allen Dulles, 1957.

The American Society of Newspaper Editors was flattered that theirs was the forum chosen by Mr. Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence and concurrently director of the Central Intelligence Agency, for his first public speech in 10 years. "The quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States in 1971," he told the editors in a self-serving assessment, "is better than it has ever been before." It would have been interesting had Mr. Helms attempted a correlation between value and volume. Benjamin Welles in *The New York Times Sunday Magazine* (April 18, 1971) breaks down the daily mountain of intelligence information as "50 percent from overt sources such as periodicals, 35 percent from electronics [satellites and radio], and the remaining 15 percent from agents." How important is the 15 percent?

Mr. Helms noted the "growing criticism" of CIA, but he avoided any discussion of its cause. The "intelligence" function of the agency is not what has provoked all the controversy. Criticism has centered not on "spying," but on CIA's political action abroad — the suborning of political leaders, labor union officials, scholars, students, journalists and anyone else who can be bought. CIA has been criticized for straying from information gathering onto the path of manipulation of foundations and such organizations as the National Student Association or Radio Free Europe or the AFL-CIO. Through liaison with foreign police and security services, the CIA tries to keep track of foreign "subversives," frequently defined as those who want to depose the government in power. Each report it manages to secure from its clandestine sources has a price in terms of closer alliance with one reactionary regime after another — as in Greece and numerous countries in Asia and Latin America. The complicity is no secret to the host government, or to the Communists, only to the American taxpayer.

Mr. Helms' point that "CIA is not and cannot be its own master" is the most difficult to accept, even from the honorable man that Mr. Helms unquestionably is. To be sure, there is a review system, but it is more shadow than substance. The President's foreign intelligence advisory board, which is supposed to analyze a \$4 billion Intelligence program, is characterized by inattention, fatigue and a charming lack of expertise. There is only the most cursory inspection and oversight of CIA by "elements of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees," which from time to time raise their hands in benediction over any Intelligence presentation. The average congressional "watchdog" is long in the tooth, and prefers not to receive in detail highly classified material, confessing in advance lack of training in sound security

practices. Such small ad hoc bodies cannot possibly cope with the multi-agencies, their billions of dollars, and their hundreds of thousands of people; in sum, the "Intelligence community." The core question, as with the FBI, is an old one: who guards the guardians?

STATINTL

CIA Chief Reveals Soviet Spy Help in Cuba Missile Crisis

BY CHALMERS M. ROBERTS

Exclusive to The Times from the Washington Post

WASHINGTON—In his first public speech as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms said Wednesday that "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians" helped the United States identify Soviet weapons in Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis.

He mentioned no names, but the reference appeared clearly to be to Col. Cleg Penkovsky, the Soviet intelligence officer who brought much information out during visits to London in the 16 months before the missile crisis. Penkovsky was arrested that October and was subsequently executed for treason.

"The Penkovsky Papers," published as a book in 1965, were widely believed to be based on CIA interrogations, and the claim was made in the introduction that Penkovsky's information was invaluable during the crisis in evaluating the threat from Russian missiles.

However, not until Helms' speech Wednesday at a luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors had an American official in a position to know come so close to crediting Penkovsky openly.

Helms detailed the kind of work the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies did at the time, trying to separate fact from fiction about what Russian Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev was doing in Cuba.

Helms then included this paragraph: "Our intelligence files in Washington, however—thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped us—included a wealth of information on Soviet missile systems. We had descriptions or photographs of the missiles, their transporters and other associated equipment, and characteristic sites in the Soviet Union."

This enabled specialists, with the help of pictures taken over Cuba, Helms said, to "tell President Kennedy the exact scope of the threat" in determining whether the Soviet missiles were capable of striking at the United States if Mr. Kennedy gave the Russians an ultimatum for their removal.

With that secret data, Helms said, "we were able to inform the President precisely how long it would take (the Russians) to make the missile sites in Cuba operational."

Helms said knowledge of Russian weaponry developed by the CIA, plus its understanding "of Soviet knowledge of our progress," helps the government decide how much money to invest in new weapons.

"If good intelligence can narrow down the choices," he said, "it can save the

U.S. taxpayers many times its cost."

Much of Helms' speech was a defense of the CIA against charges that it is an "invisible government." He denied reports that the CIA is "somehow involved in the world drug traffic." Without mentioning recent charges against the FBI, Helms said, "We do not target on American citizens."

The closest Helms came to discussing the CIA's role in current policy issues was his reference to the present strategic arms limitation talks. He said it would be "unthinkable" to conclude a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union "without the means for monitoring compliance."

He did not discuss the CIA's role in the observation satellite program or in electronic eavesdropping used for that purpose only. He did say that the United States can safely undertake such an agreement "only if it has adequate intelligence assets to assure itself that the Soviets are living up to their part."

Helms also said that the CIA wants to talk to private citizens who may have acquired useful information abroad, but that if such a person "does not want to talk to us, we go away quietly."

Referring to student protests against the CIA, Helms said, "If some student groups object to our recruiting on campus, we fall back to the nearest federal office building."

Helms said it was "for Congress to decide" how the CIA is to be supervised but that "elements" of the Senate and House Appropriations and Armed Services committees "are told more about our operations than is known to most of the personnel in our highly compartmentalized agency."

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Excerpts From Speech by Helms to Society

of Newspaper Editors

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 14—

Following are excerpts from an address by Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors:

I welcome this opportunity to speak to you today about the place of an intelligence service in a democratic government.

In doing so, I recognize that there is a paradox which I hope can be dispelled:

On the one hand, I can assure you that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States Government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before.

On the other hand, at a time when it seems to me to be self-evident that our Government must be kept fully informed on foreign developments, there is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency.

I am referring to the assertions that the Central Intelligence Agency is an "invisible government," a law unto itself, engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls.

This is an outgrowth, I suppose, of an inherent American distaste for the peacetime gathering of intelligence. Our mission, in the eyes of many thoughtful Americans, may appear to be in conflict with some of the traditions and ideals of our free society.

May I emphasize at this point that the statute [National Security Act of 1947] specifically forbids the Central Intelligence Agency to have any police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers, or any domestic security functions. I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens.

In matters directly affecting the security of the United States, the President and his National Security Council want what we call "national" intelligence—evaluations which reflect the con-

cerns of all of the intelligence components of the United States Government. The production and dissemination of this national intelligence is the responsibility and the primary function of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we can not and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts—the agreed facts—and the whole known range of facts—relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the estimate function—the projection of likely developments from the facts—but not to advocacy.

Ironically, our efforts to obtain foreign intelligence in this country have generated some of the more virulent criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is a fact that we have, as I said, no domestic security role, but if there is a chance that a private American citizen traveling abroad has acquired foreign information that can be useful to the American policy-maker, we are certainly going to try to interview him.

If there is a competent young graduate student who is interested in working for the United States Government, we may well try to hire him.

The trouble is that to those who insist on seeing us as a pernicious and pervasive secret government, our words "interview" and "hire" translate into suborn, subvert and seduce, or something worse.

We use no compulsion. If a possible source of information does not want to talk to us, we go away quietly. If some student groups object to our recruiting on campus, we fall back to the nearest Federal office building.

Similarly, we welcome the opportunity to place research contracts with the universities, but again, these are strictly voluntary.

And so I come to the fundamental question of reconciling the security needs of an intelligence service with the basic principles of our democratic society. At the root of the problem is secrecy, because it is axiomatic that an intelligence service—whatever type of government it serves—must wrap itself in as much se-

crecy as possible in order to operate effectively.

If we disclose how much we know, the opposition is handed on a platter highly damaging indications of how and where we obtained the information, in what way his security is vulnerable, and who may have helped us. He can seal off the breach in his defenses, roll up the agents, and shut off the flow of information.

I cannot give you an easy answer to the objections raised by those who consider intelligence work incompatible with democratic principles. The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service. I can assure you that we are, but I am precluded from demonstrating it to the public.

I can assure you that what I have asked you to take on faith, the elected officials of the United States Government watch over extensively, intensively and continuously.

Starting with the executive branch, the Central Intelligence Agency operates under the constant supervision and direction of the National Security Council. No significant foreign program of any kind is undertaken without the prior approval of an N.S.C. subcommittee which includes representatives of the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

In addition, we report periodically and in detail on the whole range of foreign intelligence activities to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a group of men who have distinguished themselves in Government, industry, education and the professions.

Our budget is gone over line for line by the Office of Management and Budget and by the appropriate committees of the Congress as well.

There are elements of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees in both the Senate and the House which—like the President's board—are told more about our activities and our operations than is known to most of the personnel in our highly compartmented agency. But how, in the end, we are to be supervised is for Congress to decide.

The same objectivity which makes us useful to our Government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. We may chafe under the criticism we do not answer, but we understand as well as anyone the difficulties and the contradictions of conducting foreign intelligence operations on behalf of a free society.

We are, after all, a part of this democracy, and we believe in it. We would not want to see our work distort its values and its principles. We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa.

We believe, and I say this solemnly, that our work is necessary to permit this country to grow on in a fearsome world and to find its way into a better and more peaceful one.

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Chief Counsel Behind-the-Scenes Power on House

WASHINGTON, March 27 (UPI)--The House Armed Services Committee has a new chairman, two new "dove" members, and one or two new rules of procedure. But there is not likely to be anything new in its approach to military requirements.

The committee's chief counsel, John Russell Blandford, is one big reason. He is the undeviating force behind what the committee's fans call its "steady reliability," and what its critics term "single-minded cussedness."

When one of the younger members of the panel learned that the new chairman, F. Edward Hebert, Democrat, of Louisiana, intended to retain Mr. Blandford as head of the committee's 14-man professional staff, he sighed and recalled the adage that "the more things change, the more they remain the same."

Virtually unknown to the general public, and answerable only to the committee chairman, the 53-year-old Mr. Blandford draws power from all three components of the so-called military-industrial complex: the military services, the defense industry and Congress.

He wields the power to nurture some proposals, defend others, ride down opposition to pet programs, and even initiate a few himself.

Power Recognized

He does not deprecate his role. One committee member who does not count himself among Mr. Blandford's foes, recently referred to the counsel in a private conversation as a "potentate."

Another Congressman explained: "He sits on the committee like a visiting Senator, telling us just as much or as little as he wants us to know, arguing with us, pounding the table when we disagree with him, or explaining to us with a straight face that there was

really no cost overrun on the C-5A."

The C-5A was the highly publicized military cargo plane built by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation at a cost of approximately \$2.5-billion more than estimated.

Mr. Blandford, a Republican, operates on a strictly nonpartisan basis. He was hired by a Republican party chairman, former Representative George W. Andrews of New York, during the 80th Congress in 1947. But he was promoted to chief counsel by one democrat--former chairman Carl Vinson of Georgia--and retained by two other Democrats--the late L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina and now Mr. Hebert.

A Phi Beta Kappa, Mr. Blandford graduated cum laude from Hobart College before World War II, and earned a law degree from Yale University after the war. He reached the rank of major during wartime service in the Marine Corps.

With his stocky build and close-cropped hair, Mr. Blandford looks like a retired Marine sergeant. Actually, he is a

major general in the Marine Corps Reserves--a rank that is another source of irritation to some of his foes on the committee.

"Just how many men do you think have risen from major to major general in the Marine Reserves?" one of them asked recently. "Just one, that's how many," Russ Blandford. He made it because they were afraid not to promote him every time he asked for it."

Committee dissidents have criticized its established procedure which has virtually barred amendments to military bills and which has resulted in authorizations frequently larger--but almost never smaller--than the Pentagon asked.

The chief counsel is not well liked, even by the members who are counted as his allies. They describe him as "abrasive," and "short-fused," but they excuse his manner because of the pressures of his job.

There are 41 members of the committee, all of them occasionally requiring the services of the professional staff. Mr. Blandford is required to have at his fingertips an almost incomparable amount of data on defense operations, weapons systems, costs, analyses, manpower needs and intelligence agencies of the nearly \$50-billion-a-year Defense Department.

Mr. Blandford earns \$36,000 a year, which is as much as the committee is allowed by law to pay him. The members earn \$12,500.

There is some feeling that he may be on the way out despite Mr. Hebert's decision to retain him. Those who believe this cite the fact that Mr. Blandford is not only eligible for two pensions, from the Marine Corps and from Congress, but that he would also undoubtedly be able to get a good job in the defense industry.

Lending weight to this view is the fact that the No. 2 man on the committee staff, Frank M. Slatinshek, is very close to Mr. Hebert through his work on the manpower and draft subcommittees during recent years.

Moreover, Mr. Blandford was seriously ill last year with a bout of kidney stones, and was away from the committee for several months. He reports that he is now fully recovered, but other committee sources said he is apparently not quite up to his previous driving strength.

Nevertheless, some committee sources say that he'll stay on

Military Panel

John R. Blandford

Symington Raps Policy of Secrecy on Missiles

Protests He Was Put Under Wraps About Russ Developments but Colleague Wasn't

BY JOHN H. AVERILL

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON - Sen.

Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) complained Wednesday that he was put under secrecy wraps by the Administration about Soviet missile developments only to learn that a colleague discussed them openly on a television program.

Although Symington mentioned no names, he appeared to suggest that the colleague, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), may have broken security rules.

Jackson, who was not on the Senate floor when Symington spoke, later denied that he breached security in having said the Russians are in the process of deploying a new generation of missiles. Jackson, appearing on the Sunday television program Face the Nation, called the developments ominous indeed.

Admits Mistake

"Nothing that I said violated any rule of security," Jackson said. He added, however, that he made a mistake in speaking Sunday of "huge new missiles."

"There was a misunderstanding," Jackson said. "These are sites we are talking about. They are building sites that are as large or larger than the SS-9," the largest Soviet missile thus far deployed. "These sites appear to be a follow-on to the SS-9," Jackson continued. "It takes about 18 months to build a site and we don't know what they mean except their dimensions are larger than those of sites for the SS-9."

Symington said he subsequently refused to discuss publicly what he had been told about Soviet missiles because of "the secrecy emphasis of the classified briefing." But he said Monday morning he saw a front page story with the headline, Mighty Soviet Missile Report."

Symington inserted a copy of the story, which was based on Jackson's Sunday television interview, in the Congressional Record. The first paragraph of the story said, "The Soviet Union is deploying huge advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles qualitatively mightier than its known weapons, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) said yesterday."

Jackson said he was not present at Helms' March 4 briefing of the Armed Services Committee, of which he also is a member. He declined to say where he got the information.

STATINTL

Reads Statement

Symington complained about Administration secrecy over Soviet missile developments in a three-page statement which he read to the Senate. It was the second time in little more than a week that Symington has accused the Administration of excessive secrecy.

On March 1, he said White House adviser Henry A. Kissinger was the real formulator of Administration foreign policy, rather than Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Symington, at that time, said Kissinger refused to testify before Congress and that Rogers was a laughing stock and "secretary of state in title only." President Nixon later denounced those remarks as a "cheap shot."

Symington said Wednesday that the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which he is a member, was briefed about Soviet missile plans "in a session secret to the point where no record was kept." The March 4 briefing was conducted by Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Missile Details

"This briefing," Symington continued, "included for the first time purported details of new Soviet missiles which was not known about when the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was briefed the previous week on the same subject by the same people." The joint committee, of which Symington also is a member, was briefed by Helms, Vol. 24,

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Symington Suggests Jackson Disclosed Classified Material

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 10.

Senator Stuart Symington suggested today that Senator Henry M. Jackson had used classified information in stating on a nationwide television program that the Soviet Union was deploying an advanced intercontinental ballistic missile.

The suggestion was immediately denied by Senator Jackson who told reporters that "nothing I said violated any rules of security." In a television appearance last Sunday, the Washington Democrat said "the Russians are now in the

process of deploying a new generation, and advanced generation of offensive systems."

In a brief Senate speech, Senator Symington did not directly accuse Senator Jackson, a colleague on both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, of having violated security.

But he contended that the information on new Soviet missile developments had been presented on a highly classified basis to the Armed Services Committee on March 4 by the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms.

Later, after talking with Sen-

ator Jackson, Senator Symington said his speech was "not intended as criticism of Senator Jackson" over the intelligence information because the Administration "gave it to him to put out."

In complaining that "inaccurate intelligence reports" had been used in the past to justify unneeded weapons, Senator Symington, clearly alluding to the statements, made by Senator Jackson on the Columbia Broadcasting System program "Face the Nation," said:

"Last week, in a session secret to the point where no record was kept, the Senate Armed Services Committee was briefed about Soviet missile plans. This briefing included for the first time purported details of new Soviet missiles which was not known about when the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was briefed the previous week on the same subject by the same people."

Mr. Helms appeared before the Atomic Energy Committee on Feb. 24 and the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 4 in his annual briefing of the committees on Soviet military posture.

Senator Jackson said he had not attended the March 4 briefing but declined to say where he had obtained his information about the Soviet missile developments except to say, "I try to keep currently informed on what is going on." He said he had decided to make public use of the information on the basis of his own judgment, based on years of experience, that it was not classified.

The Symington speech was the latest round in a controversy that has developed between the Administration and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--of which the Senator is a member--over the use of classified information.

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WASHINGTON STAR

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Senator Hints Jackson Leaked Secret

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

Sen. Stuart Symington has implied that classified information was divulged by Sen. Henry M. Jackson when Jackson said this week that the Soviet Union is preparing new offensive missiles bigger than any in the past.

The Nixon administration has given no sign of being upset about the "leak," but Symington is.

He suggested yesterday that administration officials planned the leak.

Jackson, a Washington Democrat, insists that "nothing I said violates any rules of secrecy." He would not say where he got his information. He explained simply, "I try to keep myself informed."

Other sources said that the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard C. Helms, briefed members of the Armed Services Committee about the detected missile sites at a secret session last Thursday.

Jackson was not present at that session, but since he is a senior and influential member of the committee, and one who maintains a close relationship with Helms, the information could have been made available to him.

Jackson appeared on CBS' "Face the Nation" on Sunday and told a national audience the Russians are deploying a new generation of missiles larger than their huge SS-9s.

The Pentagon quickly confirmed that some new construction of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile sites has been detected.

And United Press International reported that President Nixon

mentioned the development the same day when he initiated a telephone interview with White House Correspondent Helen Thomas.

On Tuesday, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird told Congress publicly that the Soviets had slowed the pace of their missile building, but he speculated that an explanation "may be that the Soviets are preparing to deploy new ICBM systems."

Symington, a Missouri Democrat, raised the leak issue yesterday in a brief speech on the Senate floor. Referring to the Helms briefing, he said that Soviet missile plans were discussed with the Armed Services Committee "last week in a session secret to the point that no record was kept."

He said that briefing "included for the first time purported details of new Soviet missiles which was not known about when the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was briefed the previous week on the same subject by the same people."

Symington said he was up about two points.

First, he said, he doesn't accept the conclusion that there's a new threat involved. He implied that any leak might have

been designed to buttress arguments for the pending defense budget.

"One cannot fail to remember," Symington said yesterday, "several comparable spring announcements of previous years — in the early 1950s those thousands of new long-range bombers, the Soviets were going to build, but never built; in the late 1950s those hundreds upon hundreds of long-range missiles the Soviets were going to build but never built."

Secondly, he says he thinks the administration "is playing the game they accuse us of playing." He is chairman of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee investigating U.S. foreign policy commitments. That panel — which often has clashed with the administration — has been accused in the past of leaking classified information supplied by the administration. On those past occasions, however, the issue generally has involved information not regarded as favorable to administration views.

Last month, an administration official, John Lehman Jr. of Henry Kissinger's White House staff, was quoted as telling a group of Senate staffers that Sy-

mington's subcommittee staff had leaked information to the press after secret hearings.

The staff members denied it. No specific leaks were enumerated by Lehman, who refused to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee to document his charge.

Symington is still upset about Lehman's charge. He told a television reporter yesterday, "That so-and-so downtown accusing us of leaking stuff. They're the leaders."

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Washington Whispers[®]

[Items appearing on this page are being talked about in Washington or other news centers]

A "Disappointment" for Laird . . . Who Will Watch CIA? . . . Why Ted Kennedy Irks Some Colleagues

President Nixon's threats in late December to call the new Congress into session on January 3 ran into opposition from the White House staff when somebody pointed out that the law requires the President to submit his budget message to Congress within 15 days of its formal opening—an almost impossible schedule for the Administration to meet.

* * *

Secretary of Defense Laird, who took office determined to remove some decision-making power from Pentagon civilians and turn it over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is less inclined to push ahead with that idea at this point. Mr. Laird is described as "disappointed" by some recent actions of his military commanders.

* * *

Veteran Congressmen are calling this the "hard-luck prize of the year": After serving for years as the No. 2 Democrat under the late Chairman L. Mendel Rivers on the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Philip Philbin was defeated by Massachusetts voters last November. As a result, the job automatically goes to the No. 3 man on the Committee, Representative F. Edward Hébert of Louisiana, in the next Congress.

* * *

As chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Representative Hébert will have the power to name the chairman of a little-known but significant sub-committee—a "watchdog" group that keeps an eye on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Hébert may decide to take the job himself.

* * *

From a White House insider: "The President now has two counselors, both regarded as 'liberals'—Robert H. Finch and Donald Rumsfeld. But don't forget there are other powerful and more 'conservative' men around him that Mr. Nixon listens to very carefully, such people as Attorney General John Mitchell and Vice President Spiro Agnew, among others."

* * *